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Zusammenfassung 
Bisherige neuropsychologische Studien trennen oft zwischen kognitiven 
und emotionalen Prozessen und untersuchen diese unabhängig voneinander. 
Dieses führt zu einem unvollständigen Verständnis, da Kognition und Emotion 
hochgradig interagieren. In der vorliegenden Dissertation werden die 
Einwirkungen von Emotionen auf kognitive Prozesse am Beispiel von 
Gedächtnisspeicherung und Verhaltensüberwachung untersucht. Dabei kommen 
als Hauptuntersuchungsmethode ereigniskorrelierte Hirnpotentiale (EKPs) zum 
Einsatz. 
Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden zwei Experimente vorgestellt, in denen 
Versuchspersonen Wortlisten lernen, welche gleichzeitig mit neutralen 
Hintergrundbildern präsentiert wurden. Ein Wort in jeder Liste unterscheidet 
sich von den anderen, indem entweder die Wortfarbe verändert oder das 
Hintergrundbild hoch emotional ist. Die erste Studie dient als Pilotstudie. Die 
Verhaltensdaten zeigen eine bessere Wiedergabeleistung für Wörter mit 
positivem, nicht jedoch mit negativem Bildhintergrund. Anhand der EKPs kann 
gezeigt werden, dass das Geschlecht der Versuchsperson eine wichtige 
Einflussgröße ist. Deshalb untersuchen sämtliche nachfolgenden Studien dieser 
Dissertation ausschließlich Frauen. Wenn möglich, basiert auch die Auswahl der 
emotionalen Stimuli auf von Frauen durchgeführte Stimulusevaluation. 
Abgeleitet aus den Erkenntnissen des ersten Experiments enthält die 
zweite Studie eine verbesserte Unterscheidung der Stimuli auf der Grundlage 
der Dimensionen Ruhe/Aufregung (Arousal) und angenehm/unangenehm 
(Valence). Unter verbesserten experimentellen Bedingungen ist die 
Gedächtnisleistung der Versuchspersonen erhöht für farbig markierte Wörter, 
nicht jedoch für Bilder mit emotionalem Hintergrund. In den EKPs zeigt sich 
eine verstärkt positive Komponente für erinnerte im Vergleich zu nicht 
erinnerten Wörtern. Dieses ist nicht der Fall, wenn die Wörter vor emotionalem 
Hintergrund präsentiert wurden. Es wird gezeigt, dass emotionale 
Einflussgrößen elementar wichtig sind, wenn die spätere Gedächtnisleistung 
vorhergesagt werden soll. Hoch emotionale, unangenehme Einflüsse könnten 
das kognitive System zur Unterbrechung von „Rehearsal “-Prozessen 
(Aufrechterhaltung von Gedächtnisinformationen durch „inneres Sprechen“) 
veranlassen. Emotionale Zusatzinformationen könnten andererseits jedoch auch 
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die Speicherung in langlebigeren Gedächtniskomponenten fördern. Der Einfluss 
von hoch emotionalen Reizen auf Aufmerksamkeitsprozesse wird ebenfalls 
diskutiert. 
Im zweiten Teil der Dissertation werden vier Experimente vorgestellt, in 
denen Versuchspersonen auf verschiedene Weise in emotionale Zustände 
versetzt werden, während sie eine Aufgabe durchführen, die Überwachung des 
gezeigten Verhaltens erfordert. 
Hauptsächlich werden emotionale Beeinflussung zweier EKP-
Komponenten untersucht: Die N2 ist ersichtlich, bevor die Versuchsperson eine 
aufgabengerechte Reaktion gezeigt hat. Diese Komponente könnte unter 
anderem das Vorhandensein von kognitiven Konflikten, verursacht durch 
gleichzeitig aktive, gegensätzliche Reaktionsalternativen widerspiegeln. Die 
ERN (Fehlerinduzierte Negativität) ist nach fehlerhaften Reaktionen in den 
EKPs ersichtlich. Die genauen Prozesse, welche der ERN zugrunde liegen, 
werden intensiv in der Wissenschaft diskutiert. Diese Dissertation bietet einen 
Überblick über die einflussreichsten Theorien der ERN und der N2. Eine dieser 
Theorien zeigt sich als besonders geeignet, um emotionale Einflüsse, vor allem 
auf die ERN, vorherzusagen. 
Im ersten Experiment betrachten die Versuchspersonen kurzzeitig 
Gesichter mit glücklichem, ängstlichem oder neutralem Gesichtsausdruck. 
Unmittelbar nach jedem Bild wird eine Reaktionszeitaufgabe durchgeführt. 
Sowohl die Verhaltensdaten als auch die EKP-Daten zeigen, dass das 
experimentelle Design geeignet ist, um altbekannte Effekte zu replizieren. Ein 
emotionaler Einfluss kann jedoch weder auf der Verhaltens- noch auf der 
physiologischen Ebene gezeigt werden. Dieses könnte daran liegen, dass die 
emotionalen Gesichter zu schwach waren, um emotionale Veränderungen der 
kognitiven Verarbeitung hervorzurufen. 
Die zweite Studie verwendet anstelle von Gesichtern sehr angenehme, 
neutrale und sehr unangenehme Szenendarstellungen, welche einer 
wissenschaftlichen Bilderserie entnommen sind. In den EKPs kann gezeigt 
werden, dass unangenehme Bilder die N2-Komponente unverändert lassen, 
während die ERN verstärkt zum Vorschein kommt. Es wird geschlussfolgert, 
dass negative, nicht jedoch positive Emotionen experimentell hervorgerufen 
werden konnten. 
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Das dritte Experiment beschäftigt sich deshalb mit Veränderungen durch 
positiven Affekt. Dieser wird durch mechanisches Ansprechen der beim Lachen 
beteiligten Muskulatur erzeugt. In den EKPs ist ersichtlich, dass die ERN 
diesmal nicht stärker, sonder schwächer ausgeprägt sind. Die N2 ist wieder 
unverändert. 
Eine vierte Studie zeigt anhand eines Fragebogens, dass negative, nicht 
jedoch positive Emotionen durch positive und negative Verhaltensrückmeldung 
erzeugt werden können. In den EKPs zeigt sich ein sehr differenziertes Bild. 
Sowohl die N2 als auch die ERN kommen stärker zum Vorschein. Es wird 
vorgeschlagen, dass die ERN auf leichte emotionale Veränderung anspricht, 
während zur Beeinflussung der N2 stärkere emotionale Reaktionen notwendig 
sind. 
Die Ergebnisse werden in neue Modelle der Verhaltensüberwachung 
integriert, was zur Erweiterung dieser Modelle dient. Es wird geschlussfolgert, 
dass Emotionen einen maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die Ausführung von geistigen 
Leistungen haben, welche bislang vorwiegend unter dem rein kognitiven Aspekt 
betrachtet wurden. 
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Abstract 
Two cognitive processes, namely memory encoding and performance 
monitoring, are selected to examine how emotional processes interact with 
cognition. The main examination tool is event-related brain potentials (ERPs). 
The first section presents two experiments which require subjects to recall 
items from lists consisting of 12 words, which were presented in front of 
emotional and non-emotional pictures. One word per list is made distinct either 
by font color or by a highly arousing background picture. The first experiment 
served as a pilot study, the second experiment implements major improvements 
suggested by the pilot study. Recall performance was enhanced for color but not 
for emotional isolates. Event-related brain potentials (ERP) showed a more 
positive component for recalled non-isolated words and color-isolated words, 
compared to the respective non-remembered words, but not for words isolated 
by arousing background. Those findings indicate that it is crucial to take 
emotional mediator variables into account, when predicting later recall. Highly 
arousing environments might force the cognitive system to interrupt rehearsal 
processes in working memory, which might benefit transfer into other, more 
stable memory systems. The impact of attention-capturing properties of arousing 
background stimuli is also discussed. 
The second section consists of four experiments. Various methods are 
used to bring subjects into pleasant or unpleasant emotional states while they 
perform a task that requires continuous monitoring of the ongoing behavior. 
Event-related potentials indicate that typical markers of performance 
monitoring, namely the Error related negativity (ERN), are enhanced when 
subjects perform under negative emotional condition, whereas the ERN is 
decreased when subjects perform under positive emotional conditions. Results 
also demonstrate emotional changes in other components engaged in error 
monitoring. The results are integrated in current models of performance 
monitoring by extending these by an affective dimension. 
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1. General Introduction 
1.1. Structure of the present thesis 
The dissertation presented here examines how emotions influence 
cognitive processes. Emotion itself is a topic which fills rows of shelves in 
libraries. Thus, it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to give a complete 
account how emotions might interact with all cognitive functions. Instead, I 
restrict myself to neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and I will choose 
memory and performance monitoring out of the broad variety of cognitive 
functions. 
The thesis starts with a more general part, introducing basic concepts, 
classification methods and neuropsychological aspects of emotions, methods to 
induce emotions. A short overview how cognition interact with emotions is 
given at the end of the general introduction. 
The experimental section consists of two parts. Two experiments examine 
emotional modulation of memory encoding. Four experiments bring further 
insight how emotions interact with brain functions concerned about monitoring 
ongoing behavior. Each experimental part starts with a separate introduction, 
where current literature is reviewed and hypotheses are derived. A specific 
discussion is provided for each experimental part. The thesis ends with a general 
discussion. 
1.2. Defining emotions 
1.2.1.1. Introductory remarks 
Every person has an idea what is meant when talking about emotions, but 
it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to find a definition that will be accepted 
by all who experience and investigate emotions. 
Because every person experiences emotions, asking for folk concepts 
might be an appropriate starting point. Emotions are something that is felt, 
something that is related to subjective experience, something that can be 
classified as either positive or negative. The word emotion is a composite 
formed from the Latin words. ex/ (out, outward) and motio (movement action, 
gesture). However, to understand what an emotion is, it is probably more fruitful 
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to look how the word “emotion” is used in language. Wierzbicka (1999) points 
out that the most appropriate German word for emotions might be “Gefühle”, 
which is derived from “fühlen” (feeling) and puts emotions at the same level as 
feeling. The German language allows to use the word “Gefühl” to describe 
bodily states like “Hungergefühl” (feeling of hunger), but also to describe 
mental states without direct link to primary bodily needs like “Schamgefühl” 
(feeling of shame). In contrast, the French word “sentiment”, does distinguish 
between bodily and mental states. One can speak of a “sentiment de honte” 
(feeling of shame), but not of a “sentiment de faim” (feeling of hunger) 
(Wierzbicka, 1999).  
The main shortcoming of folk concepts of emotions is that they are 
usually pretty vague. In addition, there is good evidence that the concepts people 
have of emotions differ radically across cultures (Wierzbicka, 1999). What 
scientist can learn from folk concepts of emotion is that emotion is not one 
thing; it might contain references to bodily states and to mental states.  
A scientific concept has to define what mental stages have to have in 
common to be regarded as emotion and, after that, how distinctions between 
emotions can be made. Everyday experience taught us that there are many 
different mental states that can be felt. Sometimes we are hungry, thirsty, happy, 
sad or angry. Sometimes we feel pride, shame. Sometimes when we are listening 
to music we can feel goose pimples all over the body. Sometimes we are in pain. 
Although all examples are mental states that can be felt, there are still large 
differences between them. A starting point to distinguish between those states is 
to group them - but along which criteria? The aforementioned mental states 
might be grouped into pleasant and unpleasant. Being hungry is unpleasant, 
being angry or ashamed or feeling pain is unpleasant as well. Alternatively, 
some of those mental states can be linked to primary bodily needs, feeling 
hungry or thirsty induces us to get some food. Feeling proud or ashamed does 
obviously not belong to this group. Emotions might also be grouped according 
to their timing. Some bodily states can last for long times, hunger can be felt 
until we get food. Others, like goose pimples while hearing our favorite song, 
might last for only a few seconds. These examples indicate that states that can 
be felt are highly diverse. They are elicited by different events, have different 
timing and they serve different functions. However, is the subjective experience 
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that a mental state can be felt enough to regard a mental state as an emotion? Is 
an emotion the same as a feeling? What do have all emotions in common? What 
distinguishes emotions from other mental states? Those questions have to be 
clarified before the realm of emotions can be examined scientifically. 
The present thesis does not attempt to retrace scientific thinking on 
emotions from the first reasoning about emotions to modern emotion theories. 
The interested reader might find philosophical and historical reflections 
elsewhere. I restrict myself to psychological, especially neuropsychological 
perspectives and start at the point where Psychology differentiated from 
Philosophy. 
Probably the first theory of emotions which included psychological as 
well as physiological aspects was largely independently proposed by William 
James and Carl Lange at the end of the 20th century (James, 1890; Lange, 
1887). According to the "James-Lange-theory of emotions", the autonomic 
nervous system reacts to environmental stimulation with physiological events 
such as changes in heart rate, muscular tension, perspiration etc. We experience 
those changes in bodily states and deduce our emotions from these. William 
James summarized it in stating: "My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling 
of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion". (James, 1890) Thus, we feel 
afraid because we recognized that our hands are shaking, or we feel sorry 
because we observe that we cry.  
The James-Lange theory was chosen as a starting point that demonstrates 
aspects of emotion research that are still up-to date: It links environmental 
events with bodily states and with changes in subjective feelings. The theory 
assumes that there are changes on multiple levels of the organism, which include 
reactions seen at effectors as well as directly in the nervous system. The fact that 
a clear distinction between feeling and emotion is not included in the theory had 
strong impact on later research, which attempted to draw a clear line between 
both (LeDoux, 1997; Scherer, 2000, 2005). The next section tries to clarify those 
aspects and defines how emotion is understood in the thesis presented here. 
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1.2.2. The purpose of emotions 
This section highlights the question “What have all emotions in 
common”? Since I emphasize the biological view, this cannot be separated from 
the question “Why do we have emotions”. There are many attempts to explain 
why organisms have emotions. Instead of summarizing them all and adding an 
additional view, I restrict myself to some statements given by emotion 
researchers that they think describe elementary parts of an emotion. Section 
1.2.3 collects the essence of those statements and goes into further detail. 
 
? “Emotions evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life 
tasks” (Ekman, 1994, p. 15). 
 
? “Emotion guides action and organizes behavior towards salient 
goals”(Davidson & Irwin, 1999, p. 11). 
 
? „The affect system has evolved to discriminate hostile from hospitable events 
and to decide quickly whether approach or withdrawal is adaptive“ 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999, p. 134). 
 
? “They (emotions) developed from primitive actions that facilitated the 
survival of species and individuals, and can be broadly characterized in 
humans as motivationally tuned states of readiness” (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1998, p. 397). 
 
? “... Emotions are embodied and manifest in uniquely recognizable, and 
stereotyped, behavioral patterns of facial expression, comportment, and 
autonomic arousal” (Dolan, 2002, p. 1191). 
 
? “There must be unique physiological patterns for each emotion, and these 
CNS patterns should be specific to theses emotions and not found in other 
mental activity (Ekman, 1994, p. 18)” 
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? “Emotions allow goal-oriented, that is, flexible behavior instigation by 
relevant events, instead of mere rigid fixed action patterns” (Frijda, 2000, p. 
199). 
 
? “The first function proposed for emotions is the elicitation of autonomic 
responses (e.g. a change in heart rate) and endocrine responses (e.g. the 
release of adrenaline)” (Rolls, 1999, p. 67). 
 
? “A (...) function of emotion is that it is motivating” (Rolls, 1999, p. 68). 
 
? “A (...) effect of emotions is that the current mood state can affect the 
cognitive evaluation of events and memories ... and facilitate the storage of 
memories ... and trigger recall of memories stored in neocortical 
representations” (Rolls, 1999, p. 70).  
1.2.3. Common features of emotions 
As shown above, emotions contain many different aspects. Reviewing the 
literature, there appears to be a consensus about the following basic features of 
emotions. 
Appraisal: Appraisal can be understood as a complex but rapidly 
working detection mechanism to distinguish between events of immediate 
importance from things that are less significant (Ekman, 1999; Robinson, 1998; 
Scherer, 2005). Emotions result from this appraisal process (Robinson, 1998). 
As pointed out by Scherer (2005) and Ekman (1999), the appraisal process 
might work on two distinct levels: a very fast automatic level and a conscious, 
higher evaluated or extended level (Ekman, 1977, in Ekman, 1999). The latter 
one accounts for appraisal mechanisms that interact with previously learned 
information; they reflect the ontogenetic modification of emotional responses. 
The extended appraisal mechanism is deliberate and conscious and was 
intensively examined from more sociological backgrounds; it has also been 
labeled “Top-down appraisal” or “Reappraisal”(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). In this 
thesis, I focus on the automatic aspect of emotions, which serves immediate 
concerns of the organism. This appraisal mechanism can be described to be 
unconscious or preconscious (Lazarus, 1991, in Ekman, 1999). 
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Onset and duration: Sometimes, environmental events change very 
rapidly. To be adaptive, emotions must have a very fast onset; they can be 
present even before one is aware that an emotion has begun (Ekman, 1994, 
1999). The duration of this emotional response must be pretty short, because 
long-term emotions would not allow the organism to show massive response 
mobilization if the environment changes (Scherer, 2005). This may sound a bit 
counterintuitive, since every day experience shows that we can be angry or 
happy for extended periods of time. Ekman (1994, p. 16) argues that an emotion 
that endures for longer time periods (more than some seconds) is actually a 
series of briefer emotional episodes. Long-term predominance of certain 
subjective feelings might be better described as mood and will be discussed 
below (section 1.2.4). In keeping with the automatic aspect of appraisal, 
emotions are experienced as involuntary; they happen to us and are not chosen 
consciously (Ekman, 1994, p. 17). 
Universal antecedent events: When assuming that emotions result from 
an automatic appraisal mechanism, there must be some class of stimuli that 
initiate automatic appraisal and thus, always co-occur with emotions. Those 
environmental aspects have been labeled as “universal antecedent event signals” 
(Ekman, 1994, 1999) or as “event focus” (Scherer, 2005). I see such a high 
similarity between both labels that I regard the underlying concepts as identical. 
The eliciting stimulus might be the sudden appearance of a new, possible 
threatening object or organism. As pointed out by Ekman (1999), there are still 
not enough data to find specific and universal antecedents for every emotion. An 
example can be given with regard to fear, which is always associated with the 
danger of being physically harmed1. Scherer (Scherer, 2005) points out that the 
organism’s own behavior might serve as the emotion-eliciting event, emotions 
labeled as pride or shame are given as an example. Including an “event focus” in 
emotions clearly states that emotions do not happen “out of the blue”. 
Intensity: Emotions are of direct importance for the well-being of the 
organism, because they might appear in situations of threat or danger. Thus, 
                                           
1 Not only physical, but also the danger of psychical harm can induce emotions of fear, but I 
believe that this does refer to the cognitive appraisal mechanism and will therefore not be 
further discussed here. 
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responses are relatively intense, and so is the corresponding emotional 
experience (Scherer, 2005). 
Specific autonomic patterns: Folk concepts would state that emotions 
can be differentiated, because there is a different subjective feeling for each 
emotion. Since subjective feelings cannot be accessed directly, scientists refer to 
changes in physiological states. Ekman (1994, 1999) argues that there are 
distinctive autonomic patterns for anger, fear and disgust, and there is some 
evidence that there are also distinctive patterns for sadness. Because Ekman 
(1994, 1999) also states that there must be a specific pattern also in the CNS for 
each emotion, this aspect will be worked out in detail in section 1.4. 
1.2.4. Emotions versus other affective phenomena 
In the previous section, it was argued that a mental state can be regarded 
to be emotional if it includes automatic and rapid appraisal, a fast onset, 
response mobilization, short duration, universal antecedent events, and specific 
physiological states. Those points are now used to draw a line between emotions 
and other mental processes. 
Mood: The concepts of “emotion” and “mood” are highly related, both 
terms are often used interchangeably. As pointed out by Beedie and colleagues 
(Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005), there have been many attempts to draw a clear 
line between both; but distinctions were often based on the particular interest of 
the researcher. For this thesis, the distinction between emotions and mood is 
based on the properties of emotions introduced in section 1.2.3. In contrast to 
properties of emotions introduced above, mood can be defined as affective states 
that are long-lasting, diffuse and lower in intensity. Mood is neither focused on 
nor about anything in particular (Ekman, 1999; Scherer, 2005). Examples for 
moods are being cheerful, depressed or listless. 
Feelings: A very important issue is the distinction between emotions and 
feelings. Although often used interchangeably in folk concepts, philosophical 
and psychological literature, there are important differences between them. 
Many researchers prefer the term "emotion" over the term feeling, because it 
seems to be somewhat more objective (Wierzbicka, 1999). This view assumes 
that emotions have a biological foundation, which enables researchers to study 
them objectively. Others define clear lines between emotions and feelings, 
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which might be of special importance when defining core components of 
emotions. 
Approaching the problem from the biological and evolutionary 
perspective, LeDoux . (1997) stated "I think it's safe to say fear behavior 
preceded fear feelings in evolution. If so, feelings are probably the wrong thing 
to focus on when we study emotions. In this sense, animals were unconscious, 
unfeeling, and non-linguistic before they were conscious, feeling, and 
linguistic". In agreement with previous opinions (Dolan, 2002; LeDoux, 1997; 
Scherer, 2000, 2005), for the present thesis feelings are regarded as the 
subjective part of emotion. Thus, feelings are associated with emotions, feelings 
are caused by emotions, and emotions precede feelings.  
Motivation: It is a serious endeavor to draw a clear line between 
emotions and motivation. Both concepts are intensively discussed within 
psychology and neuroscience, and there are many different approaches how to 
disentangle both. I see agreement in the point that emotion and motivation are 
highly interrelated. There is also the view that both cannot be distinguished at 
all. Research articles sometimes avoid clear distinctions by using the term 
“emotion and motivation” and consider also the same or highly similar neural 
circuits to be involved (Davidson, 2004). Edmund T. Rolls argues that “brains 
are designed around reward- and punishment evaluation systems, the systems, 
the brain mechanisms of both emotion and motivation are considered together” 
(Rolls, 2000, 2004). Emotion is motivating; motivation is a result of emotion. 
Rolls considers emotions to be the state elicited by rewards or punishers, and 
this state is motivating. The motivation is to obtain the reward or to avoid the 
punisher (Rolls, 2000). Emotions serve first as relevance detectors, focusing 
people’s attention on changed events, then as motivators of action. Buck 
summarizes his view with the words “I suggest it is not possible to distinguish 
coherently between motivation and emotion because they are aspects of the 
same phenomenon, two sides of the same coin, which by definition always occur 
together. (...) Motivation is not seen but is manifested in emotion: in arousal, 
expression, experience” (Buck, 2000, p. 196). In a similar vein, Lang and 
colleagues summarized this issue with the words “Whereas the patterns of 
emotional expression are highly varied, their motivational basis can be 
conceived as a simpler, two-factor organization. That is, affects are founded on 
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brain systems that adaptively respond to either appetitive or aversive 
stimulation” (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998, p. 397). 
It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an exhaustive concept 
of both, emotion and motivation. For now, it should be sufficient to state that 
both are highly related and might rely on the same more basic mechanisms of 
the brain. 
1.3. Classifying emotions 
Classification is essential in human thinking. In language use, for 
example, people distinguish between plants, animals, tools, furniture and 
hundreds of other things. This is also true for emotions; language distinguishes 
them clearly from other events within the body. Within each category, language 
provides hierarchical organization. In the same way as a chair belongs to the 
group of furniture, fear belongs to the group of emotions. If language provides 
words for an emotion, one could assume that this emotion is a basic member of 
the category emotion. The idea of clearly distinguishable emotions is the essence 
of theories summarized below as “discrete emotional systems”. The idea of 
describing emotions to be not discrete, but arranged along a dimension ranging 
from one extreme to the other, is introduced below as “dimensional systems”. 
Neuropsychological aspects of discrete and dimensional classifications are 
considered in section 1.4. 
1.3.1. Discrete emotion systems 
We consider something to be basic, primary or fundamental if it fulfills an 
important function. This can also be said for emotions, basic emotions should 
serve a vital function. But as pointed out in Averill (1994), vital for what? Vital 
for survival of the species, what emphasizes the biological aspect, vital for the 
society, what puts the sociological aspect in the center, or vital for the person 
itself, what focuses on the psychological aspect. Being well aware of the fact 
that all three points are co-existing in literature and that there are good reasons 
to examine each on them, in the next section I restrict myself to the biological 
standpoint (see Ekman, 1999 for other aspects of the term "basic"). 
Discrete or categorical classification systems are based on the assumption 
that evolution has equipped us with some emotions which proved to be 
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advantageous in natural selection. If an emotion is regarded as basic, it should 
therefore be universal among the human species, it should also be observable in 
nonhuman primates, and it should be heritable. Those basic emotional states are 
assumed to be clearly separable in terms of their eliciting conditions and by 
specific physiological, expressive and behavioral pattern.  
Basic emotions can be communicated verbally using language or 
nonverbally using expressive behaviors, among them facial expressions. It has 
been shown that there are some emotional words that can be non-ambiguously 
translated into all languages examined; those words were anger, fear, sadness, 
joy, disgust, shame and guilt (see Scherer, 1994). However, this still does not 
mean that those emotions are basic in that they are given by natural selection; 
emotions like guilt or shame might be necessary in every culture and thus, be 
generated by social interactions. 
Research on facial expressions was highly influenced by Paul Ekman and 
colleagues. In the 1960s and 1970s, he examined facial expressions across many 
cultures. Ekman demonstrated that some facial expressions are universal in that 
they are generated by all humans. He also showed that humans can classify 
facial expressions even when the expression is generated by a person with very 
distinct cultural background (Ekman, 1993). Expressions he found to be 
universal were anger, disgust, fear, joy (or happiness), sadness and surprise. 
Findings on contempt are less clear, though there is at least some preliminary 
evidence for its being universally recognized. 
Ekman (1994, 1999) introduced the concept of “emotional families”, 
which makes emotions appear less categorical. Emotions of one family differ 
from another emotional family in some aspects, but there are common 
mechanisms within one family. A possible example might be an emotional 
family comprising amusement, contentment, satisfaction and relieve. They share 
a particular type of smile and are perceived as being positive, but they differ 
from other families in terms of physiological signals, facial expression and 
perceived valence. It was suggested that the commonalities within a emotional 
family are a product of emotion, whereas the differences within one emotional 
family are produced by learning (Ekman, 1994, 1999). This idea can also 
explain the existence of emotions beyond the six basic emotions introduced 
above. In line with this, LeDoux (1997) summarized his view with the words: „I 
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tend to agree with theorists who say there are basic emotions that are hard-wired 
into the brain's architecture, and that one of the advantages of having an extra 
big cortex is that we can blend different hard-wired emotions together to create 
softer emotions, where cognitions come into play in a major way. For example, 
while detection and responding to danger may be built into the brain, the 
capacity to be afraid of falling in love is something that requires the cognitive 
integration of the system for finding mates and the system for defending against 
predators.“ 
1.3.2. Dimensional systems 
Some of the basic emotions appear to be antagonistic (i.e. happiness and 
sadness). This suggests that emotions might also be classified along dimensions. 
In addition, basic emotions can easily be classified to be either positive or 
negative. Scientists used different dimensions, such as “positive vs. negative”, 
“pleasant vs. unpleasant”, “appetitive vs. aversive” and “calm vs. excited”. 
There were also very influential approaches to classify emotions along two or 
more dimensions, for example valence and arousal. Instead of defining 
dimensions based on the subjective experience of the emotion, some 
dimensional theorists described emotions along the action pattern the emotions 
prepare (action tendencies), such as “approach and withdrawal”. 
1.3.2.1. Unidimensional models 
Proponents of unidimensional emotional systems hold the view that it is 
sufficient to describe emotions along the valence dimension with concepts like 
positive/negative or pleasant/unpleasant being the end points. The main 
advantage is that such a distinction is highly intuitive; emotions might be easily 
classified as being positive or negative. This emphasizes the subjective aspects 
of the emotion, thus, the feeling generated by the emotion.  
A somewhat different idea is to organize emotions in terms of the action 
pattern they prepare. As pointed out by Murphy et al. (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, 
& Lawrence, 2003) approach and withdrawal are basic response patterns which 
are fundamental to all complex behavior. In the context of human emotion, the 
approach system facilitates appetitive or goal-directed behavior and generates 
certain forms of positive affect that are approach related (Davidson & Irwin, 
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1999). Contrary to that, the withdrawal system facilitates the withdrawal from 
aversive stimuli and generates certain forms of negative affect that are related to 
withdrawal (Davidson & Irwin, 1999).  
Other researchers defined very similar ideas by using the terms 
“appetitive vs. aversive” or “approach/avoidance” (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). As mentioned above, the appetitive/aversive 
dimension links emotions directly to motivation, since some researchers 
described emotions to be based on a motivational basis structured along 
appetitive or aversive stimulation (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998).  
Although it might appear that the dimensions approach/withdrawal can be 
easily transferred into the positive/negative or the pleasant/unpleasant 
dimension, Ekman (1994) provides examples that this is not always the case. 
Anger and fear are classified as being negative and unpleasant, but might also 
involve approach rather than avoidance behavior. 
1.3.2.2. Multidimensional models 
At around beginning of the last century, the German psychologist 
Wilhelm Wundt suggested that subjective feelings can be described using three 
dimensions (Wundt, 1905): 
• Valence, which represents the value positive or negative  
• Arousal, which spans from calm to excited and represents the 
degree of alertness, wakefulness, engagement with the emotion-
eliciting object 
• Tension, which spans from tense to relaxed. 
The third dimension (such as tension, control, or potency) has not been 
consistently identified and distinguished from arousal. Thus, many modern 
dimensional theorists limit themselves to the valence and arousal dimension 
(Scherer, 2005). Wilhelm Wundt believed that those three dimensions are 
accompanied by specific bodily states that can be measured.  
Later work by Osgood and his colleagues (Osgood, 1957, in Scherer, 
2005) has been strongly influenced by Wundt's dimensional approach. Osgood 
introduced the semantic differential, a technique that requires subjects to 
"locate" an object (a particular behavior, a person, a word etc.) on a set of 
bipolar rating scales. Each scale consists of an adjective at each end which 
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together describe a continuum (e.g. from "large" to “small"). Based on factor 
analysis, those ratings yielded three dimensions that conform closely to the 
dimensions suggested by Wundt half a century earlier. However, most variance 
was explained by a single factor, the affective valence (found in Bradley & 
Lang, 2000). The fundamental role of valence in describing emotional 
dimensions gained further support from language categorization studies. There, 
it has also been shown that the superordinate division is between positivity 
(pleasure, joy) and negativity (anger, sadness, fear) (Bradley & Lang, 2000). 
Dimensional systems using the primary dimensions affective valence and 
arousal have also been used to classify emotional pictures (for example, the 
International Affective Picture System, IAPS, (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1997, 1999)), sounds (International Affective Digitized Sound System IADS, 
(Bradley & Lang, 2000)) and affective English words (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
The IAPS is of special importance for this dissertation and will be introduced in 
detail below (section 1.5.1).  
Despite the fact that valence and arousal are not completely independent, 
there is good evidence that variations along both scales result in different 
physiological reactions. For instance, it has been shown that facial 
electromyographic activity is selectively modified either by valence or arousal. 
It has been shown that the Corrugator Supercilii2 is sensitive to the arousal 
dimension. It contracts when a picture is rated as unpleasant; there is modest but 
above-baseline contraction when neutral pictures are presented, and there is 
below baseline activity following pleasant pictures (Bradley & Lang, 2000; 
Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). There are also other facial muscles 
responsive to arousal, i.e. the Zygomaticus Major3. It shows increased activity 
for very pleasant and unpleasant IAPS stimuli, but it shows almost no activity 
for stimuli being moderate in valence (Bradley & Lang, 2000). In contrast, 
electrodermal activity is affected by changes in arousal, but not in valence level. 
It has been shown that the amount of skin conductance increases linearly with 
                                           
2 The Corrugator Supercilii is a small muscle placed at the medial end of the eyebrow. It 
draws the eyebrow downward and medialward, producing the vertical wrinkles of the 
forehead. It is the “frowning” muscle, and may be regarded as the principal muscle in the 
expression of suffering (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998)). 
3 The Zygomaticus Major is a muscle of facial expression draws the angle of the mouth 
superiorly and posteriorly and is therefore involved in generating a smile. 
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arousal level. This effect is relatively independent of changes in valence ratings; 
the same arousal patterns are observed for highly pleasant and unpleasant 
stimuli (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). 
However, some researchers assume that a bipolar view of valence and 
arousal might not be sufficient. For example, it has been argued that positive and 
negative valence are two separable dimensions, which act independently. 
According to that, affective behavior can be described to be either low or high 
on a positivity scale and, at the same time, low or high on a negativity scale 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999). This idea is the basis of the evaluative space 
model, which allows the co-existence of approach-and avoidance tendencies at 
the same time. However, there is relatively less empirical research on this 
model; future research has to show whether it is better in explaining and 
predicting behavior than previous models. 
1.4. Neuropsychology of emotions 
1.4.1. Are there specific emotional brain systems? 
Probably the most prominent theory that hardwires emotions to the brain 
is the limbic system theory of emotions, first introduced by MacLean in 1949 
(MacLean, 1949, cited in Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). There 
are some variations in literature which cortical and subcortical brain structures 
constitute the limbic system. The most consistently found structures are the 
amygdala (involved in fear and arousal processing, see below), the cingulate 
gyrus (autonomic functions to regulate heart rate and blood pressure, cognitive 
and attentional processing; see section 4.1), the hippocampus ( major structure 
in forming new memory), the hypothalamus (hormonal regulation of autonomic 
nervous system, affects and regulates blood pressure, heart rate, hunger, thirst, 
sexual arousal, and the sleep/wake cycle), the mammillary body (involved in 
formation of memory), the nucleus accumbens (involved in reward, pleasure, 
and addiction), the orbitofrontal cortex (multiple higher cognitive functions, 
among them decision making) and the parahippocampal gyrus (involved in the 
formation of spatial memory). For many years, the limbic system was regarded 
as the general emotional system in the brain which generates every variety of 
affects. Based on recent research, LeDoux (1997) summarized the current view 
with the words "I think that the study of the limbic system, or more generally the 
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idea that there is an emotion system in the brain, is misguided. It seemed clear 
that the limbic system, if it existed at all, was not systematically involved in any 
clear way." Thus, the limbic system model and the more general idea of one 
major emotional system in the brain might no longer be sufficient (LeDoux, 
1997; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). 
But if emotions are not generated by a “single emotional processor”, are 
there specific regions or functional circuits for generating basic emotions? Or is 
there evidence that brain structures generate states of activation that can be 
described along dimensions? 
1.4.2. Discrete and dimensional brain systems 
As shown above, discrete or dimensional approaches are widely accepted 
to classify and distinguish between emotions. If one approach is superior, i.e. 
capturing the real nature of emotion, then this should have neuropsychological 
underpinnings. Thus, if the “basic emotion” approach is right, neuroimaging 
studies should find specific brain structures that are always engaged when fear is 
induced, but not engaged when happiness is induced. Ekman (1999) summarized 
this view with the words „There must be unique physiological patterns for each 
emotion, and these CNS patterns should be specific to these emotions not found 
in other mental activity“ (p. 50). If dimensional approaches are true, there 
should be brain areas that are consistently involved in processing of arousing 
stimuli (independently of whether they are classified as pleasant or unpleasant), 
but they should be less active when processing low arousing stimuli. This 
double dissociation should be found for all modalities. Research has just begun 
to examine brain function with modern imaging methods. Since the methods and 
technologies are still far from being perfect, one can not draw comprehensive 
conclusions from a single study. However, literature provides some meta-
analytic summaries that might help to decide on that topic (Murphy, Nimmo-
Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Wager, 
Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). 
1.4.3. Evidence for discrete emotional systems 
Fear: Fear is the most widely studied emotion in neuroscience. I assume 
that the immense interest on fear emerges, because early studies reported 
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changes in fear perception and fear responses after lesions of a specific brain 
structure, namely the amygdala. The amygdalae are almond-shaped groups of 
neurons located deep in both medial temporal lobes of the brain. It is relatively 
small in volume; it possesses an average width of only 15 mm, with being 
slightly longer in length (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988; Zald, 2003). 
The amygdala plays a crucial role in processing of fearful face stimuli 
(Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs et al., 1999). However, 
in a study based on nine participants with bilateral amygdala damage, Adolphs 
and colleagues (1999) showed that most patients were also impaired in 
recognition of other negative emotions (especially anger), whereas perception of 
positive emotions remained unaffected. They concluded that the amygdala 
shows not clear fear-related response, but that the amygdala is crucial in the 
detection of potentially harmful or threatening situations. 
Although the most consistent finding across two meta-analyses (Murphy, 
Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) was 
that the amygdala is involved in fear processing, both reported also a 
considerable amount of studies without fear-specific amygdala activation. 
Apparently, there are additional issues besides fearful stimulus properties that 
have to be considered. The amygdala seems to be especially responsive for 
visual presentation of fearful stimuli; this is notably true for fearful faces (Phan, 
Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). However, results are far from being 
conclusive; there is research reporting that (left) amygdala response is very 
robust across three time-separated scan sessions (Johnstone et al., 2005), 
whereas others report fast habituation of amygdala responsiveness to fearful 
faces (Breiter, 1996) and other fearful stimuli (see Phelps et al., 2001, for 
overview). 
Contrary results might also emerge because many studies do not clearly 
distinguish between fear perception and experiencing fear. As pointed out by 
Phan et al, (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2004), subjects do not report to 
be afraid of fearful faces. Instead, fearful faces may serve as a threat indicating 
signal, which alerts the organism towards salient cues. In line with this are 
findings which report increased amygdala activation to novel compared to 
repeated faces (Dubois et al., 1999; Wright et al., 2003) and to positive and 
negative emotional verbal stimuli (Hamann & Mao, 2002). Thus, fearful or 
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threatening stimuli are also more salient than neutral stimuli and have a higher 
biological significance. To summarize, the view that the amygdala represents the 
core of the “fear system” is probably too simplistic. 
Disgust: Disgust was frequently associated with activation in the basal 
ganglia, mainly in the globus pallidus. In addition to that, Murphy and 
colleagues (2003) reported activation in the insula, which is right adjacent to the 
prefrontal cortex and strongly associated with processing of taste, smell, somatic 
and visceral activity (Barrett & Wager, 2006). In line with this, selective 
impairment in disgust perception was reported in a patient with damage to the 
insula and putamen (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000). The 
patient incorrectly labeled disgust among various face sets, among them the 
Ekman and Friesen face set employed in the present thesis (experiment 4.2). In 
addition, the patient showed large deficits in recognizing disgust-related 
information from verbal emotional sounds, emotional prosody, and by disgust-
provoking scenarios, which shows that the impairment was independent of 
stimulus modality. Selective impairments in disgust and sadness recognition was 
also reported in abstinent ecstasy users (Yip & Lee, 2006). Ecstasy causes 
damage to the serotonin system of the brain, but Yip and colleagues (2006) 
pointed out that this might contribute to secondary dopaminergic system 
damage. However, Phan and colleagues (2002) described the insula to be 
responsive to negative emotions in general.  
Anger: Anger was associated with activity in the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003), a region that has also been 
linked to aggressive behavior (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). However, there are only 
few data available examining regions associated with anger; which requires 
some care with interpretation of the results. 
Sadness and Happiness: Somewhat surprisingly, activations found for 
sadness are not separable from those found for happiness (Murphy, Nimmo-
Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). This is especially true for the rostral portion of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). This indicates that happiness and sadness are 
not as easily explained in the framework of basis emotions as fear, disgust and 
anger. In clear contrast to the meta-analysis presented by Murphy and colleagues 
(2003), Phan et al. (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) and Wager et al. 
(Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003) associated happiness (or positive 
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emotions) with basal ganglia activation. This region has been shown to be 
involved in reward prediction (Hamann & Mao, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
1.4.4. Evidence for dimensional emotional systems 
Although dimensions defined by end points like approach/withdrawal, 
appetitive/aversive or positive/negative are distinguishable to some extent, there 
is always a high degree of overlap. Thus, when reviewing the literature, one 
might not expect to get an answer on the question “What are the right 
dimensions”, but merely on the question “Is there evidence that emotions are 
structured along dimensions”. 
The most parsimonious view would assume that there is a single system 
that evaluates stimuli to be either positive or negative and guides the cognitive 
system to show either approach- or withdrawal related behavior (see section 
1.3.2.1). However, recent research shows that the assumption of a single bipolar 
emotion evaluator is not sufficient (see Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999, for 
review.). For example, sadness and anger are classified as negative emotions, 
but they elicit either withdrawal or approach behavior, respectively (Murphy, 
Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). Thus, action tendencies (approach vs. 
withdrawal) and valence (positive/negative or pleasant/unpleasant) are 
considered separately in the next section. 
Action tendencies: Withdrawal is more related to left-lateralized 
activation, whereas approach results more often in right-site-activation (Murphy, 
Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). 
More specific, withdrawal-related activity was found in the amygdala, the left 
medial prefrontal cortex, the ACC and in the basal ganglia (Wager, Phan, 
Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). A clear distinction between approach and 
withdrawal was found in the medial prefrontal cortex. 
Valence: The idea that the brain organizes emotions around the 
dimension ranging from positive to negative is relatively widespread. An early 
example is the valence asymmetry model (Davidson, 1984, in Murphy, Nimmo-
Smith, & Lawrence, 2003) claims that the left site is more involved for positive 
emotions, whereas the right hemisphere is involved in negative emotions. 
However, a clear valence-asymmetry hypothesis is not supported by recent 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
19 
meta-analysis (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003) or finds only little 
support (Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). 
Arousal: As introduced above, anger and fear activate distinct brain 
regions. Both emotions have a high arousal level. As pointed out by Murphy and 
colleagues (2003), this argues against a specialized system for processing of 
highly arousing, unpleasant emotions. However, there is the idea that high 
arousing stimuli increase the overall activity of the neural system. This can also 
be observed on very early processing stages; there is increased activity in the 
primary and secondary visual areas (Lang et al., 1998; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, 
& Lawrence, 2003). Whether this activation pattern reflects a competitive 
advantage in information processing for arousing stimuli or merely reflects 
differences in stimulus properties (arousing stimuli are often more colorful, 
complex and interesting) remains to be investigated.  
Valence and arousal: Researchers often structure emotions along a two-
dimensional system defined by valence and arousal (see section 1.3.2.2). Lang 
and colleagues (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993) proposed that 
variations along those dimensions should correlate with brain states. A recent 
study found that responses along the valence dimension correlated with activity 
in the amygdala and the insular cortex, whereas arousal responses were 
associated with thalamic and frontomedial activity (Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd, 
& Birbaumer, 2004). 
However, the concepts of valence and arousal are not entirely 
independent, which is also reflected in the neuroanatomical underpinnings. 
Again, the amygdala provides an example: it has been shown to be activated by 
stimuli described as highly salient (Hamann & Mao, 2002; Phan, Wager, Taylor, 
& Liberzon, 2004). However, it is hard, if not impossible, to draw a clear line 
between valence, arousal and salience. Accordingly, amygdala activation found 
for salient stimuli might also be described in terms of valence and arousal. 
Another idea was added by LaBar and colleagues (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, & 
Phelps, 1998). They reported amygdala activation when subjects passively 
viewed negative or positive IAPS pictures which were high on the arousal scale. 
The authors concluded that the amygdala is involved in the evaluation of 
arousing scenes, including positive ones, but may play a special role in 
processing negative valence. 
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The prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is involved in higher-order emotional 
evaluation processes and operates in close interaction with other cognitive 
functions and with behavioral goals (Davidson & Irwin, 1999), has also been 
shown to be differentially activated by valence and arousal properties of 
incoming stimuli. Whereas positive pictures activate the left prefrontal cortex 
(dorsolateral PFC), pictures with negative valence are associated with right side 
prefrontal activation (ventrolateral PFC) (Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004).  
1.4.5. Beyond mapping 
The previous section has shown that it is not possible to link every 
emotion clearly to a brain structure. Instead, emotional processing engages 
highly connected systems, which interact with other cognitive functions. Again, 
the amygdala provides an example: It can by activated by all sensory modalities, 
which characterizes the amygdala as a central point where information 
converges and gets prepared for fast reactions or subsequent cognitive 
processing (Zald, 2003). The precise nature of those functions is still not fully 
understood.  
The amygdala holds extensive connections to the frontal lobe. It can be 
said that the frontal lobe processes emotional stimuli on a general level. A clear 
mapping of emotions is not possible. Frontal lobe damage often cause massive, 
often less specific emotional changes. It has been shown that the frontal lobe 
implements both, positive and negative affects (Davidson & Irwin, 1999). As 
mentioned above, a meta-analysis found no differences between happiness and 
sadness in rostral supracallosal ACC and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). 
To conclude, the previous sections have shown that both, discrete and 
dimensional emotional systems find some support in the functional structure of 
the brain, but none of the views explains the whole picture. The amygdala 
provides an example how the neuroscientific view has changed from core 
structures responsible for one aspect of emotion to a more systematic view 
which allows a structure to be involved in many aspects of emotional 
processing. However, whenever research reports amygdala activation, one 
should keep in mind that the amygdala is not a single structure. Instead, it 
consists of various nuclei, which might serve different functions (Davidson & 
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Irwin, 1999). Future research using methods with increased spatial resolution 
and improved methods for comparing different brains should clarify this issue. 
There are further challenges for future emotional research. Most things we 
know about emotions is derived from research working with stimuli that are 
somewhat artificial; for example the stimulus sets consist of posed emotions or 
still pictures. In line with this, most research does not draw a clear line between 
experiencing an emotion and perceiving an emotion (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; 
Davidson, Maxwell, & Shackman, 2004; Reisberg & Hertel, 2004). Those 
aspects have to be considered to gain further insight into the realm of the 
emotional brain.  
1.5. Methods to induce emotions 
Studying emotions in controlled laboratory settings requires stimuli that 
reliably evoke cognitive, emotional and physiological reactions. Those reactions 
have to vary systematically over the range of expressed emotions (Bradley & 
Lang, 2000). Research provides different sets of emotion-inducing stimuli, a 
subset of them which are important for the present dissertation are introduced in 
this section4. 
1.5.1. Observing emotional scenes 
One widely used method to manipulate affective states in experimental 
settings is to present participants with visual or pictorial stimuli. The advantage 
of those stimuli is that the characteristics (picture content, physical properties, 
stimulus onset and duration) can be controlled. One of the most often used 
picture stimulus sets is the International Affective Picture System IAPS (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997, 1999). This set comprises more than 600 colored 
pictures, which depict scenes of people, insects, snakes, spiders, attacks, 
diseases, tumors, mutilations, male and female nudes, erotic couples and many 
others. Lang and Greenwald (1988) developed and extended (Lang, Bradley, & 
                                           
4 There are many other ways to induce emotions beyond those mentioned in the next section. 
An example might be the shiver elicited by a person’s favorite music. Those emotional states 
have been summarized as "aesthetic emotions" (Scherer, 2005). In contrast to emotions 
considered in the present thesis ("utilitarian emotions", (Scherer, 2005)), "...the functionality 
for an immediate adaptation to an event that requires the appraisal of goal relevance and 
coping potential is absent or much less pronounced" (Scherer, 2005, p. 706). Those emotional 
states will not be further discussed in the present thesis. 
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Cuthbert, 1997, 1999) a methodology to describe the IAPS slides based on a 
dimensional model of emotion (see section 1.3.2.2). The two primary 
dimensions of the IAPS are valence and arousal. The arousal scale has 9 levels, 
with 1 depicting the lowest (calm), 5 a medium and 9 the highest arousal level 
(excitement). The valence scale ranges from 1 (unpleasant) to 9 (pleasant).  
The IAPS is standardized in that it provides valence and arousal norms for 
both male and female subjects (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997, 1999). 
Valence and arousal are not completely independent of each other and the 
pictures are not equally distributed across the space spanned by valence and 
arousal. Thus, pictures that are high in arousal are often high or low in valence. 
And there are no pictures which are very low on the arousal scale and 
concomitantly low or high on the valence scale. In other words, exciting pictures 
are either very pleasant or unpleasant, calm pictures are never very pleasant or 
unpleasant.5
As shown in section 1.3.2.2, variations along the valence and arousal 
dimensions lead to specific changes in physiological responses. Whether this 
goes along with changes in perceived emotions (feelings) can be examined when 
subjects are requested to rate IAPS pictures along scales of a widely used 
instrument to measure current affective states. This was done by Patrick & 
Lavoro (1997). They asked students to rate IAPS pictures along the scales of the 
PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule). The PANAS (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988) is a well-validated and widely used self-report index of 
positive and negative mood dimensions. It requires rating of 10 adjectives 
related to pleasurable engagement and 10 relating to unpleasant activation or 
distress. Results showed in general that pleasant pictures load high on the 
positive affect scale and unpleasant pictures loaded high on the negative affect 
scale. Since the PANAS does not clearly distinguish between valence and 
arousal, unpleasant pictures loaded also high on some scales claiming to 
measure positive affect (for example adjectives like attentive or alert). The study 
                                           
5 Some literature describes also a third dimension, dominance. But it emerges less 
consistently across factor analytic studies. It was argued that dominance deals with 
antecedents or consequences of emotion rather than current experience. (Patrick & Lavoro, 
1997). In addition, dominance has been shown to correlate very high with valence ratings 
(Lang & Greenwald, 1988). For these reasons, the present thesis considers only the valence 
and arousal dimensions. 
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shows that a two-dimensional description of affect is superior over rating scales 
used to measure affect in clinical settings. Using the PANAS, Simon-Thomas 
and colleagues (Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005) showed that presentation of 
aversive IAPS pictures (low in valence and high in arousal) during a cognitive 
task elicits negative feelings. However, PANAS ratings showed a strong 
increase in negative affect only for the beginning of the experiment. After the 
first few blocks, emotional reactions to the pictures decreased. This shows that 
the IAPS pictures, mainly those loading high on the arousal and low on the 
valence scale, are suitable to elicit changes in affective state. Those changes are 
short, and, as pointed out by Patrick and Lavoro (1997) might be confounded by 
attention-capturing properties of emotional stimuli (see section 1.6). 
How IAPS picture presentations affect brain responses was extensively 
examined. Because the present thesis employs ERPs, the following section is 
restricted to electrophysiological findings only. In general, emotional compared 
to neutral stimuli have been associated with more positive ERP components. 
Beyond emotionality, those positive components have been related to stimulus 
evaluation, target detection, attention and stimulus probability (Kok, 1997; 
Polich & Kok, 1995). Cuthbert and colleagues (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, 
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000) conducted a study in which subjects were required to 
view IAPS pictures for six seconds. Subjects rated each picture directly after 
presentation along the original valence and arousal scales (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1997, 1999). ERPs showed a late positive potential (LPP) for arousing 
IAPS pictures (positive and negative in valence), which emerged beyond 
200 ms. The LPP was most pronounced at parietal electrode Pz. A possible 
explanation of positive waveforms as being a variant of the oddball phenomenon 
(P300 for rare compared to often presented stimuli) was ruled out by presenting 
the same amount of neutral, positive and negative IAPS pictures6.  
Using high density EEG recording, more positive ERPs to affective 
stimuli have been replicated (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003). In 
addition, Schupp and colleagues (2003) reported an early posterior negativity, 
starting around 150 ms, which was also modulated by arousal and did not 
                                           
6 However, an oddball-effect cannot completely be ruled out, because in every day 
experience, highly emotional stimuli are less frequently experienced than neutral stimuli. 
Emotional stimuli might therefore work as a “natural” oddball, even when presented with the 
same frequency. 
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distinguish between valence. They interpreted the early posterior negativity as 
early facilitation of visual processing for emotional cues, which guides 
attentional processes. Recent research has shown that it is sufficient to present 
IAPS pictures for only short time periods to elicit very similar ERP responses as 
seen for longer presentation times (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2004).  
However, studies considered so far did not describe pronounced 
differences between positive and negative IAPS stimuli in late positive 
potentials (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Schupp, 
Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003, 2004). Those findings are challenged by 
research reporting an earlier emerging and more positive ERP wave (Ito, Larsen, 
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998) for negative compared to positive IAPS pictures. This 
picture fits well in the idea that negative emotional stimuli require a faster and 
more intense response, since they might indicate harmful or threatening events 
(negativity bias, see section 4.3.3). 
Shortly presented pleasant and unpleasant IAPS pictures were used in 
experiment 4.3 to induce short-time affective modulations in the context of a 
performance monitoring task.  
1.5.2. Perceiving emotions of others 
“Smile – and the world smiles with you” 
(English proverb) 
Humans react to emotional expressions of other humans. Seeing 
somebody being very happy brings us in a pleasant state; seeing somebody 
suffering makes us feel unpleasant. There is some research providing deeper 
insight into the underlying processes. Although emotions can be communicated 
via different channels (for example, laughing and crying for the auditory 
channel), here I will restrict to emotions communicated by facial expressions. 
Perception of human emotion was examined using different picture sets, 
among them the Ekman and Friesen face picture set (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 
Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). Research revealed that 
people react with specific facial expressions when perceiving emotional 
expressions of others. For example, when humans perceive happy faces, they 
react spontaneously with increased activation of the Zygomaticus Major3. On 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
25 
the other hand, when subjects are exposed to angry faces, there is increased 
Corrugator supercilii2 activation. 
Dimberg and Thunberg (1998) measured the electromyogram while 
subjects were presented with happy and angry faces from the Ekman and Friesen 
face series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). They found the above-described 
Zygomaticus Major3 and Corrugator Supercilii2 activation. Most interestingly, 
the muscle reactions occurred as early as 300 ms after stimulus onset. 
It was shown that perception of emotional face expressions elicits distinct 
ERP components. When subjects are required to view neutral and fearful faces 
while doing a repetition detection task, fearful faces elicit a more positive 
waveform beyond 300 ms which is similar to late components described for 
IAPS pictures (Eimer & Holmes, 2002) (see section 1.5.1). More interestingly, 
there was also a frontocentral positivity for fearful faces, which emerges within 
the first 120 ms after face onset. This indicates that fear is processed very 
rapidly. Since the N170, a temporo-occipital component related to structural 
encoding of faces (Bentin & Deouell, 2000; Eimer, 2000), emerged after the 
frontocentral positivity and did not show any modulations due to face 
expressions, it was concluded that face emotions are processed independently of 
face identification processes. Eimer and Holmes (2002) suggested that “the early 
emotional positivity might reflect the rapid activation of prefrontal areas 
involved in the detection of emotionally significant events” (p. 431). 
Schupp and colleagues (Schupp et al., 2004) included friendly, angry and 
neutral faces taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces series 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). While friendly faces showed no clear 
differences relative to neutral faces, angry faces elicited an early posterior 
negativity and a late posterior potential very similar as described for arousing 
IAPS pictures (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003, 2004). Since 
subjects described angry faces to be more arousing, this finding can be 
explained based on the arousing picture properties. Unlike others (Eimer & 
Holmes, 2002), Schupp et al. (2003; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 
2004) did not report a positive ERP component related to unpleasant stimuli. 
However, differences in face picture selection (Ekman face sets vs. Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces series), face emotions (fearful vs. angry faces), and 
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reference method (linked earlobe vs. average reference) might contribute to 
those differences. 
There is evidence that even extremely short, subliminal presentation of 
facial emotions is sufficient to elicit emotion-specific responses. Whalen and 
colleagues (Whalen et al., 1998) found amygdala activation for masked fearful 
faces (33 ms, offset coincident with onset of a neutral face shown for 167 ms) 
despite the fact that subjects did not report perception of fearful face expression. 
There was no amygdala activation when subjects viewed masked happy faces. 
Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that brain responses 
to facial reactions are elicited automatically and controlled by rapidly operating 
facial affect programs. The experiment presented in section 4.2 uses shortly 
presented neutral, happy and fearful faces to induce emotions while subjects 
conduct a performance monitoring task. 
1.5.3. Facial feedback 
Улыбнись и ты почувствуешь себя лучше! 
(Smile, and you’ll feel better) 
Russian Proverb 
As mentioned above, the onset of facial muscle activation associated with 
emotions is very rapid (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998). Thus, it is conceivable that 
the facial expression anticipates the emotion. Integrating this reasoning in the 
James-Lange theory (see section 1.2.1.1), facial expressions might not only 
precede the emotion. Instead, efference from facial muscles might play a causal 
role in regulating emotional experience and behavior. This “facial feedback 
hypothesis” finds experimental support in recent research. 
Research to prove this hypothesis seems appropriately comical. In a 
famous study, participants were instructed to watch cartoons while holding a 
pencil either between their lips or between their teeth. The pencil between the 
teeth was to contract the Zygomaticus Major3, whereas the pencil between the 
lips was to prevent subjects from smiling. Participants with the pencil between 
their teeth rated cartoons funnier than those who were prevented from smiling 
(Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). The most elegant point in this stimulation 
procedure is that people do not have to be aware that they are smiling. This 
excludes alternative explanations based on people’s self-perception, for example 
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that people perceive themselves to be smiling and infer that they are probably 
happy (Laird, 1974, in Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). In addition, one might 
argue that people are set in an emotional state because they feel silly or funny 
when holding a pen in the mouth during an experiment. Strack and colleagues 
(1988) excluded this alternative by introducing the “hold the pen with the lips” 
condition: People were prevented from smiling, but there is no reason to assume 
that they feel less silly or funny compared to the “pencil between the teeth” 
condition. This passive paradigm allows also to direct attention toward another 
task; a sham story can be used to explain the necessity to hold a pen in the 
mouth. 
However, whereas the James-Lange theory assumes that facial 
expressions are causal for the emotions, Strack and colleagues (1988) provided 
evidence that emotions are merely modulated by facial feedback. Literature 
refers to this distinction using the terms “modulation hypothesis” and “initiation 
hypothesis” (Soussignan, 2002). The initiation hypothesis is of special 
importance for the present dissertation. It states that affective experience can be 
generated by facial expressions even in the absence of an emotional stimulus 
(Soussignan, 2002). The initiation hypothesis is supported by reports of 
physiological changes in heart rate, electrodermal activity and peripheral 
temperature due to muscle-by muscle-manipulation of emotion-relevant facial 
muscles (see McIntosh, 1996 and Soussignan, 2002, for overview). 
There were also alternative explanations how face actions interfere with 
emotions, for example by vascular changes, which alters the thermoregulation of 
the brain. See McIntosh (1996) for overview. 
Experiments using facial feedback to initiate or to modulate emotions are 
limited because not all basic emotions can be initiated with the same simple 
procedure. For example, it is easier to initiate a smile, because people can smile 
using one muscle only (Zygomaticus Major3), whereas negative patterns needs 
more than one muscle (McIntosh, 1996). In addition, it might be argued that a 
real smile (“Duchenne smile”) is much more than just contraction of the 
Zygomaticus major, because it involves the orbicularis oculi muscle near the 
eyes as well (Soussignan, 2002). 
To summarize, there is good evidence that feedback from the facial 
muscles modulates or even initiates emotions, but those effects are relatively 
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small. The experiment presented in section 4.4 uses a facial feedback paradigm 
to set the brain into a state of positive emotions while subjects perform a 
performance monitoring task. To my knowledge, it is the first experiment 
examining the physiological changes induced by facial feedback with event-
related potentials. 
1.5.4. Positive or negative feedback 
It is pleasant to receive positive feedback in a given task, whereas 
negative feedback induces feelings of unpleasantness. Thus, feedback to task 
performance can be used to induce positive or negative emotions. However, this 
is hardly done in neuroscience. This is somewhat surprising, given that the effort 
in understanding the neurological underpinnings of emotions is immense. I see 
the advantage in inducing emotions via performance feedback in the personal 
involvement of the subject. As pointed out elsewhere (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; 
Davidson, Maxwell, & Shackman, 2004; Reisberg & Hertel, 2004), it makes a 
major difference whether a subject merely perceives or experiences an emotion. 
One study provided subjects with positive or negative feedback (“Win” or 
“Loose” on a screen) in a simple reaction time task (Zalla et al., 2000). 
Unbeknownst to the subjects, this feedback was independent from the subject’s 
actual performance. Positive feedback was associated with left amygdala 
activation, whereas loosing activated the right hemisphere amygdala. However, 
this study did not focus on the subjective part of the task; feelings of 
pleasantness during winning or unpleasantness during loosing were not assessed. 
An example how arbitrary positive or negative feedback for the performance on 
a cognitive task can change emotional states is given in a study published by 
Krohne and colleagues (Krohne, Pieper, Knoll, & Breimer, 2002). Subjects 
conducted the “Positive and Negative Affect Schedule” (PANAS) prior and after 
the experiment. The scale “Joviality” increased after success and decreased after 
failure, whereas “anxiety”, “hostility” and “shame” showed the opposite pattern. 
Thus, providing either positive or negative feedback appears to be a feasible 
method to induce emotions. 
The present thesis uses performance feedback for induction of emotions 
while subjects conduct a performance monitoring task (experiment 4.5). 
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1.6. Interactions of emotions and cognition 
"... Emotions are less encapsulated than other 
 psychological states as evident  in their  
global effects on virtually  all aspects of cognition." 
(Dolan, 2002, p. 1191) 
The term “Cognition” is central in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology. A comprehensive definition is hard to provide. In the broadest 
sense, cognition describes high level functions carried out by the human brain. 
This includes reasoning, comprehension and use of speech, attention, memory, 
and executive functions such as planning, problem-solving, and self-monitoring. 
To denote "higher"-level abstractions, the term cognition is occasionally 
distinguished from perception. 
As pointed out by Gray, “Emotion has also been left out in the cold by 
cognitive psychology” (Gray, 1999, p. 84). After cognitive psychology could not 
deny the importance of emotions for the understanding of cognition, there has 
been an long and intense debate regarding their relationship (see Lazarus, 1999 
for detailed discussion on this debate). A core part of this discussion was the 
question "What comes first - cognition or emotion"? Izard (1984; p. 24, found in 
Wierzbicka, 1999) explicitly states that "emotion has no cognitive component”. 
This does not mean that there are no interactions between emotions and 
cognitions; it is merely assumed that emotions precede and determine cognition, 
and not the other way around. Although there are alternative views (Lazarus, 
1999), there is emerging evidence that emotional stimuli can act at such a speed 
that they outperform other cognitive functions. A good example is provided by 
the way how emotions interact with attentional processes. 
Emotional stimuli capture attention. It takes less time to detect an 
emotional stimulus among other stimuli. This is especially true for fear-relevant 
stimuli (Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Emotional processing occurs even 
before the operation of selective attention on a pre-attentive base (Dolan, 2002; 
Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003). For example, it has been shown that even a patient 
with damage to the primary visual cortex can distinguish between facial 
expressions without being aware of them (de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & 
Weiskrantz, 1999). Again, the amygdala was the crucial structure in eliciting 
those extremely fast and pre-attentive mechanisms that guide later cognitive 
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processes. In line with this, it has been shown that an angry face picture, 
previously coupled with an aversive stimulus, elicits activation in the right 
amygdala even when subjects do not perceive the angry face consciously 
(Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998). Similar results have been presented by 
Whalen and colleagues (Whalen et al., 1998). It is conceivable that those 
amygdala-circuits constitute the neurological underpinning of what have 
previously proposed as “appraisal mechanisms” (Ekman, 1999; Robinson, 1998; 
Scherer, 2005), see section 1.2.3. 
On the other hand, cognitive processes can also have a major impact on 
emotions. For example, thinking of something else diminished the aversive 
properties of a painful heat stimulus (Tracey et al., 2002). There is emerging 
evidence that anticipation of an emotional event, for example a painful shock, is 
sufficient to activate the amygdala. Phelps and colleagues told their subjects that 
they might receive a painful electric shock when one of two neutral stimuli (blue 
or yellow squares) appears on the screen (Phelps et al., 2001). Although subjects 
did never receive any aversive stimulation, the amygdala (mainly the left site) 
showed increased activity to the stimulus which was verbally linked to the 
painful event. Amygdala activation have previously been reported during fear 
conditioning with real aversive stimuli, although the laterality issues are still not 
finally clear (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; Morris, Ohman, 
& Dolan, 1998; Phelps et al., 2001). It was also shown that expectation of pain 
enhances perceived unpleasantness of a non-painful stimulus. Those changes in 
pain perception were correlated with increased activation in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Sawamoto et al., 2000). Another example how cognition 
interferes with emotional responses can be given by the placebo effect: Placebos 
given to relieve pain reduced activation in pain-relevant brain areas, among 
them the thalamus, the insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (Wager et al., 
2004).  
Those examples demonstrate that emotion and cognition interact. Lazarus 
(1999) emphasized the principle of reciprocal causality. Depending on the 
starting point, which is arbitrary, emotion can influence cognition or the other 
way around. The present thesis examines how emotions interact with cognitive 
processes like memory and performance monitoring. More detailed information 
to those specific cognitive functions is provided in section 3.1 and 4.1. 
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2. General methodological issues 
2.1. Overview of studies and participants 
All participants who contributed to the data of the present study were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision. They received 
course credits or € 6.50 per hour after completion of the experiment. All 
participants gave written informed consent prior to the experimental session. All 
study protocols had been approved by the ethics committee of Magdeburg 
University. 
2.2. Overview of software used 
Experiment 3.2 was programmed by Jascha Rüsseler and Daniel 
Wiswede, all other experiments were programmed by Daniel Wiswede using 
Presentation software package (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., 
http://www.neuro-bs.com/).  
Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS statistical package, version 
11 and 12 (http://www.spss.com). ERP data were analyzed and plotted using 
ERPSS software package and special purpose programs. Preprocessing of 
behavior data and modification of ERP conditions was made using the free text 
pattern manipulation software tool AWK (Aho, Kernighan, & Weinberger, 
1988). All graphics were made using Corel Draw (http://www.corel.com/). 
Sound files for experiment 3.3 were recorded, transformed and analyzed using 
Adobe Audition software (http://www.adobe.com/de/products/audition/). 
2.3. Overview of statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis: All df-values are given uncorrected. Whenever 
necessary, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values und F-values are provided. 
2.4. Overview of ERP settings 
2.4.1. General recording issues 
Recording environment: All measurements were conducted in the ERP 
lab of the Neuropsychology Unit at the University of Magdeburg. Recordings 
were conducted in an electrically shielded, but not sound proofed recording 
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chamber with a Neuroscan EEG amplifier. Participants were seated in a 
comfortable chair with a distance of 1 m (experiments 3.2 and 3.3 ) or 80 cm 
(experiments 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) to the screen. Stimuli were presented on a 19 
inch analog monitor. Chamber illumination was slightly dimmed. 
 
Figure 1: Electrode arrangement. Experiments in section 3 were referenced to the left 
mastoid electrode (LM), experiments in section 4 were referenced to a electrode placed 
on the tip of the nose (NR). 
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Recording settings: The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 
29 electrodes including all 19 standard locations of the 10/20 system (Jasper, 
1958) with tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap relative to a reference 
electrode placed either on the left mastoid electrode (experiments 3.2 and 3.3) or 
on the top of the nose (experiments 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.4.1.1). If other reference 
methods are used, this will be explicitly stated in the data analysis section of the 
particular experiment. Eye-movements were recorded with electrodes affixed to 
the right and left external canthi (horizontal electrooculogram (hEOG), bipolar 
recording) and at the left and right orbital ridges (vertical electrooculogram 
(vEOG), bipolar recording). Impedances of all electrodes were kept below 10 
kΩ. Biosignals were amplified with a band-pass from 0.05 to 30 Hz and stored 
with a digitization rate of 250 Hz. Due to the limited number of physical 
recording channels available on the amplifier, either left mastoid electrode 
(experiment 3.2 and 3.3) or electrode Fpz (experiments 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 
4.4.1.1)were excluded as recording electrode. See Figure 1 for electrode 
arrangements. 
Artifacts: Prior to ERP data analysis, all trials containing eye artifacts 
were either discarded using a special purpose program with individualized peak-
to-peak-amplitude criteria on vEOG, hEOG (experiment 3.3) or corrected 
(experiments 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5) using a blind component separation 
(Joyce, Gorodnitsky, & Kutas, 2004). See section 2.4.2. for additional 
information on eye artifact correction. Head artifacts were rejected based on 
individual peak-to peak amplitude criteria using the same special purpose 
program as for artifact rejection. Artifact correction was always applied when 
there were conditions containing low number of trials. 
Averaging: Stimulus-locked ERPs were averaged for epochs of 1024 ms 
starting 100 ms prior to stimulus onset for stimulus-locked data analysis and 
200 ms prior to response for response-locked analysis. Detailed analysis of ERP 
conditions is given separately in the “Data analysis” sections for each 
experiment. 
Filtering: Unless not explicitly stated (see experiment 3.2), all ERP 
figures and all ERP statistics are based on unfiltered data (except band-pass 
from 0.05 to 30 during recording). 
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2.4.2. Dealing with eye artifacts 
Eye artifacts can have a major impact on the electroencephalogram due to 
two reasons: First, with the cornea (front of the eye) being electrically positively 
charged and the retina (back of the eye) being negative, the eye bulb can be 
regarded as a dipole. Movements of this dipole (movement artifacts) change the 
electrical field in the surrounding of the eye. Second, eye blinking also causes 
artifacts, because the moving eye lid changes the electric field around the eye 
bulb7. Relative to eye movement artifacts, eye blink activity decreases more 
rapidly with distance to the eyes, but is higher in amplitude (Joyce, Gorodnitsky, 
& Kutas, 2004). Potentials generated by blinks and eye movements can be 
orders of magnitudes larger (more than ten times) than the brain activity, thus, it 
overlays and dilutes the brain signal even on electrodes which are relatively far 
from the eyes. The electrical activity attained at the head electrodes is therefore 
assembled by a relatively small “real” brain signal, eye movement and blink 
artifact and overall brain activity which is not associated with the current task 
(noise). The noise is controlled by generating ERPs out of the EEG signal; this 
procedure will not be further discussed here. The next section gives a short 
overview how to deal with eye artifacts and derives an appropriate correction 
method for the present thesis. 
A well-established method to handle eye artifacts is to detect movements 
and blinks with electrodes placed close to the eyes (see section 2.4.1) and 
remove artifact-containing EEG sections prior to creation of ERPs. However, 
artifact rejection causes substantial data loss. It is therefore inapplicable for ERP 
conditions based on low trial numbers, as it is the case in the present 
dissertation. Thus, an algorithm which removes the artifacts from the brain 
signal without distorting the brain signals provides the best solution. 
Eye artifact correction mechanisms can be subdivided based on the 
statistical and mathematical algorithms. There are regression-based approaches, 
methods based on principal component analysis (PCA) and on independent 
component analysis (ICA). Regression-based methods perform correction for 
one electrode at one time. That means they do not use data of all electrodes 
simultaneously. PCA- and ICA-based methods use data from EEG and EOG 
                                           
7 Researchers do not agree whether movement artifacts and blink artifacts should be treated as 
the same, see (Croft, 2000; Verleger, 2000) on this topic. 
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simultaneously to perform the correction. ICA based methods decompose data 
into statistically independent components utilizing higher-order statistical 
measures, which extend over the second-order statistics used in PCA. Those 
methods represent a subclass of the more general group of blind source 
separation algorithms (Joyce, Gorodnitsky, & Kutas, 2004). A recent study 
concluded to prefer regression-based or PCA-based over ICA-based correction 
algorithms (Wallstrom, Kass, Miller, Cohn, & Fox, 2004), but new 
developments in ICA-based methods challenge this conclusion. A new and very 
promising ICA-based algorithm was introduced by Joyce, Gorodnitsky, and 
Kutas (2004) and was labeled SOBI (second-order blind identification 
correction). In contrast to earlier methods, SOBI is highly automatic and 
therefore not susceptible to subjectivity. Although SOBI performs especially 
well on eye movement artifacts, it also outperforms other algorithms in 
correcting eye blinks. A recent study compared six artifact correction algorithms 
(Kierkels, van Boxtel, & Vogten, 2006). They report that differences between 
algorithms are large, but “for almost every EEG configuration the SOBI 
algorithm shows the best correction” (Kierkels, van Boxtel, & Vogten, 2006, p. 
251). Thus, the SOBI algorithm was seen to be most appropriate to correct for 
eye artifacts and therefore employed in experiments 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. 
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3. Part 1: Emotional modulation of memory encoding.  
3.1. Background 
Distinctiveness affects memory performance. Subjects are better in 
recalling items from a list that are distinct in at least one dimension. This 
phenomenon is called the von-Restorff or VR-effect (von Restorff, 1933). 
Distinctiveness of an item can be created by changing the color, the size, the 
meaningfulness, the background color or many other aspects of a stimulus (see 
Cimbalo, 1978 for techniques to isolate items). As an example, Fabiani & 
Donchin (1995) visually presented lists of 20 words which included one 
physical (different font size) or semantic isolate (different semantic category). 
Memory for the isolated items was better than for standard items in free recall as 
well as recognition tests. 
There are different approaches to explain the superior memory 
performance for isolated items. According to the total-time hypothesis, isolated 
items are rehearsed for a longer time in working memory, leading to a relative 
increase in rehearsal compared to non-isolated items (Cooper & Pantle, 1967). 
Alternatively, subjects could consider isolated items as a special category in a 
free recall task (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Hunt & Lamb, 2001). This is 
supported by the finding that the reproduction of isolated items tends to be 
organized: In the word list produced in the recall phase, subjects recall 
physically isolated items more often at the end, whereas they produce semantic 
isolates more often at the beginning (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995). 
The studies 3.2 and 3.3 were conducted to further delineate the 
relationship between item distinctiveness and recall performance by introducing 
arousing or physical attributes to the words to be learned. In particular, the 
experiments aimed at the description of the neural correlates of distinctiveness 
effects through the recording of event-related brain potentials (ERPs). To put the 
observed brain potential modulations into perspective, I will provide a short 
review on how distinctiveness, memory performance and emotional information 
affect ERP components. 
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3.1.1. Novelty 
Research has shown that novel (as well as isolated, distinct) events trigger 
a variety of neural processes which are related to attention, perception, learning 
and memory. Stimulus novelty can be examined by comparing the behavioral 
and neural responses elicited by the first and repeated presentation of a stimulus. 
However, the present set of two experiments focuses on another form of 
distinctiveness, namely contextual novelty, which is given when a stimulus 
occurs in an unexpected context (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). 
In ERPs, novel or distinct stimuli elicit an increased positive waveform 
between 250 and 400 ms (Simons, Graham, Miles, & Chen, 2001). This ERP 
component is regarded as a member of the "P300 family" and labeled novelty P3 
or P3a. (Polich & Kok, 1995; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). The P3a is not tied to 
any particular modality, it can be elicited even when a stimulus is not task-
relevant or if it is ignored (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). It has been argued that 
the P3a reflects mechanisms engaged in preparing the organism for speeded 
responses to biologically significant stimulus changes. 
Event-related fMRI studies showed that contextually novel stimuli elicited 
increased BOLD responses in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the insula, and 
the cingulate gyrus (see Ranganath & Rainer, 2003 for overview). Strange and 
colleagues (Strange, Henson, Friston, & Dolan, 2000) postulated a generic 
"deviance detection system", which is activated by different kinds of deviance 
attributes (semantic, perceptual or emotional deviants). It involves right inferior 
prefrontal and bilateral posterior fusiform cortex. Most importantly, it has been 
shown that contextually novel events elicit initial activation in the hippocampus, 
which links processing of novel stimuli to structures directly involved in 
generating memory (Strange & Dolan, 2001). 
3.1.2. Difference due to subsequent memory  
ERPs have also been used to predict later recall in list learning tasks. A 
consistent finding has been a greater positive ERP deflection during encoding 
for those items that are subsequently recalled compared to items that cannot be 
recalled. This effect has been labeled "difference due to subsequent memory" or 
DM-effect (Paller, Kutas, & Mayes, 1987). 
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The DM effect has been found in a variety of experimental settings (see 
Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 1999 , for overview): for nouns in free recall or 
recognition tasks (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Neville, Kutas, Chesney, & 
Schmidt, 1986; Paller, Kutas, & Mayes, 1987) , for high and low frequency 
words (Fernandez et al., 1998), for physically and semantically isolated words 
(Fabiani & Donchin, 1995), and for picture stimuli in a recognition task 
(Friedman & Sutton, 1987). Some researchers have explained this effect within 
a P300 framework. However, the DM-effect (Paller, Kutas, & Mayes, 1987; see 
Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 1999, for overview) extends over several 
hundred milliseconds and, thus, has a different timing than the P300 component. 
Friedman, Ritter and Snodgrass (1996, p. 11) suggested that the DM effect "… 
could be a unitary ERP activity with a unique functional role that overlaps 
several ERP deflections, or it could reflect the contribution of several 
overlapping components, each reflecting a different process."  
Functional imaging studies have repeatedly shown the involvement of the 
inferior frontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe (MTL) including the 
hippocampus in the generation of the DM-effect (Erk et al., 2003; Wagner, 
Koutstaal, & Schacter, 1999). Importantly, the same prefrontal, medial temporal 
and lateral temporal regions (i.e. hippocampus) that generate the DM-effect are 
also active during detection of stimulus novelty (Kirchhoff, Wagner, Maril, & 
Stern, 2000). 
3.1.3. Novelty and Memory 
To detect novelty, it is required to compare incoming information with 
content stored in memory. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that structures 
involved in novelty detection are also crucial in encoding and retrieval. Recent 
work supports this idea: Contextually novel events elicit initial activation in the 
hippocampus, a brain structure directly involved in encoding and recall of 
memory content (Lisman & Grace, 2005; Strange & Dolan, 2001). Lisman and 
Grace (Lisman & Grace, 2005) proposed a functional loop comprising the 
hippocampus and the ventral tegmental area, linking both, novelty detection and 
memory. The hippocampus detects rapidly incoming information that is not 
stored in long term memory. Then it generates a novelty signal, which is 
conveyed through various structures (subiculum, nucleus accumbens) to the 
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ventral tegmental area. The upward arm of this loop increases dopamine in the 
hippocampus, which facilitates long-term potentiation and learning. 
3.1.4. ERPs and the von-Restorff effect 
If a stimulus differs from other stimuli in a series by a distinct feature, this 
feature will be encoded in working memory in addition to the item-specific 
semantic information. According to the context updating hypothesis of the P300 
(Donchin & Coles, 1988), additional encoding should be reflected in an 
increased P300 amplitude. In an early study (Karis, Fabiani, & Donchin, 1984), 
subjects were presented with series of 20 words that had to be recalled after 
every series. Most of the word lists contained a distinct word (different font 
size). An increased P300 and better memory performance for the isolated items 
was observed for subjects that reported using primarily a rote rehearsal strategy 
(based on silent repetition of the word list). In contrast, subjects using an 
elaborative strategy (making up sentences or stories) did not show increased 
performance for the isolated words and no P300-recall-relationship, but an 
increased overall recall rate. Instead, they showed a 'frontal positive slow wave', 
which was enhanced for subsequently recalled items (Karis, Fabiani, & 
Donchin, 1984). In a subsequent study, subjects were instructed to use an 
elaborative strategy in one, and a rote strategy in the other of two recording 
sessions. A larger P300 was found for recalled compared to non-recalled items 
in the rote rehearsal strategy (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990). This effect was 
seen for the isolated as well as for all other words. However, no differences in 
the P300 between recalled and non-recalled items were found for the elaborative 
strategy. Instead, a 'frontal positive slow wave' starting at 800 ms was more 
pronounced for the elaborative strategy, with subsequently recalled words being 
more positive. Apparently, different encoding strategies are reflected in separate 
ERP components (see also Otten & Donchin, 2000). 
In the studies discussed above, distinctiveness could not be separated from 
the item that had to be learned, the distinct information was "integral". Integral 
dimensions cannot be separated from the stimulus to be encoded because they 
(a) define the relevant aspects of the items or (b) occupy the same spatial 
location (Otten & Donchin, 2000, p. 645). Even when the semantic category is 
changed, the distinctiveness attribute is still integral to the word. In addition to 
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an integral isolate word (increased font size), Otten and Donchin (2000) used 
frames at a close or at a far distance to make a word distinct in a non-integral 
manner. For non-isolated items, they found a larger P300 for recalled than for 
non-recalled items. Changing the size of the word (integral attribute change) 
also resulted in an increased P300 for subsequently recalled items. In the non-
integral condition (isolated by a frame in far distance), the P300 was smaller 
than in the integral condition and there was no relationship between P300 
amplitude and subsequent recall. Instead, a larger frontal slow wave was seen 
for subsequently recalled framed words (non-integral isolates). Free recall 
performance was increased for isolated items, regardless of whether 
distinctiveness was integral or not. Those findings imply that it is crucial how 
distinctiveness is created. Integral distinctiveness attributes had to be fully 
processed because "processing the size of the characters may be a necessary step 
towards processing the orthographical, phonological and / or semantic attributes 
relevant for memorization" (Otten & Donchin, 2000, p. 658). This resulted in 
more context updating and a larger P300 component. Other organizational 
processes might be reflected in the frontal positive slow wave, since the recall 
performance was also increased for non-integral distinct items. The context 
updating hypothesis thus might be suitable for explaining the standard DM 
effect for integral isolates, but not for the frontal DM-effect seen for non-
integral items. 
3.1.5. Memory and emotions 
Emotionally arousing events are more likely to be recalled later than more 
neutral events. A well-known example is the flashbulb phenomenon: it describes 
that memory consolidated during high arousal will be stored for a long time. 
From the evolutionary perspective, it can be argued that highly emotional events 
have direct consequences for the well being of an organism. Storing these events 
in memory is therefore highly adaptive to cope with future situations that might 
be related to the organism’s well-being. 
Amygdala activation has been shown to be crucial in predicting later 
recall. For example, Canli and colleagues (Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & 
Cahill, 2000) presented their subjects with neutral and negative scenes. Subjects 
indicated how emotionally intense they found each scene. The amygdala had the 
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greatest response to scenes rated as most emotionally intense. Activity in the left 
amygdala predicted recall performance in an unexpected delayed recall task 
(three weeks later) for scenes rated to be most emotionally intense (see Hamann, 
2001, for review).  
However, as mentioned in section 1.4 , recent research has shown that the 
amygdala is not only responsive to fearful, but also to highly salient, attention 
drawing stimuli (Hamann & Mao, 2002; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 
2004). In line with this, it can be argued that emotional arousal leads to a 
narrowing of attention, in which information in the periphery is less likely to be 
attended to and therefore less likely to be later remembered. This phenomenon 
has been labeled “weapon focus”, as it refers to the fact that the witnesses to 
crimes often seem to “lock” their attention onto the weapon and ignore all other 
parts of the scene, among them crucial details of the criminal (Reisberg & 
Hertel, 2004). Somewhat similar to that, a decline in memory performance has 
been described for stimuli that directly precede or succeed emotional events 
(Strange, Hurlemann, & Dolan, 2003).  
Independent of subsequent recall, emotional pictures as those taken from 
the IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997, 1999) have been shown to 
modulate the P300 component (Keil et al., 2002), or late positive potential (LPP) 
(Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Schupp et al., 2000) and the positive 
slow wave (PSW) (Amrhein, Muhlberger, Pauli, & Wiedemann, 2004). Those 
components are more positive going for pleasant and unpleasant compared to 
neutral pictures (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; see 
section 1.5.1). Some research found a stronger positivity for negative IAPS 
pictures, (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). Dolcos and Cabeza (Dolcos & 
Cabeza, 2002) reported that the emotion effect on parietal scalp regions is more 
sensitive to arousal, whereas it is more sensitive to valence on frontocentral 
electrodes. The neural origin of the emotion effect is not entirely known, but it is 
assumed that the arousal effect is generated by interactions between the 
amygdala and cortical regions, whereas valence-related activity reflects 
prefrontal cortex involvement (Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002). 
I see at least three different ways in which affective stimuli might 
contribute to changes in recall performance. First, affective stimulus material 
might elicit physiological and evaluative processes that are not evoked by non-
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emotional stimuli. Second, affective stimuli capture attention, which might lead 
to speeded processing and / or increased rehearsal (Ochsner, 2000). For 
example, subjects are faster and more accurate in detecting emotional stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli (Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Third, there is a 
general recall advantage for items belonging to a common category compared to 
uncategorized items. One might argue that emotional items are semantically 
coherent (Maratos, Allan, & Rugg, 2000); that is they are more similar to each 
other than non-emotional items. Taken together, those additional attributes may 
increase the distinctiveness or add additional retrieval cues during encoding and, 
thus, support later recall. 
How non-integral emotional information affects memory processes has 
been the subject of recent research. A word can be made emotionally distinct in 
a non-integral manner by presenting a highly emotional but task-irrelevant 
picture prior to the neutral item (Erk et al., 2003) or in the background of the 
neutral word (studies presented in section 3.2 and 3.3). Encoding processes for 
non-integral emotional information was examined in a fMRI study conducted by 
Erk and colleagues (2003). They used IAPS pictures to induce positive or 
negative emotions prior to the presentation of the word. Recall performance was 
better for words preceded by positive but not for words preceded by negative 
pictures. Successful recall for positive encoding trials was predicted by 
activation of the right anterior parahippocampal and fusiform gyrus, whereas 
recalled items from negative encoding conditions were associated with 
amygdala activation. This supports the view that different pathways are involved 
when a person encodes words in a neutral, positive or negative context. 
3.1.6. The current studies 
The experiments presented in section 3.2 and 3.3 use a von Restorff 
paradigm comprising the presentation of word lists, in which one word was 
made distinct by either changing an integral attribute (font color of one of the 
words) or by changing a non-integral attribute (highly arousing instead of low 
arousing background pictures). While experiment 3.2 does only manipulate the 
arousal level without controlling for valence of the background picture, 
experiment 3.3 controls for both, valence and arousal. For the sake of simplicity, 
the arousing background condition will be referred to as “arousing background 
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condition” in both experiments. Both experiments use a free recall rather than a 
recognition paradigm because it has been shown that emotional effects on 
emotion are generally stronger when active retrieval is required (Erk, Martin, & 
Walter, 2005; Fiedler, 2001). 
The following predictions are made: 
• First, it is assumed that there is an increased memory performance 
combined with an increased ERP positivity (P300-recall-
relationship) when changing an integral stimulus attribute. In 
contrast to earlier studies (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Otten 
& Donchin, 2000), the changed integral item was font color rather 
than font size and subjects were not instructed to use a specific 
encoding strategy.  
• Second, it is predicted that a P300-Recall-relationship might also 
be seen for words isolated by a task-irrelevant, but highly arousing 
background picture. In contrast to changes of an emotionally 
neutral, non-integral item attribute (Otten & Donchin, 2000), 
emotionally arousing background information should facilitate 
rehearsal processes in working memory and result in an even 
stronger P300-recall relationship. 
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3.2. Experiment 1a: Memory recall in arousing situations – 
a pilot study 
3.2.1. Methods 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Data were acquired from22 subjects (14 women). Data from one subject 
had to be removed due to extensive recording artifacts. Thus, analysis is based 
on data from 21 subjects (13 women, mean age all subjects: 22.5 years, range 19 
to 29). All of them were students at the Otto-von Guericke University, all were 
German native speakers. See section 2.1 for additional information. 
3.2.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
A trial consisted of an IAPS picture, superimposed by a German noun. 
The noun was presented in white capital letters with ARIAL font in front of a 
black filled frame presented in the lowest part of the IAPS picture. The words 
covered between 5.1° and 7.4°, and the pictures covered horizontally 8.5° of 
visual angle. 
During the experiment, subjects were presented with 1200 trials. The 
trials were made up of 600 nouns and 300 IAPS pictures (International Affective 
Picture System; see “Picture selection” below). Thus, each noun was presented 
twice, each IAPS picture was presented four times. Words and IAPS pictures 
were allocated randomly and it was checked whether there is no obvious link 
between word and background picture. All subjects were presented with the 
same trial sequence and, thus, saw the same word-picture combinations. The 
experiment was conducted in 2 sessions, which contained the same selection of 
IAPS pictures and nouns, but at different sequences and with a different IAPS-
noun allocation. Both sessions were separated by at least one week.  
Each session consisted of 40 lists; each list consisted of 15 trials. Each 
trial was presented for 1500 ms. Trials were separated by a fixation cross shown 
at variable length between 1500 and 2000 ms (mean 1750 ms). 
Deviant stimuli: Each list contained two deviant trials, which were either 
deviant by word font color (red instead of white; “color isolated” condition) or 
by valence of the background picture (arousing background isolate condition). 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
To achieve emotional modification of the background picture, one word per trial 
was presented in front of a highly arousing IAPS picture See “picture selection” 
below for detailed background picture information. 
 
Figure 2: Experimental setup of study 3.2. A sequence of 15 trials constituted one list. 
Isolation was achieved either by changing the font color (color isolate) to red or by 
changing the emotional background picture from neutral to highly arousing (arousing 
background isolate). There was a color and an emotional background isolate in each list. 
All pictures selected as arousing background isolates are shown in Figure 3. 
To avoid interactions with the well known superior performance for first 
list and last list items (primacy and recency effect), color deviant and arousing 
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background deviants were presented with the same probability on list positions 5 
to 11 only, but never on list position 1 to 4 or 12 to 15. Both deviant conditions 
were never presented in successive trials. After each list, there was a screen 
indicating the beginning of the recall phase. After finishing recalling the last list, 
the next list was initiated by a button press. An example of a 15-word-list is 
provided in Figure 2. 
Instruction: Participants were instructed to write down as many words as 
they could remember from the previous list. They were not required to recall the 
words in the same sequence as previously shown and there was no instruction 
regarding the encoding strategy.  
In contrast to the subsequent study provided in section 3.3, subjects were 
informed that word stimuli are superimposed by pictures and that it is important 
to pay attention to the pictures as well. 
Word selection: The 600 words were German nouns selected from the 
CELEX data base (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995). The nouns had a 
mean Mannheim Word frequency of 22 per million; word length ranged from 4 
to 11 letters. All words were emotionally neutral. Emotional neutrality was 
assured by a pre-study, in which 15 subjects were asked to mark every word 
they considered as not being emotionally neutral. The original list comprised of 
800 words. Words rated by more than two people as not being emotionally 
neutral were excluded.  
Picture selection: The background pictures were taken from the 
International Affective Picture System IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997, 
1999) based on their mean arousal level without distinguishing between women 
and men. As introduced in section 1.5.1, high positive and negative valence both 
involve high levels of arousal. In contrast to the study provided in section 3.3, 
arousal was the only selection criterion for picture selection. Thus, emotional 
deviant pictures were always high on the arousal scale. However, there were 
some emotional deviant pictures loading high on both, the arousal and the 
valence scale (exciting and pleasant pictures), whereas others were high on the 
arousal and low on the valence scale (exciting and unpleasant pictures). 
Emotional pictures included scenes of mutilations, injuries, attacks (low 
valence), but also pictures of erotic scenes (high valence). See Appendix 1 for 
arousal and valence ratings and Figure 3 b for all arousing pictures. 
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Figure 3: a) Pictures selected to provide either neutral or emotional background, 
arranged along the IAPS dimensions valence and arousal. Picture selection was based on 
IAPS ratings for men and women. b) All pictures taken for the emotional background 
condition. IAPS picture numbers in reading direction: 3000, 3010, 3030, 3053, 3060, 
3080, 3170, 3266, 3530, 4490, 4607, 4608, 4656, 6230, 6260, 6313, 6350, 6540, 9405, 9410. 
See Appendix 1 for ratings. 
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All other pictures, taken as neutral background for color deviant words or 
for the not deviant condition, were low or medium on the arousal scale and 
ranged from pleasant to unpleasant on the valence scale. See Figure 3 a for a 
graphical illustration for picture selection based on valence and arousal. 
Mean arousal and mean valence ratings for selected IAPS pictures are 
listed below, standard deviations are given in brackets: 
Neutral IAPS pictures   arousal: 3.8 (0.8) valence: 4.9 (1.1) 
Neutral IAPS with color Words arousal: 3.7 (0.8) valence: 5.2 (0.9) 
Emotional IAPS pictures   arousal: 6.9 (0.4) valence: 2.8 (2.1) 
Arousing pictures differed from neutral pictures and neutral pictures with 
colored words in both, arousal and valence values (ANOVA, F (2,297) < 34.1; 
p < .001, post hoc comparisons, p < .001). 
3.2.1.3. Data recording and preprocessing 
See section 2.4.1 for general recording issues. Normal artifact rejection 
procedure (see section 2.4.1) was not appropriate for this study because recall 
performance was pretty low on middle list positions (see section 3.2.2.1). 
Artifact rejection would decrease the amount of trials to a degree that reliable 
ERPs could no longer be generated. This is especially true for recalled items on 
midline positions. Thus, eye artifacts were corrected using blind component 
separation as described in section 2.4, head artifacts were rejected as described 
in section 2.4.1. To reduce muscle artifacts, data were filtered using a 10 Hz low 
pass filter. 
3.2.1.4. Data analysis 
ERPs were averaged relative to a 100 ms pre-trial baseline for the 
conditions “Standard-not isolated”, “Arousing background isolated” and “Color 
isolated”. Trials presented on primacy position (list position 1 to 4) or on 
recency position (list position 12 to 15) were not further analyzed (see Wiswede, 
Rüsseler, & Münte, 2007, for analysis of serial position effects). Thus, ERPs for 
all three conditions were based on list positions 5 to 11 only. A distinction 
between recalled and not recalled items was made for analyzing the DM-effect 
(difference due to subsequent memory), but not for analyzing the deviance 
effect. The total number of trials included in the conditions is listed in Table 1. 
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CONDITION RECALL Mean trial number SD Range 
Recalled 103.1 38.1 59-199 Standard 
Not recalled 277.3 36 187-327 
Recalled 24.7 8.9 9-45 Arousing 
Not recalled 51.9 9.2 34-70 
Recalled 20.1 8.2 10-43 Color 
Not recalled 55.9 8.0 33-67 
Table 1: The number of trials included to generate the ERP conditions in study 3.2. 
Time windows for mean amplitude analysis were based on visual 
inspection. The deviance effect was examined in a 400 ms to 900 ms time 
window. Due to differences in latency onset and less clear pronounced 
differences, the DM effect was examined in the following time windows: 200 to 
300 ms; 200 to 450 ms; 300 to 400 ms; 300 to 600 ms; 400 to 900 ms; 500 to 
900 ms; 600 to 900 ms; 700 to 900 ms. 
Repeated measurement ANOVAs were based on mean amplitude on 
midline electrodes Fpz (frontopolar), Fz (frontal), Cz (central) and Pz (parietal, 
see Figure 1 for electrode location). To examine the DM-effect, separate 
ANOVAs (Factors ELECTRODE and RECALL) were conducted for all three 
conditions. The deviance effect was based on the factors CONDITON and 
ELECTRODE. 
3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. Behavioral data – recall performance 
Visual inspection: As depicted in Figure 4 a, recall performance shows 
the normal U-shape with superior recall performance for items on first and last 
positions. This refers to the well-known Primacy/Recency effect and will not be 
further discussed. Within the plateau position, there was an increased recall 
performance for words shown in front of an arousing background picture. 
However, this effect seems not to be very consistent; it is not seen for emotional 
words shown on position 8 and 9. Color isolated items did not differ from non-
isolated items. 
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However, as mentioned above (section 3.2.1.2), emotional background 
pictures were selected based on their arousal level only and were either high 
(pleasant) or low (unpleasant) in their valence level (see Figure 3 a). Therefore, 
it is conceivable that the superior performance for highly arousing background 
trials could be subdivided into a high valence and a low valence effect. As 
shown in Figure 4 b and c, this is clearly the case. Participants were better in 
recalling words when shown in front of arousing pictures which were high in 
valence (exciting and pleasant), but not when words were shown in front of 
arousing pictures which were low in valence (exciting and unpleasant). This 
explains also that there was no superior performance for arousing items shown 
on list positions 8 and 9, where the emotional trials contained either no high 
valence picture (list position 8) or only 1 high valence picture (list position 9). 
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Figure 4: Behavior data for experiment 3.2. a) Recall performance across all 15 serial 
positions, divided by isolation attribute. right panel: recall performance for single 
subjects. b) recall performance, separately for men and women. The arousing 
background condition is divided into high and low valence (pleasant or unpleasant) 
c) Data as used for statistical analysis. Middle serial positions were merged, highly 
arousing was divided into high and low valence. Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
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Statistical analysis: As for the ERP data analysis, the 15 serial positions were 
summarized as follows: Standard (all not isolated items on position 5 to 11), 
Color deviant (all color word items on positions 5 to 11), Arousing background 
deviant (all arousing deviants on positions 5 to 11). Differences in recall 
performance were found for highly arousing stimuli, gender differences were 
not emergent on middle positions (rmANOVA, factors CONDITION (3 levels) 
and GENDER (between factor, 2 levels); F (2, 38) = 7.06; p < .002; GENDER 
or CONDITION x GENDER n.s., pairwise comparisons: Arousing background 
differed from both other conditions, p < .016). 
However, as indicated by visual impression, differences in valence level 
might explain superior performance for arousing items. To test this, the same 
analysis as described above was conducted except that the factor CONDITION 
had four levels (arousing background divided into “High Valence” and “Low 
Valence”; Color deviants, Standard). This revealed that the superior recall 
performance for arousing background pictures was caused only by arousing 
pictures with high valence level (exciting and pleasant) and not by arousing 
pictures with low valence rating (exciting and unpleasant). As above, subject’s 
gender did not have a major impact on recall performance (Main effect of 
CONDITION, F (3,57) = 12.45; p < .001; pairwise comparisons: High valence 
trials differed from all other conditions, p < .017 (Bonferroni-corrected); no 
significant main effect of GENDER or interaction). See Figure 4 c and Table 2 
 
Arousing Background CONDITION Standard Pos 5-8 Color 
High valence Low valence 
Recall 26.9 (9.4) 26.4 (10.7) 39.4 (14) 30.5 (11.9) 
VRI  -.53 (5.7) 12.5 (12.7) 3.6 (6.2) 
Table 2: Recall performance in percent for the Standard, the Color and the Arousing 
Background (subdivided into high and low valence) condition. Values are means across 
all 21 subjects, SDs are given in brackets. VRI indexes the Von-Restorff-index, 
computed by subtracting the recall percentage for Standard words from the arousing or 
color recall percentage. 
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3.2.2.2. ERP data 
ERPs modulated by deviance 
To test whether deviance was detected for color isolates as well as for 
emotional background isolates, ERPs were averaged for all three conditions 
independent of recall performance (see Figure 5 left panel).  
Visual inspection: There was an increased positive ERP component, 
strongest on parietal scalp portions, seen for color isolates and even more 
pronounced for emotional background isolates. This component emerged around 
400 ms and lasted until the end of the averaging period. See Figure 5, left panel. 
Statistical analysis: Differences between the 3 conditions were seen on 
parietal, but not on frontal electrode sites (rmANOVA based on mean 
amplitudes, 400 to 900 ms time window, factors CONDITION (3 levels), 
ELECTRODE (4 levels), between group GENDER (women, men): significant 
CONDITION x ELECTRODE interaction, F (6, 114) = 6.73, p < .001). The 
emotional deviant condition elicited the strongest, the standard condition the 
weakest positive component. The gender or the subjects did not influence the 
amplitude (rmANOVA on Pz, Factor CONDITION, GENDER; Main effect 
CONDITION: F (2,38) = 11.77, p < .001; no other significant effects. Mean 
amplitudes on Pz: standard 3.3 µV, emotional isolate 6.0 µV, color isolate 
4.1 µV, all conditions differed; p < .031.). See Figure 5, left panel. 
ERPs modulated by deviance and recall performance 
Visual inspection: Visual inspection showed that there was a long-lasting 
more positive ERP wave found for recalled compared to not recalled items 
(DM-effect). Although also seen for not isolated items, this effect was strongest 
for color isolates and for emotional isolates. However, the DM effect was quite 
variable across subjects, what might be at least partly caused by limited number 
of trials, especially in the “recalled” conditions.  
Statistical analysis: Statistical analysis as described above (section 
3.2.1.4) revealed no reliable DM-effects in any of the three conditions. This was 
unexpected, since visual inspection indicated clear differences and the DM-
effect is often described in literature.  
Failure to validate the effect statistically might be due to differences 
between subjects. One possible factor could be the gender of the subject, since it 
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was shown that woman react differently on arousing IAPS stimuli (Kemp, 
Silberstein, Armstrong, & Nathan, 2004; Wrase et al., 2003). Thus, the same 
analysis was conducted for the 13 women. Due to the limited number of male 
subjects measured, this subgroup was not further analyzed. See Figure 6 b and c 
for grand averages separately for man and women. 
 
Figure 5: ERP waves for standard (no isolation), color isolated and emotional 
background isolated items on midline electrodes Fpz, Cz and Pz for all subjects. 
Visual inspection, ERPs of women: shows that women showed a DM 
effect for all three conditions. The DM effect was strongest on frontal sites for 
color deviant trials and strongest on parietal sites for emotional deviant trials. 
The DM-effect for not isolated trials was seen on frontal, central and parietal 
electrode sites.  
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Figure 6: ERP waves for standard (no isolation), color isolated and emotional 
background isolated items on midline electrodes Fpz, Cz and Pz separately for woman 
and men. 
Statistical analysis, data of women: The DM effect was significant for 
non-isolated items in the 700 to 900 ms time window (RECALL, 
F (1, 36) = 5.34, p < .039). Color deviant trials showed an widespread DM-
effect on frontal, but not on parietal electrode sites, which was earlier in onset 
compared to the non-isolation condition (RECALL x ELECTRODE, 
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F (1,36) > 2.88; p < .09 on all examined time windows, e.g. time window 200 to 
450 ms: F = 4.94; p < .024; time window 400 to 900 ms: F = 4.35; p < .023;). 
Most interestingly, there was no reliable DM-effect found for emotional isolated 
trials (no significant main effect of RECALL or significant RECALL x 
ELECTRODE interactions in any of the examined time windows (see 3.2.1.4)). 
As reported in section 3.2.2.1, valence might be an important issue in 
explaining arousal effects. However, due to the relatively low number of trials 
for recalled arousing items, a further distinction between “arousing-high 
valence” and “arousing – low valence” as done for behavioral data, was not 
possible for the ERPs in this experiment. To avoid intermixture between valence 
and arousal, the study in section 3.3 includes only highly arousing pictures that 
are low in valence. 
3.2.3. Summary and perspective 
Summary: Study 3.2 presented subjects with neutral or highly arousing 
IAPS pictures superimposed by German nouns. The subjects were required to 
recall the nouns only in the recall phase. Behavioral data show that words are 
better recalled when presented in front of arousing pictures. However, detailed 
analysis revealed that increased recall performance was only seen when words 
were presented in front of arousing high valence (pleasant) pictures, but not 
when words were presented in front of arousing low valence pictures 
(unpleasant). In line with this, a recent theory (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999) has 
shown that positive affect facilitates various aspects of cognitive performance 
(see section 4.1), among them free recall performance. A superior performance 
was not seen for colored word trials. 
ERPs were more positive for color deviant trials and, especially, for 
arousing background trials. This indicates that subjects followed the instruction 
to pay attention to the background pictures, which might have reduced 
attentional resources allocated to foreground words and to color words (integral 
isolation attribute, see 3.1). A DM-effect was seen for women for non-isolated 
items (frontal, central and parietal) and for color isolated items on frontal sites. 
No reliable DM-effect was found for the emotional condition. 
Perspective: Based on the experience gained from study 3.2, there is 
some room for improvement regarding stimulus selection and experimental 
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design. All improvements listed below were implemented in the next experiment 
described in section 3.3: 
• DM-effects were shown for women, but not for a group of mixed 
subjects. Thus, agreeing with previous literature (Kemp, 
Silberstein, Armstrong, & Nathan, 2004; Wrase et al., 2003), 
gender might be a major issue when working with emotional 
stimuli. This is especially true when stimuli include erotic scenes 
(Bradley & Lang, 2000; Costa, Braun, & Birbaumer, 2003; Karama 
et al., 2002). Thus, study 3.3 includes only women and no erotic 
pictures. 
• IAPS ratings are different for men and women (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1997, 1999). For example, when only unpleasant pictures 
are considered, rating of women shows a high correlation between 
valence and arousal; this correlation is less pronounced in men 
(Bradley & Lang, 2000). Consequently, picture selection for study 
3.3 was based on IAPS ratings for women only. 
• As shown in study 3.2, it is important to select emotional stimuli 
carefully based on both, arousal and valence ratings. Thus, study 
3.3 includes only IAPS pictures which are high on arousal and low 
in valence (exciting and unpleasant). In addition, in study 3.2, there 
is less variance on the arousal scale among neutral pictures. 
• Although study 3.2 attempted to avoid any relationship between 
background pictures and superimposed words, it cannot be 
excluded that at least some subjects had specific picture-word 
associations. This might confound memory effects caused by words 
and by background information. To exclude this possibility in study 
3.3, word/list allocations were randomized across all subjects. 
• Recall performance on middle positions was relatively low. Thus, 
ERPs for recalled items for some subjects were based on a 
relatively low trial number (see 3.2.1.4). A general increase of 
middle position recall performance can be achieved by reducing the 
number of words to be encoded per list. Thus, in experiment 3.3, 
subjects were presented with 12 item-lists instead of 15 item lists. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
59 
• Participants were required to pay attention to both, background 
pictures and pictures to be learned. However, one could argue that a 
background picture is not regarded as background information if 
the task requires to pay attention to it. That subjects paid much 
attention especially to the arousing background information is 
reflected in the increased positive ERP component. To keep the 
background picture on the level of additional, but not task-relevant 
information, subjects in study 3.3 were instructed to encode the 
words only. Any explicit reference to the background pictures was 
avoided. 
• Study 3.2 contained a color and an emotional isolate item in each 
list. However, although they were never presented directly adjacent, 
it cannot be excluded that there are interactions between both 
isolates. An isolated item is defined in the framework of other 
items. If one of the non-isolated items is distinct in any dimension, 
the isolating property of the “oddball” is weakened. To get clearer 
isolation attributes, study 3.3 includes only one isolated item per 
list, which, again, was either isolated by color or by background 
arousal level. 
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3.3. Experiment 1b: Memory recall in arousing situations 
3.3.1. Methods 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
Data were acquired from 23 right-handed women from different faculties 
at the Otto-von Guericke-University Magdeburg (age range 20 to 35, mean age: 
24, SD 3.9). All subjects were native speakers of German. Data from 5 subjects 
had to be discarded due to excessive artifacts in the EEG-tracings. Thus, data of 
18 subjects were analyzed. See section 2.1 for additional information. 
3.3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
The experiment was based on the study described in section 3.2. There 
were several improvements regarding stimulus selection and experimental 
design (see section 3.2.3).  
Each subject participated in 2 sessions, separated by at least one week. 
Both sessions consisted of a Color deviant and an Arousing background deviant 
block. The sequence of the blocks was counterbalanced across subjects and 
sessions.  
All parameters except the distinctiveness manipulation were identical for 
the blocks. There were 40 lists per block, yielding 480 words per block, 960 
words per session and 1920 words for the entire experiment (12 words x 40 lists 
x 2 blocks (arousing vs. color deviant) x 2 sessions). The same 480 words were 
used in all blocks, but the position of the words and the accompanying 
background pictures were allocated randomly. Thus, in contrast to experiment 
3.2, there was a new and unique picture-word sequence for every subject, block 
and session.  
Each list consisted of 12 trials (compared to 15 in experiment 3.2). A trial 
consisted of an IAPS picture background and a superimposed German noun. 
Trial properties (frame, font, size, visual angle and word position) were the same 
as in experiment 3.2. Each trial was presented for 1500 ms. Prior to each trial, a 
fixation cross with a varying duration between 600 and 1000 ms was shown. A 
screen at the end of the list indicated the beginning of the recall phase. The next 
list was started by a button press. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
61 
Instruction: Participants were instructed to recall all words shown in the 
previous block verbally (rather than written as in experiment 3.2). Recalled 
words were recorded with a computer microphone for later analysis. Participants 
were not required to recall the words in the same sequence as previously shown, 
and there was no instruction regarding the encoding strategy. Unlike instruction 
in experiment 3.2, subjects were not informed that word stimuli are presented in 
front of pictures. The task was simply to recall as many words as possible. 
Deviant stimuli: Distinctiveness was created by changing either the 
word's color from white to colored (Color deviant condition, see below for color 
selection) or the word's background picture from low on the arousal scale to 
high on the arousing/low on the valence scale (unpleasant) (Arousing 
background condition, see below for picture selection). In contrast to experiment 
3.2, there was only one distinctiveness manipulation in each list, color isolate in 
the Color blocks, arousing background in the Arousing background blocks. 
Trials with a low arousing IAPS picture background (see below for picture 
selection) and white font words in the foreground constituted the Standard 
condition. To avoid confounds with the primacy and recency effect, the 
distinctiveness attribute was only changed on word positions from 5 to 8, and 
also behavioral and ERP data for the Standard condition were only generated 
from list position 5 to 8. The distinctiveness attribute appeared with the same 
frequency on each of the 4 middle positions. An example of a single list is 
depicted in Figure 7. 
Word selection: 480 German nouns were selected from the CELEX 
Lexical Database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995). Four to 11 letter 
words were included and all words were emotionally neutral. Emotional 
neutrality of words was assured using the same procedure as described in section 
3.2.1.2. The 480 words were randomly selected from the remaining word set. 
Picture selection: Words were presented in front of colored pictures 
taken from the IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997, 1999) (see section 
3.2.1.2 for additional information). In contrast to the experiment described in 
3.2, background pictures were selected based on their arousing values for 
women and only high arousing pictures with low valence level were selected. A 
picture was defined to be low arousing when the mean value of the arousing 
scale plus 0.5 SD did not exceed the value 5 on the IAPS arousal scale. Pictures 
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with portrait alignment were excluded, 120 of the remaining pictures were 
selected on a random basis (mean arousal value = 3.2; minimum = 1.9; max = 
4.4) for the neutral background condition. A picture was considered to be 
arousing when the mean arousal value minus 1 SD was above 5 and the valence 
was lower than 5. Pictures with portrait alignment and extremely intrusive 
pictures were excluded. Ten pictures were chosen from the remaining set (mean 
arousal level 7.3; minimum 6.9; maximum 7.4). Pictures contained i.e. 
mutilations, dead bodies, snakes, threatening situations. See Appendix 2 for 
arousal and valence ratings for arousing pictures and Figure 8 for the selected 
pictures in the IAPS valence arousal space. 
Color selection: Since the Arousing Background condition was made 
distinct by 10 different emotional backgrounds, 10 different colors from the 256 
RGB color scale were selected for the color word condition. Only colors that are 
easy to discriminate were included.  
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Figure 7: Experimental setup for experiment 3.3 . A sequence of 12 trials constituted one 
list. Isolation was achieved either by changing the font color (color isolate) to one of 10 
colors or by changing the emotional background picture from neutral to highly arousing 
(arousing background isolate). There was either a color or an emotional background 
isolate in each list. 
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Figure 8: IAPS stimuli selected for the neutral and the arousing background condition 
in experiment 3.3, ratings are for women only. Picture details for the arousing 
background pictures are given in Appendix 2. 
3.3.1.3. Data recording and preprocessing 
See section 2.4.1 for general recording issues. Eye artifacts were rejected 
as described in section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, head artifacts were rejected as described 
in section 2.4.1. Due to more recalled trials on middle positions, it was not 
necessary to conduct any artifact correction or filtering. 
3.3.1.4. Data analysis 
The same conditions as described in section 3.2.1.4 were generated 
relative to a 100 ms pre-trial baseline. Midline positions were ranging from list 
positions 5 to 8, trials presented on positions 1 to 4 and 9 to 12 were not further 
analyzed here. Detailed analysis of Primacy and Recency effects based on the 
same data will be available elsewhere (Wiswede, Rüsseler, & Münte, 2007). 
 
64 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
65 
The mean number of trials included in each of the six conditions is listed 
in Table 3. 
 
CONDITION RECALL Mean trial number SD Range 
Recalled 127 44 80-236 Standard 
Not recalled 197 54 81-309 
Recalled 22 6 14-34 Arousing 
Not recalled 34 11 10-55 
Recalled 25 7 11-42 Color 
Not recalled 32 12 15-56 
Table 3: The number of trials included to generate the ERP conditions in study 3.3. 
Although, after artifact correction, there were a few subjects with a low 
number of trials included in some of the averages (lowest trial number: 10), all 
averages provided clear signals. 
Time windows for statistical analysis were based on visual inspection. 
The deviance effect was examined in time windows 180-250ms, 250-350 ms, 
450-700 ms and 700-900 ms. The DM-effect was examined in time windows 
200-450 ms and 450-800 ms. Statistical analysis was the same as described in 
section 3.2.1.4. 
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Behavioral data – recall performance 
Overall, participants recalled 46.5 percent of the words. Words at the 
beginning of the list (position 1 to 4, Primacy effect) were recalled in 41.1 
percent, at the end of the list (position 9 to 12, Recency effect) in 67.7 percent of 
the cases (Fig. 1). The Primacy and Recency effect will not be further discussed 
in this paper (see Wiswede, Rüsseler, & Münte, 2007).In the following, trials 
that occurred at positions 5 to 8 of each list are considered only. 
There was better recall performance for the Color condition compared to 
Arousing background and Standard conditions (F (2,34) = 5.78, P < .007; see 
Table 4 for recall performance). Paired t-tests revealed significant differences 
between Standard and Color (T (17) = -3.39; P< .003), Color and Arousing 
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Background (T (17) = -2.43; P< .026), but no differences between Standard and 
Arousing Background (T (17) = -.71). See Figure 9 and Table 4. 
 
 Condition 
 Standard Pos 5-8 Arousing Background   Color 
Recall 38.4 (10.1) 39.9 (11.0) 45.3 (11.6) 
VRI  1.5 (9.2) 6.9 (8.7) 
Table 4: Recall performance in percent for the Standard, the Arousing Background and 
the Color condition. Values are means across all 18 subjects, SDs are given in brackets. 
VRI indexes the Von-Restorff-index, computed by subtracting the recall percentage for 
Standard words from the arousing or color recall percentage. 
 
 
Figure 9: Behavior data for experiment 3.3. a) Recall performance across all 12 serial 
positions, divided by isolation attribute. Right panel: recall performance for single 
subjects. 
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3.3.2.2. ERP data 
ERPs modulated by deviance 
Visual inspection: Grand average ERPs averaged across recalled and 
non-recalled words are shown in Figure 10 a. The first clearly distinguishable 
component is the N100-P200 complex, which is typically seen for visually 
presented words.  
Color isolates elicited a more positive ERP deflection around 180 ms, 
which was most pronounced at electrode-sites Fz and Cz (see Figure 10). A 
strong positivity was seen for Color as well as for Arousing Background isolates 
emerging around 300 ms. This component was parietally distributed for 
Arousing Background and seen on parietal and in attenuated manner on more 
anterior electrodes. 
Statistical analysis: The Color word condition differed from the Neutral 
and the Arousing condition within the 180-250 ms time window (rmANOVA, 
factors CONDITION (Standard, Color, Arousing Background) and SITE (Fpz, 
Fz, Cz, Pz) based on mean amplitude in the 180-250 ms time window; 
CONDITION (F (2,34) = 6.69; p < .004, CONDITION x SITE n.s., pairwise 
comparisons: Color word condition differed from both others, p < .033). Three 
further time intervals based on visual inspection of the grand average waveforms 
were assessed, 250 to 350 ms; 450 to 700 ms and 700 to 900 ms. In the 250 to 
350 ms interval, mean amplitude for Color words was more positive compared 
to Standard words. Amplitude differences between standard and Arousing 
Background words did not reach statistical significance (significant effect of 
CONDITION (F (2,34) = 4.09; p < .03). The same pattern was found in the 450 
to 700 ms time window (CONDITION (F (2,34) = 5.02; p < .03; Color words 
more positive than Standard words). 
Within the 700 to 900 ms time window, both classes of isolates differed 
from the Standard, whereas there are no significant differences between both 
types of isolates (CONDITION (F (2,34) = 4.92; p < .015). 
ERPs modulated by deviance and recall performance 
Visual inspection: There was a more positive going waveform for 
recalled compared to non-recalled items, starting at 250 ms for the Standard and 
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at 450 ms for the Color condition. Importantly, this clear and long-lasting DM 
effect was not seen for the Arousing Background condition (see Fig. 3a and 3b).  
Statistical analysis: In the 200 to 450 ms time window, there was a 
significant effect of RECALL in the Standard (F (1, 17) = 12.17, p < .003), but 
not in the Color (F (1,17) = .11; p < .74) or Arousing Background condition 
(F (1,17) = .93; p < .35) . In the 450 to 800 ms time window, there was a 
significant main effect of RECALL for the Standard (F (1,17) = 13.17, p < .003) 
and the Color (F (1,17 = 5.17, P <.04), but not for the Arousing Background 
condition (F (1,17) = .40; p < .53). 
While visual inspection hinted at a small DM-effect in the Arousing 
Background condition between 300 and 400 ms, statistical analysis did not 
confirm this (ANOVA on the mean amplitude 300 to 400 ms, RECALL: 
(F (1,17) = 1.21; p < .29). Visual inspection might imply that there is an inverse 
DM-effect for the Color condition in the 200 to 300 ms time range. However, 
statistics conducted as described above revealed that the more negative 
waveform for recalled color isolates was not significant (F (1,17) = .87; p < .37; 
n.s.). 
The scalp distribution of the DM-effect in the 450-800 ms time window is 
depicted in Figure 10 d. For the Standard condition, the difference between 
recalled and non-recalled words had a frontoparietal distribution. In contrast, the 
DM-effect for the Color condition has a clear frontal maximum. 
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Figure 10: a) to c): ERP waves on midline electrodes Fpz, Fz, Cz and Pz. a) Grand 
average for the Standard, the Color and the Arousing background condition without 
considering recall performance. b) DM-effect for the three conditions. c) Difference 
waves (recalled minus non-recalled) for the three conditions. A clear DM-effect is only 
seen for the Standard and the Color word condition. d) Scalp distribution for the 450-
800 ms time window. 
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3.3.3. Summary 
Words that are isolated by a different color are remembered better than 
non-isolated words. This isolation advantage is not seen for words that are 
presented in front of a highly arousing picture. ERPs show that there is an 
increased P300 effect for words isolated by color and a delayed P300 for words 
isolated by a highly arousing background. An ERP modulation due to 
subsequent memory, a DM-effect, is seen for Standard and Color isolates, but 
not for Arousing Background words. This DM-effect starts later for colored 
words than for standard words. 
In contrast to study 3.2, the Arousing Background stimuli elicited a P300 
that was enhanced relative to Standard, but not larger in amplitude than the 
P300 elicited by Color isolates. This might reflect differences in the instruction; 
the explicit instruction in study 3.2 to pay attention also to the background 
pictures might result in an additional P300 enhancement. Thus, the P300 is seen 
as evidence that arousing background pictures were salient enough to catch 
attentional resources, while remaining nonintegral information. 
3.4. Discussion – Part 1 
3.4.1. Behavioral data 
The finding that words isolated by color are recalled better replicates 
earlier results (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; von Restorff, 1933; Wallace, 1965). 
Failure to find enhanced memory effects for color isolated items in experiment 
3.2 are attributed to the instruction (subjects were required to pay attention to the 
emotional background stimuli) and to the presence of two distinctiveness 
attributes per list, which might diminish the distinctiveness of the color attribute.  
Study 3.3 has shown that there was no memory enhancement when words 
were presented exclusively in front of arousing unpleasant stimuli. This was 
unexpected when having only the non-integral background picture properties 
and not the emotional properties in mind, because previous research has shown 
that changing a non-integral item attribute results also in a VR-effect (Otten & 
Donchin, 2000). Consequently, the absence of the VR-effect in the Arousing 
Background condition in study 3.3 can not merely be attributed to the non-
integral nature of the isolation. Higher coherence among emotional stimuli 
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(Maratos, Allan, & Rugg, 2000) is also no major issue in the present study, since 
this would be expected to result in better than normal recall performance for the 
arousing background condition. 
Adolphs, Tranel and Buchanan (2005) presented neutral pictures 
embedded either in a neutral or in an emotionally highly arousing story to 
amygdala-damaged subjects, brain-damaged controls (unimpaired amygdala) 
and healthy controls. They found that under the emotionally arousing condition, 
recall performance was increased for gist, but not for peripheral information of 
the neutral pictures in healthy and amygdala-unimpaired subjects. This pattern 
was reversed in amygdala-impaired subjects. At first glance, those data appear 
to contradict the present finding; recall was not enhanced for word stimuli with 
arousing background. However, it is crucial how to distinguish between gist and 
irrelevant information: Adolphs and colleagues defined (2005) gist information 
as information essential to the meaning of the picture (for example, who were 
the main characters in the picture) and background information to be irrelevant 
(for example, what the clouds looked like) for the meaning of the picture. A 
distinction between gist and irrelevant information cannot be made for the words 
in experiment 3.3. A gist/irrelevant distinction for background pictures was not 
conducted in the present studies, because background pictures were not task-
relevant and recall performance was not assessed. Thus, instead of 
distinguishing between gist and irrelevant information, the relationship between 
task-relevant word and task-irrelevant, but highly arousing background picture, 
will be considered in more detail.  
While it has been shown previously that emotionally enriched stimuli 
enhance memory performance (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; 
Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Palomba, Angrilli, & Mini, 1997), there is evidence 
that under some circumstances, memory performance can also be decreased in 
highly arousing situations. For example, Erk et al. (Erk et al., 2003) found no 
increased memory performance for words in negative compared to non-
emotional encoding trials. They (Erk et al., 2003) pointed out that negative 
emotion might improve memory performance when it is part of the item to be 
encoded, but that it does not improve performance when it is part of the learning 
environment, as it was the case in the present study. Thus, similar to the integral 
vs. non-integral distinction introduced in section 3.1.4, the emotional content 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
72 
might be a central or a peripheral aspect of the encoding material (see Reisberg 
& Hertel, 2004 for overview). This idea is derived from an old hypothesis 
introduced by Easterbrook in 1959 (Easterbrook, 1959): Arousal causes a 
narrowing of attention, which makes the aroused organism more sensitive to 
central information, but less sensitive to encoding material presented at the 
periphery. More recent research with human subjects supports this idea; central 
details were recalled more frequently than peripheral details in memories of 
shocking events (Berntsen, 2002; Reisberg & Hertel, 2004). Following this 
argumentation, the Arousing background condition in study 3.3 can be regarded 
as a stimulus set consisting of an attention-capturing highly arousing, unpleasant 
element underlying an unemotional, less attention-attracting word. This puts the 
arousing background information rather than the word in the center of attention. 
This pattern is reversed in all other conditions, since the non-emotional 
background pictures do not act as an “attention-magnet” (Reisberg & Hertel, 
2004) and, thus, remains background information overlaid by a central, task-
relevant word. That means that only in the Arousing background condition the 
background information could interact with memory processes. It is conceivable 
that the arousing information interrupted encoding processes, and, thus, 
decreases recall performance back to normal level. 
In study 3.2, also no enhanced memory effect for words presented in front 
of arousing unpleasant pictures was obtained. However, increased memory 
performance for words presented in front of arousing pleasant IAPS pictures 
was clearly seen. Although this finding replicates earlier results (Erk et al., 
2003), this finding requires a more detailed differentiation of the “attention 
magnet” explanation introduced above. This can be done by taking not only the 
arousal, but also the valence level into account: While negative context enhance 
memory performance only for the negative item and withdrawing attentional 
resources from other items (weapon focus, see section 3.1.5), study 3.2 provides 
evidence that positive context cues enhance memory performance also for non-
emotional information. Thus, positive context might not possess the same 
“attentional magnet” properties than negative context stimuli; attention is not 
withdrawn from the task-relevant, but emotionally neutral item. Instead, the 
neutral item is enhanced with pleasant information and, thus, more likely to be 
recalled.  
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Recent research suggests that changes in affective state interact with a 
broad variety of cognitive functions (see section 4.1). For example, there is 
emerging evidence that positive affects facilitates creative problem solving, 
decision making and flexibility (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004). For memory encoding, it has been argued that positive affect 
increases memory for task that require active recall rather than recognition (Erk, 
Martin, & Walter, 2005). This is in line with the presented findings; experiment 
3.2 shows increased memory performance when pictures in front of positive 
pictures. 
One could argue that the behavior effects described in both studies are not 
caused by emotion, but merely by attention directed toward or away from the 
stimulus to be encoded. 
• Memory performance was increased for pleasant arousing 
background pictures in experiment 3.2 because the pleasant 
background enhances all, central and peripheral details and does not 
withdraw attention from the word to be learned. 
• Memory performance was not enhanced for words presented in 
front of unpleasant arousing stimuli (experiment 3.2 and 3.3), since 
unpleasant pictures withdraw attention from the non-emotional 
item. 
• Memory performance was enhanced for the color condition in 
experiment 3.3 because additional attentional resources were 
allocated to the central color attribute in the Color condition 
However, I do not think that this is a feasible alternative explanation, 
because other research (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Reisberg & Hertel, 2004) 
demonstrated a clear distinction between emotion-induced and attention-induced 
effects on memory performance: emotional contents increases memory 
selectively for central information, whereas attention-capturing, but unemotional 
stimuli do not selectively increase recall performance for central as well as 
peripheral information. 
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3.4.2. Brain Potentials  
Behavioral data clearly indicate that it is of major importance to clearly 
distinguish between pleasant and unpleasant valence when working with 
emotional pictures. A valence-based distinction was not possible for study 3.2, 
see section 3.2.3. Thus, the following section discusses ERP findings from study 
3.3 only. 
The most important ERP findings were a) a P300 effect, seen for the 
Color as well as Arousing background isolates, b) a DM-effect for the Standard 
and the Color condition, but not for the Arousing background condition, c) no 
positive slow wave in the Arousing background condition. These findings will 
now be discussed in detail. 
The P300 for Color isolates as well as for Arousing Background isolates 
clearly indicates that subjects did process the arousing background information. 
Unlike previous research (Otten & Donchin, 2000), which included also a non-
integral, but non-emotional isolation attribute (frame around the word), the P300 
in the Arousing background condition was not markedly reduced in amplitude 
compared to the integral isolation condition. This might reflect emotional 
processing which adds to the P300 amplitude elicited by pure non-integral 
properties. The large P300 for the Arousing background condition might be the 
neuropsychological correlate of the attention-capturing properties of emotional 
stimuli discussed above. The delayed peak latency for Arousing backgrounds 
might reflect increased stimulus complexity.  
The DM-effect for the Color Isolate condition consists of a frontal and a 
parietal part: the latter likely represents a modulation of the P300, while the 
former is not easily explained in a P300 framework. The parietal DM-effect has 
often been discussed based on the context updating hypothesis developed to 
account for P300 modulations (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Fabiani & Donchin, 
1995; Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Otten & Donchin, 2000). More intense 
context updating leads to a better memory trace, which increases the likelihood 
of successful recall. Words isolated by color contain additional information, 
which elicits more updating in working memory and leads to an improved 
memory trace during encoding and therefore to an increased VR-effect and 
P300-enhancement. As pointed out by Otten and colleagues (Otten & Donchin, 
2000), an integral part of the word (color in the current study, word size in 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
75 
(Otten & Donchin, 2000)) cannot be separated from the words’ informational 
content at an early processing stage; enhanced context updating might therefore 
be an obligatory processing step. The earlier onset of the DM-effect for the 
Standard compared to the Color condition might be due to the additional 
information content of the words isolated by color. 
Otten and Donchin (Otten & Donchin, 2000) pointed out “that some of the 
non-isolated words were distinctive in some sense, for semantic or contextual 
reasons. Specific words may appear to the subject to deviate from the general 
vocabulary used in the study. Or they may have personal associations that make 
some words distinct” (p.659). This might explain the DM-effect for non-isolated 
words (Standard words). 
The generally increased P300 amplitude for Arousing Background stimuli 
was not associated with increased recall performance. Although unexpected and 
not supported by studies using IAPS pictures only (Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002), 
this finding is nevertheless in line with earlier observations (Fabiani, Karis, & 
Donchin, 1990; Otten & Donchin, 2000) showing that the P300 amplitude is not 
necessarily a valid predictor for recall performance. Consequently, 
distinctiveness alone is not sufficient to elicit an enhanced P300 component for 
recalled items. Thus, having in mind that the Arousing background condition 
elicited a strong P300 independent of recall performance, I conclude that a 
P300-recall-relationship does not merely arise because a distinctiveness attribute 
triggers deeper and more extensive processing. It also matters how 
distinctiveness is achieved.  
I see three ways to explain the missing P300-recall-relationship for the 
Arousing Background condition: First, the highly arousing pictures draw 
attention from the words toward the arousing background pictures. Unlike in the 
study conducted by Otten and Donchin (Otten & Donchin, 2000), who 
concluded that the cognitive system could redirect the attentional resources 
away from a non-integral, but unemotional distinctiveness attribute, such an 
attentional redirection was not possible for our non-integral, but highly arousing 
isolation attribute. This resulted in an increased P300 for the Arousing 
background condition. It seems unlikely that recall performance for the words 
could benefit from the increased overall arousal level induced by the 
background picture, because arousing information increases memory 
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performance for gist, but not for peripheral information (Reisberg & Hertel, 
2004). Thus, the P300 is solely caused by the background pictures; there is no 
contribution of context updating elicited by the words. Consequently, there is 
also no P300-recall relationship for the recalled words. It appears that the recall-
predicting part of the P300 can only be added by integral items. It is conceivable 
that a P300-recall-relationship would be seen if subjects were required to recall 
the content of the emotional background task. In this way, the emotional content 
would be an integral part and a gist of the encoding material. However, this 
assumption cannot be tested by the present study, because recall performance to 
the emotional background pictures was not acquired. Second, words with 
Arousing Background might be transferred into working memory, but are 
instantly overwritten by the arousing picture content. This would predict a 
memory performance for the Arousing Background condition that is even lower 
than for non-isolated words which was not the case. The third explanation is 
based on the earlier finding that subjects do not show a VR-effect in behavioral 
data and no P300-recall relationship in the ERPs when they were instructed to 
use an elaborative rather than a rote rehearsal strategy to encode word stimuli 
(Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Karis, Fabiani, & Donchin, 1984). To some 
extent, this finding is similar to the results presented here. Since a P300-recall-
relationship is not seen when subjects refrain from rote strategies, I assume that 
arousing context could interrupt the rehearsal strategy normally used in simple 
memory tasks. 
In contrast to Donchin and Fabiani (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990), the 
present experiment did not yield a positive slow wave for the Arousing 
background condition, which needs some further explanation. There are 
important differences between this putative “enforced strategy change” and the 
instructed strategy changes used elsewhere (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990): 
Instructing a subject to use a specific encoding strategy triggers top-down 
processes, which might influence memory performance and ERP components. 
There was no strategic instruction in the present study, the proposed strategy 
change was stimulus driven. These differences might contribute to the 
emergence of the recall sensitive frontal positive slow wave in Fabiani et al. 
(Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990). 
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On the other hand, a positive slow wave was also found when subjects 
used a rote encoding strategy (Otten & Donchin, 2000). Otten and Donchin 
(Otten & Donchin, 2000) attributed the positive slow wave to “the retrieval of 
preexisting knowledge about the word or to connecting the words with episodic 
information” (p. 658). Apparently, depending on task requirements and stimulus 
properties, successful encoding processes might be reflected in an increased 
P300 or an increased positive slow wave. I add another aspect, namely that 
recall performance and ERPs might be decoupled as seen in the Arousing 
background condition. It has to be kept in mind that fMRI revealed a number of 
deep brain structures who display strong DM-type effects. Especially the 
amygdala has been shown to be involved in processing of arousing information 
(Adolphs, Tranel, & Buchanan, 2005; Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Erk et al., 2003). 
However, those structures are not directly accessible by ERP technique, and 
thus, their “DM-activity” can not be demonstrated by ERPs. Thus, the following 
conclusions have to be considered as tentative. As mentioned above, emotional 
information enhances recall performance for the gist, but not for peripheral 
information. Adolph and colleagues (Adolphs, Tranel, & Buchanan, 2005) 
linked this finding directly to amygdala functions: they found that patients with 
unilateral amygdala damage do not show enhanced memory for gist information 
when encoding in emotional situations. Thus, the amygdala, possibly in 
cooperation with the hippocampus, might be involved in recalling words from 
the emotional background condition.  
A possible limitation of the current study is the fact that highly arousing 
but pleasant emotional background pictures (upper right quadrant of Figure 8) 
were not used. Thus, future studies should examine, whether positive affective 
information might lead to a von Restorff effect in the ERP. 
 
Experiment 3.3 was recently published in a peer-reviewed international journal 
(Wiswede, Rüsseler, Hasselbach, & Münte, 2006). Analysis of Serial Postion 
effects based on data described in experiment 3.3 are published as well 
(Wiswede, Rüsseler, & Münte, 2007). 
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4. Part 2: Emotional modulation of performance monitoring. 
4.1. Background 
Everyday experience teaches us that the way we perceive and act upon 
our environment is influenced by our current affective state. Research has shown 
that changes in affective state modify many aspects of our cognitive 
performance. For example, it is well documented that positive affect facilitates 
creative problem solving, decision making and flexibility (Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004; Isen, 2001; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987).  
There is increasing evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
its afferent and efferent connections are crucial in generating complex behavior 
and in mediating affective influences on behavior. The ACC is a part of the 
medial frontal cortex; functionally it is a part of the brain’s limbic system. 
Previous research indicated that the ACC can be subdivided into a dorsal 
cognitive and a rostral affective subdivision (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, 
Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001; Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 
2000). The cognitive subdivision holds strong reciprocal interconnections with 
lateral prefrontal regions, parietal cortex and many other structures. It has been 
shown to be activated in cognitively demanding tasks, among them stimulus-
response-selection, stroop-like tasks and performance monitoring tasks. As a 
part of the anterior attention system (Posner & Petersen, 1990), it is engaged in 
the conscious direction of executive attention. The rostral affective ACC 
subdivision holds strong connections to the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, 
hypothalamus, ventral striatum, hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortex 
subdivision (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). It is 
involved in assessing the salience of emotional and motivational information, 
the mediation of arousal and in the regulation of emotional responses (Bush, 
Luu, & Posner, 2000; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2004). 
The ACC has been extensively examined in the last years, since there is 
good evidence that it is a key structure linking cognitive and emotional 
processes. One of the most intensively addressed functional properties is 
performance monitoring. The second section of this thesis examines the 
interactions between cognitive and emotional processes exemplified by 
emotional modulation of performance monitoring. An introduction to recent 
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research is provided focusing on behavioral and electrophysiological correlates 
of choice-reaction tasks. The main hypotheses which provide the theoretical 
framework for performance monitoring processes are introduced and linked to 
modern theories of positive and negative affect. Specific hypothesis are derived 
and tested in four ERP studies. 
4.1.1. The Flanker task in performance monitoring 
Anticipation, detection, correction and avoidance of errors are major parts 
of goal-directed behavior. These processes are summarized by the term 
performance monitoring (or action monitoring); they are fundamental in 
understanding how organisms flexibly adjust to fast changes in the environment. 
Performance monitoring can be understood as the process of monitoring the 
appropriateness of an action in a given context. Inappropriateness of a response, 
defined as errors, is evaluated relative to the context of the action (Luu & 
Pederson, 2004). 
An often used paradigm to induce a reasonable amount of errors is based 
on a choice response time (RT) task introduced by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974). 
In this task, a centrally presented target letter is surrounded by distracting letters, 
which are either equivalent to the target letter (congruent) or different from the 
target (incongruent). Subjects are required to respond as fast and as accurate as 
possible to the central letter. For example, a letter string might consist of either a 
central S or a central H surrounded by peripheral SS or HH. S requires a button 
press with the left, H with the right hand. Thus, there are two conditions with the 
target and the flanker being congruent (SSSSS and HHHHH) and two conditions 
with the target and flanker being incongruent (SSHSS and HHSHH). It has been 
consistently shown that RTs are faster and error rates are lower in congruent 
trials (HHHHH, SSSSS) compared to incongruent trials (HHSHH, SSHSS). 
Eriksen and colleagues suggested that delayed RTs and higher error rates for 
incongruent flanker trials might result from competition at the motor response 
level, since incongruent flankers might invoke a conflict between flanker and 
target based motor responses. This effect has been replicated using a broad 
variety of non-letter flanker stimuli (i. e. arrow heads in Kopp, Rist, & Mattler, 
1996). 
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Behavioral studies have consistently shown that erroneous responses are 
given faster than correct responses. Subjects are usually aware of committing an 
error (Rabbitt, 2002). They adapt their performance after the erroneous response 
was given. One behavioral consequence of an error is that subjects tend to 
rapidly correct for their errors by providing the correct button press directly after 
the erroneous response, irrespective of whether they are instructed to do so or 
not. The response time for the corrective response is usually faster than for 
normal correct responses. 
A change in response strategy after error commission is indicated by the 
finding that subjects show a strong increase in reaction time for the next correct 
response following an error. This effect was first described by Rabbit (Rabbitt, 
1981) and is referred to as "post-error slowing" or “Rabbitt-effect” (Falkenstein, 
2004). Post-error slowing indicates a change in response strategy in favor to 
more cautious responses. As pointed out in recent research, post error slowing 
has to be carefully discriminated from regression to the mean effects (Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003b, 2004). This issue will be further discussed below 
(section 4.3.2.1). 
4.1.2. Neural correlates of performance monitoring 
In ERPs, there are two main components that are consistently found when 
subjects perform a Flanker task, depending on whether examining cognitive 
processes prior to the response or processes after the response to the central 
letter. When examining processes elicited by properties of the flanker-stimuli, 
the ERPs are generated stimulus-locked with the presentation of the flanker 
stimulus providing the zero point for averaging. A flanker-typical activity is an 
ERP deflection which is more negative for incongruent compared to congruent 
flanker stimuli and has been labeled N2. The N2 emerges beyond 200 ms after 
stimulus onset; it is largest at frontal to central areas Fz to Cz (Kopp, Rist, & 
Mattler, 1996; Rüsseler, Hennighausen, Münte, & Rösler, 2003; Rüsseler & 
Rösler, 2000; Van 't Ent, 2002). 
When ERPs are generated with the subject’s response being the zero point 
(response-locked ERPs), a more negative component is seen for erroneous 
compared to correct responses. This negative component has been labeled as 
ERN (Error related negativity, (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 
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1993)) or Ne (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991). It is 
observed for frontal to central scalp regions within 0 to 100 ms after the 
erroneous response. The present thesis uses the label ERN. Within the same time 
range, there is a smaller negative deflection following correct responses; which 
has been labeled CRN (Correct response negativity (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & 
Simons, 2005) or conflict related negativity (Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005)). 
The N2 and the ERN/CRN will now be introduced in detail. 
Another, but far less examined component emerges after the ERN/CRN in 
response-locked data around 200 ms. This component is a positive deflection for 
errors, which has been labeled Pe (Error Positivity). It emerges around 200 ms 
after error commission with a parietal maximum. It has been hypothesized to 
reflect conscious error processing (Falkenstein, 2004), but has also been 
associated with affective processes. Thus, the Pe might be of special importance 
for the present thesis; it will be further introduced in section 4.1.2.3. 
4.1.2.1. The stimulus-locked N2 and the response-locked 
ERN/CRN 
In the flanker task, the N2 emerges beyond 200 ms after the presentation 
of the stimulus and shows increased amplitude for incongruent compared to 
congruent trials. It is reasonable to assume that the N2 seen after incongruent 
flankers corresponds to the negativity described in Go/NoGo reaction time tasks. 
In Go/NoGo tasks, subjects are required to withhold a reaction. Similar to that, 
in a flanker task, subjects are required to withhold action tendencies induced by 
the flanker which surround the target. Thus, the N2 might be related to motor 
inhibition processes (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Kopp, Rist, 
& Mattler, 1996; Van 't Ent, 2002) and is thought to represent pre-response 
conflict. 
Whenever an erroneous response is given, a more negative deflection is 
seen in response-locked ERPs. This Error-related negativity (ERN) emerges 
around the time of an erroneous response, and peaks 50-100 ms later. The very 
fast onset after the response indicates that the underlying generator must have 
had access to an efference copy of the initiated incorrect response 
(Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). The ERN is best seen 
on frontocentral scalp portions and is symmetrical to the midline (Yeung, 
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Cohen, & Botvinick, 2004). A similar, but much smaller negativity is often seen 
after correct responses and labeled as "CRN" (conflict-related negativity) or 
"Nc" (Falkenstein, 2004). The CRN has been described to reflect a general, non-
error specific, response-related process (Falkenstein et al., 2001). Literature 
provides conflicting results about the distribution of the CRN. There is the view 
that the CRN has a different topography than the ERN, with the reference 
method being a major criterion: The CRN has been shown to be most 
pronounced somewhat more posterior than the ERN on centroparietal scalp 
portions when a linked mastoid reference is used. The topographical difference 
disappears when employing a spatial reference (current source density, CSD) 
(Falkenstein, 2004). However, others report no differences in CRN/ERN 
distribution when using linked mastoid reference (Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2004; Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005). 
The ERN/CRN and the N2 dipole sources have been shown to be 
consistent with a neural generator in various subregions of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC). Van Veen and Carter (Van Veen & Carter, 2002b) have also 
reported a dorsal ACC source for both ERN and N2 components. However, due 
to limited spatial resolution of ERP data, fMRI results might provide further 
insight. A meta-analysis of 38 fMRI studies published between 1997 and 2004 
revealed a very consistent finding: Regardless of whether studies examined 
response errors, response conflict, decision uncertainties or undesired outcomes, 
increased brain activation was found in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex, 
more specifically in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Within this region, 
there is still debate whether exactly the same regions are activated when the 
conflict occurs prior to or after the response. Although both sorts of conflict 
show high overlap in areas activated. Pre-response conflict activates regions of 
the posterior medial frontal cortex that are slightly more dorsally than regions 
activated by error monitoring (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2004). However, those authors point out that a clear distinction between regions 
for conflict and error monitoring cannot be ubiquitously confirmed by their 
meta-analysis. 
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4.1.2.2. Mismatch, conflict or bad outcome? 
There is debate about whether the ERN/CRN and the N2 reflect different 
or similar mechanisms. The following sections review the most common 
theories in explaining the underlying mechanisms of the ERN and, if possible, 
integrate the ERN/CRN and the N2 into one theoretical framework. 
There are four major hypotheses describing the functional significance of 
the ERN/CRN, namely the mismatch hypothesis, the conflict monitoring 
hypothesis, the inhibition hypothesis and the reinforcement learning hypothesis 
(Falkenstein, 2004). Those theories are best regarded as being not fundamentally 
conflicting, but, instead, they do emphasize different aspects of performance 
monitoring. All of them have in common that the ERN/CRN (and in some of 
them the N2) signals that an internal or external goal or a reward might not be 
achieved and that there is need to increase cognitive control (Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). All four theories will be shortly 
introduced, with special focus on the conflict monitoring hypothesis and the 
reinforcement learning theory, since they are of special theoretical importance 
for the present experiments. 
Mismatch: The mismatch hypothesis states that the ERN reflects a 
monitoring process that signals errors whenever it detects that the neural 
representation of a given response does not match the neural representation of 
the intended (correct) response. There are some data which support the 
mismatch hypothesis. For example, the ERN has been shown to be larger under 
moderate compared to severe time pressure. A possible explanation for this is 
that the response determination process is not conducted as thoroughly as under 
high time pressure, because the representation for the correct response might be 
impaired (Falkenstein, 2004). 
Inhibition: The Inhibition Hypothesis provides a theoretical framework 
that unifies pre-and post-response conflicts in one theory. It assumes that the 
ERN reflects the attempt to inhibit an ongoing error (Falkenstein, 2004; 
Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999). It is well known that subjects 
show an increased mediofrontal component after successful withholding a 
response (NoGo-N2) (Eimer, 1993). However, it can be reasoned that the ERN 
reflects the final (but unsuccessful) attempt to prevent the error. This hypothesis 
was challenged by studies that found different distributions of the N2 and the 
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ERN (N2 largest at Fz to Cz, ERN largest on Cz, linked earlobes reference) 
(Van 't Ent, 2002). In addition, the N2 amplitude is more pronounced in subjects 
with a high error rate, while the ERN was reported to be not responsive to 
overall error rate (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999). However, I 
regard the last-mentioned point as not very strong, since there is also literature 
reporting a stronger (more negative) ERN in subjects with a low error rate 
compared to subjects with a high error rate (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & 
Donchin, 1993; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b) and there is also 
literature reporting identical distribution of the N2 and the ERN (Van Veen & 
Carter, 2002b). 
Conflict monitoring: In contrast to the mismatch hypothesis, the conflict 
monitoring hypothesis assumes that the ERN does not reflect the mismatch 
between the representation of a given and an intended response, but the conflict 
between response representations (Carter et al., 1998; Falkenstein, 2004; van 
Veen & Carter, 2002a, 2002b). An error might occasionally occur due to 
premature responding. The correct response tendency, activated by continued 
stimulus processing, conflicts with the already executed incorrect response. This 
conflict is reflected in the ERN (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Most importantly, the conflict hypothesis makes only 
predictions about the amount of conflict; an ERN-like component would 
therefore also be expected when conflict is induced without having committed 
an error. This means that the conflict hypothesis is feasible to explain not only 
conflicts between given and intended response, but also between conflicts 
established prior to the response. In a flanker task, only the incongruent stimuli 
elicit conflict, because partial analysis of the stimulus material might activate 
correct response preparation based on middle items and incorrect response 
preparation based on flanker stimuli. Thus, the conflict hypothesis allows to 
explain the ERN/CRN and the N2 in one theoretical framework (van Veen & 
Carter, 2002a; Yeung, Cohen, & Botvinick, 2004). As mentioned above, there 
are ERP studies reporting the same distribution for the ERN and the N2, which 
supports the idea of a common underlying mechanism (Van Veen & Carter, 
2002b). On the other hand, a recent study has convincingly shown that the ERN 
is increased after administration of Yohimbine (a selective alpha2-adrenergic 
receptor antagonist), whereas the N2 remains unaffected (Riba, Rodriguez-
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Fornells, Morte, Münte, & Barbanoj, 2005). This might imply that at least 
partially distinct neural processes underlie the ERN and the N2. However, there 
is accumulating evidence that conflicts and errors do not engage exactly the 
same brain regions. There is research using a Go/NoGo-paradigm which showed 
that conflict activate dorsal aspects of the ACC, whereas errors activate more 
rostral ACC regions (Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; Menon, Adleman, 
White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001). 
Reinforcement learning: In the “reinforcement learning hypothesis”, 
Holroyd and Coles (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) propose that an ERN is generated 
whenever an event is worse than expected. This is somewhat similar to the 
mismatch hypothesis, with the mismatch not being between given and intended 
response, but between expected and actual outcome.  
More specifically, the reinforcement learning hypothesis proposes that a 
motor control system involving the anterior cingulate cortex generates behavior 
appropriate to the current external context. Simultaneously, a monitoring system 
located in the basal ganglia predicts the outcome (good or bad) of the response, 
based on information received from the external environment and an ‘efference 
copy’ of the response. When the basal ganglia estimate that the outcome of the 
response is better than predicted, they induce a phasic increase in mesencephalic 
dopaminergic brain structures activity. In contrast, when the outcome is worse 
than expected, the basal ganglia induce a phasic decrease in midbrain 
dopaminergic structure activity. The error signals are carried by the 
mesencephalic dopamine system to the anterior cingulate cortex, where they 
reinforce performance on the current task, and back to the basal ganglia, where 
they are used to improve the predictions of the monitor. The theory holds that 
the ERN is produced when a phasic decrease in activity of mesencephalic 
dopaminergic neurons following error commission disinhibits the apical 
dendrites of motor neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex. No ERN is produced 
when these dendrites are inhibited by a phasic increase in activity of 
mesencephalic dopaminergic neurons following correct responses (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Holroyd & Yeung, 2003).  
One of the biggest advantages of the Reinforcement Learning hypothesis 
is that it specifies exactly the functional circuits involved, which makes it 
possible to integrate the hypothesis with other theories of specific brain 
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functions (see below). In contrast to the conflict monitoring hypothesis, the 
Reinforcement Learning hypothesis does not make any specific predictions 
regarding the N2 component (Holroyd & Yeung, 2003). 
4.1.2.3. The error positivity Pe. 
A further component associated with action monitoring and error 
processing in response-locked ERPs is the error positivity Pe. In contrast to the 
N2 and ERN/CRN, there is relatively little research on the Pe. 
Falkenstein (2004) lists two theories which are supported by some data: 
The “conscious error recognition” hypothesis is mainly based on the finding that 
an error has to be fully perceived and thus, be conscious, to invoke an Pe. This 
hypothesis is supported by research using an antisaccade paradigm, in which 
subjects are instructed to respond with an opposite side saccade to a peripheral 
abrupt onset cue (Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). 
Antisaccade data contain a fairly amount of unperceived, incorrect reflex-like 
saccades. This makes this task feasible to distinguish between perceived and 
unperceived errors. Whereas the ERN was consistently found for both, 
perceived and unperceived erroneous saccades, the Pe was much more 
pronounced for perceived compared to unperceived errors (Nieuwenhuis, 
Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). A second theory relates the ERN to 
emotional error processing. Errors are perceived by the subjects to create 
unease. Taking this into account, the Pe has also been described to reflect an “Oh 
shit!”-response (Falkenstein, 2004). In fact, it is not unusual to hear this 
expressive word directly after the subject committed an error. There is also some 
evidence from source localization that the Pe is generated in the rostral part of 
the ACC (Van Veen & Carter, 2002b). As mentioned above, the rostral ACC has 
been associated with affective processing (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). 
4.1.3. Emotional modulation of performance monitoring 
Research on whether the ERN/CRN, the N2, and the Pe are sensitive to 
affective changes has just begun to emerge. This is surprising, because people 
usually report that unease, disappointment and frustration arises when 
committing an error or when an outcome that is worse than expected. The 
following section reviews current studies of affective modulation in 
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performance monitoring. A comprehensive model of positive affect is 
introduced and integrates it into the reinforcement learning theory introduced 
above.  
There is emerging evidence that the ERN/CRN reflects, at least to some 
extent, the emotional response to an error. This idea is not very surprising, since 
the anterior cingulate cortex is part of the limbic system, which has been 
extensively shown to be involved in affective responses (see section 1.4). A 
higher than normal performance monitoring rate, indicated by an increased 
ERN, has been observed in a variety of studies using subjects with high anxiety 
level or with psychiatric disorders characterized by high anxiety levels. 
Increased ERN amplitude was also reported for patients suffering from 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000), an 
anxiety disorder characterized by intense, recurrent, unwanted thoughts and 
rituals that are beyond the person's control and high level of negative affect 
(Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998). Fitzgerald et al. (2005) found that both, 
patients with OCD and healthy subjects, showed increased activation in the 
dorsal cognitive division of the ACC during error commission, whereas OCD 
patients only showed increased activation in the rostral emotional ACC section. 
Medication has also been shown to affect the ERN. Johannes and 
colleagues (Johannes, Wieringa, Nager, Dengler, & Münte, 2001) administered 
Oxazepam to a group of subjects and compared the ERN relative to a placebo 
group. Oxazepam is a benzodiazepine derivative and possesses anxiolytic 
properties. They found that the ERN is reduced in the Oxazepam group and 
interpreted this finding “...as support for a link between affective distress, 
associated behavior patterns, and frontal lobe executive functions” (Johannes, 
Wieringa, Nager, Dengler, & Münte, 2001, p. 104). Thus, reduced anxiety leads 
to reduced action monitoring. Interestingly, Johannes and colleagues (2001) 
report no behavior effects caused by medication. 
ERN modulations due to negative affect were also shown in non-
psychiatric subjects: Hajcak and colleagues (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 
2004) conducted a stroop-like experiment employing students which scored 
either high or low on a negative affect scale. There were no performance 
differences between both affect groups, neither in reaction time nor in post error 
slowing. However, within the ERN time window, there was an enhanced 
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negative deflection for the negative affective group. This was seen for error as 
well as for correct trials. The Pe was smaller in the high negative affect group. 
Again, this effect was seen for erroneous as well as for correct trials. A similar 
ERN increase for college students with high negative affect was also reported by 
Luu, Collins and Tucker (Luu & Pederson, 2004). Simon-Thomas and Knight 
(2005) used a working memory delay task with numeric Stroop-like stimuli in a 
within-group design on healthy subjects to investigate how the CRN and the Pe 
might be modulated by cognitive demands and negative affect. They induced 
emotions by presenting highly negative or neutral IAPS picture stimuli prior to a 
response-requiring stimuli. They found that the CRN and the Pe were selectively 
increased for initial blocks under negative affective state condition. Affective 
modulation of the ERN was not examined by Simon-Thomas and Knight (2005). 
As mentioned in section 4.1.2.2, Riba and colleagues (Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, 
Morte, Münte, & Barbanoj, 2005) showed that the ERN in an Eriksen-flanker 
task is selectively enhanced when subjects take Yohimbine. However, this drug 
is known to produce states of high arousal and anxiety. Thus, this effect might 
also be explained in the framework of affective modulation. 
4.1.3.1. Affect and performance monitoring – a common 
framework? 
Ashby and colleagues (1999) proposed a comprehensive model of how 
positive affect might impact cognitive performance. The key issue is that 
positive affect is associated with an increased dopamine level in various brain 
areas, among them the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). 
Rewarding stimuli are associated with dopamine release and, at least in humans, 
with positive affect. A dopaminergic system heavily involved in reward 
processing is the mesocorticolimbic system, which consists of dopamine 
producing neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and projects to different 
limbic and cortical areas. There are two dopaminergic VTA connections which 
might be of particular interest in understanding how positive affect modulates 
cognition: The VTA-prefrontal connection, which has been shown to interact 
with working memory processes, and the VTA-ACC connection, which 
facilitates executive attention and the selection of cognitive perspective (Ashby, 
Isen, & Turken, 1999). 
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A comprehensive proposal which links mesencephalic dopaminergic 
structures with the ACC was provided by Holroyd and Coles (2002). The 
reinforcement theory has been introduced above as a general indicator that 
signals bad outcomes. As introduced above (section 4.1.2.2), the mesencephalic 
structures, among them the VTA and the substantia nigra (SN), forward the error 
signal generated by the basal ganglia to the ACC, where the signal is used to 
adaptive behavior modification. A strong mesencephalic signal results in strong 
inhibition of the ACC error monitoring system, whereas a weaker signal causes 
the ACC to be more active. The theories proposed by Ashby, Isen, and Turken 
(1999) and by Holroyd and Coles (2002) overlap in that they describe 
mesencephalic changes in dopamine level which lead to cognitive modifications 
mediated by the ACC. Both place interactions between midbrain dopaminergic 
structures and the ACC in the center of a complex system that mediates and 
adapts behavior. I see good reason that both theories describe different aspects 
of the same (or, at least, highly overlapping) behavior regulation system and 
might be brought together: An unexpected reward or the absence of any threat or 
danger in the environment is associated with increased dopamine level and 
positive affect. This, in turn, might facilitate the switching among alternative 
cognitive perspectives and behavior alternatives (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Thus, the organism starts to explore the 
environment less cautiously, which increases the probability of a rewarding 
outcome. However, to maintain this behavior, the ACC performance monitoring 
system must adapt in that it evaluates the consequences in a less rigid way than 
it does in the wake of threat, i.e. in a state of negative affect. Integrating the 
reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), it is conceivable that 
the increase in dopaminergic midbrain activity caused by the reward predicting 
signal from the basal ganglia accumulates with the midbrain activity caused by 
positive affect. Consequently, the midbrain signal to the ACC should be stronger 
than under neutral affect conditions, which increases inhibition of the ACC 
performance monitoring system. This should result in a diminished ERN. 
Brain structures involved in generating affect are highly connected to the 
ACC performance monitoring system. Thus, in threatening situations, which 
might be associated with negative affect and go along with rapid amygdala 
activation, an organism has good reasons to avoid any behavior that might lead 
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to an unpredictable and potentially threatening outcome. To avoid any 
aberration from established behavior, the ACC performance monitoring system 
should be activated in a higher than normal manner, which should be reflected in 
an increased ERN. 
A similar idea was proposed by Wager, Phan, Liberzon, and Taylor 
(2003). They linked positive affect to the basal ganglia: “In positive emotions, 
basal ganglia may play a pivotal role in broadening the repertoire of accessible 
thoughts and actions that leads to exploratory behavior and skill-building, 
leading to activation of a number of functional loops in the basal ganglia that 
implement a wide range of thoughts and behaviors. In aversive situations, the 
basal ganglia may play a role in developing a specific action plan to deal with 
threat, leading to focal activation of circuits implementing more stereotyped 
responses “(p. 526). Here, the same idea is extended beyond the basal ganglia by 
integrating the anterior cingulate cortex. 
4.1.4. The current studies 
The four studies presented in section 4 examine how mild changes in 
affective state interfere with processes involved in supervising ongoing 
behavior. Especially experiments 4.2 and 4.3 were inspired by recent research 
published by Dreisbach and Goschke (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). They 
demonstrated that, when appropriate paradigms are used, shortly presented 
positive IAPS pictures can have clear effects on behavior: Dreisbach and 
Goschke (2004) instructed their participants to detect a target of a certain color, 
while they had to ignore a distracter presented in what had previously been the 
target color. Normally, those task settings lead to “perseveration costs” on the 
first few trials following the task switch, because the old target color is difficult 
to ignore. However, perseveration costs were reduced when the trials were 
preceded by shortly presented (250 ms) high-valence (positive) IAPS pictures 
relative to neutral and negative pictures. They concluded that positive affect 
enhances cognitive flexibility, which facilitates orientation of attentional 
resources towards the new requirements. In line with Ashby’s theory of positive 
affect introduced above (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999), Dreisbach and Goschke 
speculated “that positive affect serves as an appraisal signal indicating the 
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absence of danger or obstacles in the pursuit of current goals, thereby promoting 
less focused, explorative modes of thought and behavior” (p. 351).  
The experiments presented in section 4 extend those findings to the 
cognitive domain of performance monitoring and make specific predictions 
about the modulations induced by unpleasant emotions. In addition, the 
following experiments do allow more direct conclusions regarding the neural 
mechanisms, because physiological measures (ERPs) are also applied. Four 
experiments were conducted, in which subjects performed a flanker task while 
emotions are induced via different techniques. 
In experiments 4.2 and 4.3, emotional pictures are rapidly presented 
directly prior to the presentation of each flanker task trial. Experiment 4.2 uses 
facial expressions, experiment 4.3 highly arousing pictures taken from the IAPS 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). 
In contrast to most previous studies, the present thesis underscores the 
distinction between “seeing emotions or emotional situations” and “producing 
emotions by being personally involved”(Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Thus, 
experiment 4.4 uses facial feedback to induce emotions, experiment 4.5 provides 
subjects with either positive or negative feedback to make them either feel good 
or bad. 
The predictions are based on the theoretical framework introduced in 
section 4.1.3.1 and are summarized as followed:  
• The ERN is increased under negative affective conditions 
• The ERN is decreased under positive affective conditions. 
Since the reinforcement learning theory does not make explicit statements 
about the N2 and the conflict monitoring hypothesis has not yet been linked to 
emotional processing, specific N2 modulations cannot be predicted. 
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4.2. Experiment 2a: Emotions induced by observing facial 
expressions 
4.2.1. Methods 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
Data were acquired from 9 women. See section 2.1 for additional 
information. One subject had to be excluded due to extensive head artifacts. 
Thus, analysis was based on data from 8 subjects (mean age 22.3 years, range 18 
to 33 years). 
4.2.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
A trial consisted of the following sequence: fixation cross – emotional 
face picture – fixation cross – flanker stimulus with the following timing:  
• First fixation cross, varying duration 600 to 1000 ms, mean 800 ms  
• Emotional face picture (80 ms) 
• Second fixation cross, varying duration 600 to 800 ms, mean 
700 ms 
• Flanker stimuli until response, but no longer than 800 ms. 
See below for exact description of flanker and face stimuli. Faces 
subtended a visual angle of 4° horizontally and 6° vertically. See Figure 11 for 
an example of a trial. The experiment consisted of 2100 trials. A feedback 
screen was presented after every 30 trials, informing the subjects whether they 
were faster or slower than in the previous 30 trials. This procedure was 
introduced to keep subjects attending and to maintain fast responses. 
Participants terminated the feedback screen by button press. After 210 trials, 
there was a break for 15 seconds. Participants could request longer breaks if 
necessary. 
Instruction: Participants were instructed to respond as fast and correct as 
possible on the middle letter in the flanker stimulus. H was mapped the left hand 
button and S required a right hand button press. Subjects were not instructed that 
an emotional face expression was presented prior to the flanker stimulus. 
Emotional stimuli: Emotions were induced by presenting emotional face 
pictures taken from the Ekman and Friesen Face stimuli set(Ekman & Friesen, 
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1976; Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002); see section 
1.5.2. Stimuli depicted neutral, happy and fearful face expressions of 10 
different people. See Appendix 3 for a list of all face stimuli used. 
Face pictures were grayscale and depicted four male and six female faces 
without any artificial features (glasses, necklace, piercing etc.). The picture set 
was provided in a preprocessed manner depicting the face only; peripheral face 
features (hair, ears) were replaced by gray color. Examples of face pictures are 
given in Figure 11 . 
In agreement with Whalen et al. (1998), fearful faces rather than angry 
faces were selected to represent negative valence stimuli. This was done because 
it is well known that an angry face represents a direct threat. In contrast, the 
relation between a fearful face and a threat is more ambiguous. It signals the 
presence of a danger, but not the source of a danger. Thus, a fearful face can be 
conceptualized as a contextual stimulus, whereas an angry face can be 
conceptualized as a specific cue. 
Research has shown that emotional (or affective) responses to facial 
stimuli can be activated after only a minimal duration of stimulus exposure or 
even when subjects do not perceive face expressions consciously (see section 
1.5.2). Thus, the very short presentation of emotional face stimuli for only 80 ms 
was regarded as sufficient to elicit reactions specific to perceiving emotional 
expressions. 
Flanker stimuli: Flanker stimuli consisted of black capital letters 
(“Courier new” font) H or S presented in front of a gray background (128, 128, 
128 in RGB color space). A congruent flanker string was either HHHHH or 
SSSSS; incongruent flanker strings were SSHSS or HHSHH. Flankers were 
presented in random order, there were 60 % congruent and 40 % incongruent 
trials. They covered 2.1 ° of visual angle. 
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Figure 11: Experimental design for experiment 4.2. Emotional modulation was induced 
by presenting a neutral, a happy or a fearful face prior to the flanker stimulus. 
4.2.1.3. Data recording and preprocessing 
See section 2.4.1 for general recording issues. Eye artifacts were corrected 
using blind component separation described in section 2.4.2., head artifacts were 
rejected as described in section 2.4.1. 
4.2.1.4. Data analysis 
Trials with RTs lower than 200 ms or higher than 800 ms were excluded 
from behavioral data analysis. Behavior data and ERP data were analyzed using 
repeated measurement ANOVAs. Depending on the question, some or all of the 
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following factors were included in the rmANOVAs: CORRECTNESS (2 levels, 
Correct or erroneous response to flanker stimulus), FACEEMOTION (3 levels, 
neutral, happy, fear face). It was assumed that the emotional impact on 
behavioral data and ERPs change over time (Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005). 
Thus, the experiment was divided into two sections. Unlike previous research 
(Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005), the present study examines emotional effects 
not only on correct trials, but also on erroneous trials. Dividing the experiment 
after half of the trials (Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005) could result in an 
unequal number of erroneous trials per experimental half, since errors are often 
not equally distributed across the entire experiment. To avoid this, the 
experiment was divided after commission of 50 percent of the errors (Factor 
ERRORHALVES, levels “first half” and “second half”). However, subjects do 
not show the same performance across the entire experiment; some subjects 
have an increased error rate during the beginning of the experiment, whereas 
others become less accurate later on. Appendix 7 a) provides estimation for each 
subject whether the same performance (error rate) was maintained during the 
entire experiment. A value lower than 50 % indicates that less than half of the 
correct responses were given at the point where 50 % of the errors were 
committed. In this case, subjects had an increased error rate at the beginning of 
the experiment. 
Post-error slowing: Post error slowing refers to the consistent finding 
that that trials directly following an error (post-error trials) are slower compared 
to trials that follow correct responses (post-correct trials) (Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2003b, 2004; Rabbitt, 1981, 2002). However, since erroneous trials are 
usually faster than correct trials, this effect could be caused by regression toward 
the mean: Fast responses are relatively rare. Thus, it is more likely that a fast 
response is succeeded by a more slowly response. Since errors are usually faster 
than correct responses, it is more likely that a relatively slow correct response 
follows. To distinguish between post-error effects caused by regression towards 
the mean from “pure” error-induced RT slowing, a subset of correct trials was 
selected that matches the erroneous trials in terms of reaction time and total 
number. Thus, the selected correct trials belong to the faster responses among all 
of the correct trials. Reaction times of correct trials given directly after those 
response-matched correct trials (post-correct trials) and response times of 
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correct responses given directly after an erroneous response (post-error trials) 
provide the basis for post-error slowing analysis. 
Face-locked ERP analysis: Face-locked ERPs were analyzed relative to 
a 100 ms baseline; exact description and selection criteria for the time windows 
are given in section 4.2.2.2. 
Flanker-locked ERP analysis: Flanker-locked ERPs were analyzed 
relative to a 100 ms baseline in a time window from 300 to 400 ms after flanker 
stimulus onset. The time window was defined by visual inspection. To be 
consistent with the analyses of subsequent experiments, statistics were also 
conducted in a 200 to 400 ms time window. RmANOVA included the factors 
CONGRUENCY (congruent vs. incongruent flanker) and FACEEMOTION on 
a parietal patch of electrodes (averaged across CP1, CP2, Cz and Pz). 
Response-locked ERP analysis: Statistics were conducted relative to a 
200 ms pre response baseline. Consistent with behavioral data analysis and 
previous ERP research (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005), trials with 
reaction times faster than 200 ms or slower than 800 ms were excluded from 
analysis. The ERN was examined on a frontocentral electrode patch (averaged 
across electrodes FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz); the CRN and the Pe were analyzed 
somewhat more posterior on a centroparietal electrode patch (averaged across 
CP1, CP2, Cz and Pz).  
It is an established finding that participants display shorter reaction times 
to erroneous compared to correct responses. Because uniformly fast reaction 
times can give rise to stimulus-related activity in the response-locked ERN, and 
because correct trials vastly outnumber incorrect trials, CRN analysis was based 
on a subset of correct trials which matched the incorrect trials in number and 
reaction times. This response-matching procedure has been shown to be 
appropriate in analyzing the ERN (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004). The 
response matching procedure for correct responses was adjusted so that the same 
amount of correct trials were included in both error halves. ERP conditions for 
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response-locked data and the number of trials8 included in each condition are 
listed in Table 5. 
Time windows for ERN/CRN peak amplitude analysis were determined 
based on a time window +/- 30 ms around the ERN and CRN grand average 
peak; exact time ranges are provided in Table 8. The ERN was defined as the 
most negative peak, the CRN as the most positive peak. The Pe was analyzed 
based on man amplitudes from 200 to 400 ms. 
 
FACE 
EMOTION 
CORRECTNESS ERROR 
HALF 
Mean trial 
number 
SD Range 
1st 40.0 15.7 11-65 Correct 
2nd 39.1 16.9 14-70 
1st 38.4 16.0 13-64 
N
eutral 
Error 
2nd 38.1 15.6 10-66 
1st 40.3 16.3 14-66 Correct 
2nd 40.8 14.3 14-63 
1st 40.0 14.3 15-65 
Pleasant 
Error 
2nd 39.3 14.3 18-65 
1st 39.8 16.4 15-70 Correct 
2nd 41.5 17.3 10-67 
1st 39.9 17.6 12-72 
Fear Error 
2nd 38.4 16.4 13-71 
Table 5: The number of trials included to generate the response-locked ERP conditions 
in study 4.2. 
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Behavioral data 
Reaction times and error rates 
Erroneous responses were faster than correct responses. Also, responses 
were faster in the second compared to the first error half. There was no effect of 
face emotions on reaction times (CORRECTNESS: F (1,7) = 253.52; p < .001; 
                                           
8 One might expect that the sum of all correct and the sum of all error trials in the first half 
matches exactly the sum of all correct and the sum of all error trials in the second half. 
However, small differences in sum of error and correct trials between halves might occur due 
to head artifact correction, which excluded some trials. 
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ERRORHALVE9: F (1,7) = 20.32; p < .003, FACEEMOTION, 
CORRECTNESS x FACEEMOTION and ERRORHALVE x FACEEMOTION 
n.s.). See Table 6. Face emotions did also not affect error rates (percentage of 
errors: neutral: 12.5; happy: 12.9; fear: 12.6). 
 
CORRECT- 
NESS 
ERROR- 
HALVE 
FACE- 
EMOTION 
Mean 
RT 
SD 
Neutral 395 87 
Happy 396 88 
First Fear 393 85 
Neutral 377 86 
Happy 378 86 
C
orrect 
Second Fear 376 85 
Neutral 338 71 
Happy 344 67 
First Fear 338 67 
Neutral 323 66 
Happy 323 64 
E
rror 
Second Fear 317 57 
Table 6: Reaction times (mean RT) and standard deviations (SD) for correct and 
erroneous responses following faces with neutral, happy or fearful face expressions. RTs 
are in ms. 
Congruency effect 
To examine the impact of flanker congruency, response times (correct 
responses only) of congruent (HHHHH or SSSSS) and incongruent (HHSHH or 
SSHSS) flanker stimuli were compared. Subjects were faster in responding to 
congruent compared to incongruent flanker stimuli. This effect was consistently 
found in both error halves (rmANOVA; CONGRUENCY (congruent vs. 
incongruent flanker): F (1,7) = 162.9, p < .001; ERRORHALVES: F (1, 
7) = 28.2, p < .001; no significant effect of FACEEMOTION or interactions). 
See Table 7 for detailed behavior data. 
                                           
9 See Appendix 7 a for distribution of errors across the experiment. 
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Analysis of error rates revealed a similar pattern. Subjects committed 
more errors following incongruent compared to congruent flanker stimuli; the 
emotional face presented prior to the flanker did not affect error rates (ANOVA 
on error rates (percentages); CONGRUENCY: F (1, 7) = 67.2; p < .001; mean 
error rates: congruent flanker: 6.3%; incongruent flanker: 22.4 %; no significant 
effects of FACEEMOTION or interactions). 
 
CONGRUENCY 
ERROR- 
HALVE 
FACE- 
EMOTION 
Mean SD 
Neutral 377 80 
Happy 375 79 
First Fear 374 77 
Neutral 359 76 
Happy 359 77 
C
ongruent 
Flanker 
Second Fear 359 77 
Neutral 428 88 
Happy 432 91 
First Fear 428 88 
Neutral 410 94 
Happy 412 93 
Incongruent 
Flanker 
Second Fear 408 91 
Table 7: Reaction times (mean RT) and standard deviations (SD) for congruent and 
incongruent flanker stimuli following faces with neutral, happy or fearful face 
expressions. RTs are in ms. 
Post error slowing 
Post error slowing was present in this study; see section 4.2.1.4 for details 
on post error slowing analysis. Subjects showed delayed reaction times when the 
previous response was erroneous. The face picture preceding the post-correct or 
post-error response did not influence reaction times (rmANOVA, Factors 
POSTRESPONSE (post-correct vs. post-error), FACEEMOTION, 
POSTRESPONSE: F (1,7) = 5.8, p < .047; mean correct following error: 
395 ms; mean correct following correct: 379 ms; no other significant effects or 
interactions) 
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4.2.2.2. ERP data 
Face locked ERPs 
Visual inspection: Facial stimuli elicited a face-typical N170 (Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996) on parieto-occipital sites and a VPP 
(vertex positive peak) (Jeffreys & Tukmachi, 1992). Differences between 
emotional face expressions as reported elsewhere (Eimer & Holmes, 2002) were 
not detected on any electrode site. See Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: ERPs locked to face stimuli onset. The components typically found for face 
stimuli (N170 on parieto-occipital sites and vertex positive peak) are clearly found, 
emotional face content did not influence ERP waves. See Figure 1 for exact electrode 
locations. 
Statistical analysis: Previous research (Eimer & Holmes, 2002) reported 
first differences between fearful and neutral faces in the following time windows 
and scalp locations: 
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• 110 to 150 ms on frontocentral electrodes 
• 155 to 200 ms on frontocentral and parietal electrodes 
• 250 to 1000 ms on frontocentral electrodes 
• 455 to 1000 ms on posterior electrodes. 
Due to the fact that visual inspection of the present data did not yield any 
differences between emotional face conditions, the same time windows as 
reported by Eimer and Holmes (2002) were examined10 on a subset of frontal, 
central and parietal electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz). There were no differences between 
emotional face conditions. To test whether emotional effects declined over time, 
the experiment was split into half, but this did also not reveal any emotional face 
effects (rmANOVA, no significant effects of FACEEMOTION or significant 
FACEEMOTION x ERRORHALVES or FACEEMOTION x ANTERIORITY 
interactions in any of the time windows examined).  
Although it was shown that the N170 is not affected by emotional face 
expressions (Eimer & Holmes, 2002), this component was also examined for 
emotional effects on electrodes P7 and P8. There were also no emotional effects 
found. 
Flanker locked ERPs 
Visual inspection: Around 300 ms, the incongruent stimuli were 
markedly more negative than the congruent stimuli. This N2 effect did not differ 
in respect to the face stimulus previously shown. See Figure 13.  
Statistical analysis: The visual impression was confirmed statistically 
(rmANOVA, 300 to 400 ms: CONGRUENCY: F (1,7) = 61.4; p < .001; no 
significant effect of FACE or interactions. rmANOVA, 200 t0 400 ms: 
CONGRUENCY: F (1,7) = 40.52; p < .001; no significant effect of FACE or 
interactions). 
 
                                           
10 The ERP software used in this experiment does only allow time windows of 1024 ms, 
baseline inclusive (256 samples at 250 Hz). Thus, ERP averages were no longer than 924 ms. 
Time windows 250 to 1000 ms and 455 to 1000 ms did therefore end at 924 ms. 
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Figure 13: ERPs locked to flanker stimuli. Left panel: N2-effect without regarding 
preceding face picture. Middle: scalp distribution at 340 ms based on difference waves 
incongruent minus congruent. Right: Difference waves based on incongruent minus 
congruent flanker stimuli, separately for all three face conditions preceding the flanker. 
Response-locked ERPs-the ERN/CRN 
Visual inspection: Erroneous responses elicited a negative component, 
between 40 and 100 ms, correct responses elicited a more positive ERP 
component (ERN and CRN). The ERN is seen best on midline central scalp 
areas. Thus, statistics were conducted on a patch of electrodes consisting of Fz, 
Fc1, FC2 and Cz. See Figure 14. 
Peak latency analysis: Peak latencies of the ERN and the CRN were 
determined in a time window from 0 to 150 ms. Errors responses peaked earlier 
than correct responses, especially in the second error half (ERRORHALVES x 
CORRECTNESS, F (1,7) = 6.09, p < .043). There was no effect of face pictures.  
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Mean amplitude analysis: Due to different peak latencies for correct and 
erroneous responses, time windows for mean amplitudes were defined around 
the peak as depicted in Table 8. 
 
CORRECTNESS 
ERROR 
HALVES 
Mean 
peak latency 
Time window for 
peak amplitude analysis 
1st 83 40 to 120 Correct 
2nd 104 60 to 140 
1st 78 40 to 120 
Error 
2nd 68 30 to 110 
Table 8: mean peak latencies and time windows for ERN/CRN peak amplitude analysis. 
Values are in ms. 
Not surprisingly, ERN amplitude was more negative than CRN 
amplitudes. Emotional faces did neither influence ERN nor CRN amplitudes 
(CORRECTNESS, F (1,7) = 94.49, p < .001, no main effects or interactions of 
ERRORHALVES or FACEEMOTION). 
Response-locked ERPs-the Pe
The Pe was most pronounced on parieto-central electrodes and will be 
examined on an electrode patch consisting of Pz, Cz, CP1, CP2. See Figure 1 for 
electrode locations. Mean amplitudes of correct responses were more negative 
compared to erroneous responses, there were no differences due to face 
emotions in the Pe (CORRECTNESS, F (1,7) = 86.62, p < .001, no significant 
ERRORHALVES or FACEEMOTION main effects or interactions).  
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Figure 14: ERPs locked to responses. Correct responses are coded by a dotted line, 
erroneous responses are solid. Facial emotions preceding the Flanker and the response 
are color-coded. ERPs for correct responses are based on trials that match incorrect 
trials in reaction time and total number (response matching). 
4.2.3. Summary and perspective 
Summary: The study presented in section 4.2 shows well known effects 
on the behavioral level with correct responses given faster than incorrect 
answers (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & 
Simons, 2005; Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, Morte, Münte, & Barbanoj, 2005) and 
faster responses given to congruent compared to incongruent flanker stimuli 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, Morte, Münte, & 
Barbanoj, 2005). 
ERPs also replicated earlier studies with showing the “classical” 
components: The face-specific N170 (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & 
McCarthy, 1996) and a VPP (Jeffreys & Tukmachi, 1992) in face-locked ERPs 
indicates that the Ekman-faces were presented long enough to be processed . 
ERPs locked to flanker stimuli (N2) were more negative to incongruent 
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compared to congruent flanker stimuli (Kopp, Rist, & Mattler, 1996). Response-
locked ERPs were more negative to errors (ERN) compared to correct responses 
(CRN) (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, 
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993), and there was a later positive component seen 
after errors (Falkenstein, 2004). 
Most important, the emotional face expressions presented prior to the 
flanker stimulus did not influence face-locked, flanker-locked or response-
locked ERPs. This was surprising and unexpected, since previous research has 
shown that a short-time presentation of emotional stimuli is sufficient to modify 
cognitive functions (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2004; Whalen et al., 
1998); see also section 1.5.2. 
Perspective: The lack of an emotional effect in any of the examined ERP 
components could be due to several reasons: Although one might argue that 
emotional face processing might be rapid and automatic, it is conceivable that 
this effect habituates very fast, since subjects learn that faces do not really 
indicate the presence of a threat or danger. In contrast to our passive task, where 
subjects were not instructed to pay attention to the face pictures, Eimer and 
Holmes (2002) instructed the subjects to detect immediate repetition, which 
requires identification of the stimulus category and the stimulus emotion. 
Habituation to the face stimuli might be prevented or attenuated by this active 
task. It is conceivable that habituation to face stimuli occurred rapidly in the 
present experiment because facial emotion pictures were based on 10 different 
individuals only. Including more individual face pictures would make the 
experiment less susceptible to become boring, but this would require to use a 
different, more comprehensive face picture set. 
Eimer and Holmes (2002) presented face stimuli for as long as 300 ms, 
which was considerably longer than the 80 ms presentation rate in the present 
experiment. Evidence that very short presentation of emotional pictures elicit 
emotional responses comes mainly from research using the IAPS picture set 
(Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2004). They presented neutral, pleasant 
and unpleasant IAPS pictures for 120 ms (See sections 1.5.1 and 4.3.1.4 for 
more details on this study). Schupp and colleagues concluded that brain activity 
due to short presentation of affective faces is highly similar to longer 
presentation. Thus, while it seems feasible to present pictures very short to 
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induce emotional responses, this might work for IAPS pictures, but not for 
Ekman face pictures (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Young, Perrett, Calder, 
Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). In addition, the Ekman face set used in this 
study was generated in the 1970s; pictures are only in grayscale, and people do 
look a little bit “old fashioned”. This might contribute to the finding that 
emotional expression was not feasible to elicit specific brain response. 
To overcome the shortcomings of the previous experiment, the next 
experiment uses the same basic design with the face pictures being exchanged 
by pictures taken from the IAPS. The short presentation duration is kept, since 
there is good evidence that short presentation is sufficient for IAPS pictures 
(Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2004). 
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4.3. Experiment 2b: Emotions induced by observing IAPS 
pictures 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
Data were acquired from 28 right-handed women. See section 2.1 for 
additional information. ERP data were analyzed from 22 subjects (mean age 24 
years, range from 19 to 36.), two subjects were excluded because the committed 
less than 60 errors throughout the experiment, which does not allow reliable 
ERPs for all IAPS-related sub-conditions. Four subjects were excluded due to 
high and uncorrectable artifact levels. 
4.3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
The experimental design was exactly the same as described in section 
4.2.1.2 except that emotional variations were induced by IAPS pictures. 
Previous research has shown that short presentation of pleasant and unpleasant 
IAPS pictures is suitable to tune the brain for selective perceptual processing 
(Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2004).  
Emotional stimuli: 30 IAPS pictures (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) 
were selected based on their valence rating for women. There were 10 pictures 
with medium, high and low valence ratings, which provided the neutral, pleasant 
and unpleasant affective state condition, respectively. Mean valence and arousal 
ratings are listed below; Standard deviations are given in brackets.  
Neutral IAPS pictures  valence: 5.0 (0.1)  arousal: 2.5 (0.4) 
Pleasant IAPS pictures  valence: 8.5 (0.1  arousal: 4.5 (0.6) 
Unpleasant IAPS pictures valence: 1.6 (0.3)  arousal: 6.9 (0.6) 
The experimental design is visualized in Figure 15. A list of all IAPS 
pictures used is provided in Appendix 4, all pictures selected among all 
available pictures in the IAPS valence/arousal space is shown in Figure 16. 
Flanker stimuli: Flanker stimuli were the same as described in section 
4.2.1.2. 
Instruction: The instruction was the same as in section 4.2.1.2. 
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Figure 15: Design for experiment 4.3. Emotional modulation was induced by presenting 
a neutral, a pleasant, a unpleasant IAPS picture prior to the flanker stimulus. See 
Appendix 4 for valence and arousal values for each picture. 
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Figure 16: IAPS stimuli selected to provide the neutral, pleasant and unpleasant 
pictures; ratings are for women only. See Appendix 4 for valence and arousal values for 
each picture. 
4.3.1.3. Data recording and preprocessing 
See section 2.4.1 for general recording issues. Eye artifacts were corrected 
using blind component separation described in section 2.4.2., head artifacts were 
rejected as described in section 2.4.1. 
4.3.1.4. Data analysis 
Behavior data: Trials with reaction times lower than 200 ms and higher 
than 800 ms were excluded behavioral data analysis. 
Post error slowing: Response-matching was conducted prior to analysis 
of post error slowing. See section 4.2.1.4 for details. 
IAPS-locked ERPs: The previous experiment described in section 4.2 did 
not find any modulation due to emotional picture presentation. Thus, the present 
study pays special attention to demonstrate and analyze ERP effects due to 
emotional stimuli. Previous research has described an early temporo-occipital 
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negativity, an early centro-medial positivity and a later centroparietal positivity 
for emotional compared to neutral IAPS pictures (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & 
Hamm, 2003), even when presented for very short intervals (Schupp, Junghöfer, 
Weike, & Hamm, 2004). To maintain comparability to this previous research, 
analysis of IAPS-locked data was conducted using the average reference11 
(100 ms baseline prior to IAPS picture onset). However, because Schupp and 
colleagues used a 129-electrode array and grouped electrodes to widespread 
electrode patches, it is not possible to conduct exactly the same analysis. Thus, 
early effects will be examined based on mean amplitudes in a 200 to 300 ms 
time window with electrodes P7 and P8 representing the parieto-occipital 
cluster, and electrode Cz representing centromedial activation. Later effects will 
be examined based on mean amplitudes in a 400 to 600 ms time window on 
electrodes Cz and Pz, which represent the centroparietal activity. See Figure 1 
for electrode locations. Statistical analysis contained the factor IAPS (3 levels, 
pleasant, neutral, unpleasant). 
Flanker-locked ERPs: To investigate emotional modulations on 
components following the flanker stimuli, ERPs were averaged with the flanker 
stimulus onset being the zero point (100 ms baseline, only flankers with a 
subsequent correct response were included). Statistical analysis was based on 
mean amplitudes in a 200 to 400 ms time window and contained the factors 
CONGRUENCY (congruent vs. incongruent flanker), IAPS (neutral, pleasant or 
unpleasant IAPS picture prior to flanker stimulus). To keep consistency with 
analysis of response-locked ERPS, the factors ERRORHALVES (first and 
second error halve) and the between-group factor ERRORGROUP (High and 
low error group) were included, both factors are explained below. 
Response-locked ERPs: To analyze response-locked ERP components 
(CRN/ERN and Pe), the same data analysis settings as described in section 
                                           
11 Common references (nose, mastoid etc.) are electrically active. Defining them to be 
“electrically neutral” might distort the ERP components of interest. Instead, it was suggested 
to use the average reference (Dien, 1998; Tucker, Liotti, Potts, Russell, & Posner, 1994). It 
combines all active electrodes and subtracts the activity common to all of them. However, the 
average reference requires equally distributed electrodes across the entire head and a high 
number of electrodes (> 64). Thus, it is a suboptimal reference for the present study and will 
be only used here to maintain comparability with earlier research (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, 
& Hamm, 2003, 2004). 
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4.2.1.4 were used. Thus, the ERN/CRN were examined relative to a 200 ms pre-
response baseline, ERPs for correct responses were based on response-matched 
trials, and only trials within a time range from 200 to 800 ms were included. 
As mentioned earlier (section 4.1.2.2), ERN amplitude is decreased when 
subjects commit more errors (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b). To take 
this into account, participants were subdivided based on the median of the 
overall error rate into a “high error rate group” and a “low error rate group”, 
both containing 11 subjects (Factor ERRORGROUP). Specific information 
regarding the number of trials8 included in each condition is listed in Table 9. 
Statistics were conducted on a frontocentral electrode patch or a parietal 
patch, (see section 4.2.1.4), exact details are given in the result section. To 
define time windows for statistical analysis, peak latencies were obtained for 
correct and erroneous responses and for both error halves in a 0 to 150 ms time 
post-response time window. Latency differences due to CORRECTNESS or 
ERRORHALVES were considered for defining time windows of CRN and ERN 
mean amplitude analysis. See Table 10 for selected time windows.  
The Pe was analyzed in a 200 to 400 ms time window. To make sure that 
differences found in the Pe do not merely reflect activity which were already 
picked up in the ERN/CRN time window, the baseline for correct and erroneous 
responses and for both error halves was set to the time windows of ERN/CRN 
analysis (see Table 10). Thus, activation of the ERN\CRN time window was 
subtracted from activity in the Pe range. See below for further details. 
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ERROR 
GROUP 
IAPS 
CORRECT
NESS 
ERROR
HALVE
Mean trial 
number 
SD Range 
1st 47.5 15.9 32-76 Correct 
2nd 45.7 14.6 28-70 
1st 45.5 14.7 26-78 
N
eutral Error 
2nd 48.2 14.9 30-76 
1st 45.1 16.5 26-80 
Correct 
2nd 46.7 15.1 28-78 
1st 42.9 16.3 20-74 
Pleasant Error 2nd 44.5 17.0 25-73 
1st 44.5 12.7 27-67 
Correct 
2nd 44.3 15.1 25-71 
1st 48.7 16.4 27-76 
H
igh error group Unpleasant 
Error 
2nd 44.8 14.6 23-77 
1st 20.2 7.3 8-29 Correct 
2nd 21.0 5.4 12-29 
1st 20.3 6.8 7-29 
N
eutral Error 
2nd 21.3 6.5 6-31 
1st 19.5 6.1 8-27 
Correct 
2nd 22.3 4.8 12-29 
1st 21.4 7.2 12-33 
Pleasant Error 2nd 21.9 6.7 13-37 
1st 21.7 6.1 10-32 
Correct 
2nd 21.0 5.7 8-28 
1st 20.5 5.3 10-27 
L
ow
 error group Unpleasant 
Error 
2nd 19.9 5.4 10-27 
Table 9: The number of trials included to generate the response-locked ERP conditions 
in study 4.3 
4.3.2. Results 
4.3.2.1. Behavioral data 
Reaction times and error rates 
Reaction times were analyzed for both groups and both error halves. 
Erroneous responses were faster than correct responses; this finding is consistent 
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over both experimental halves and seen in both error groups (rmANOVA, 
Factors ERRORHALVES12, CORRECTNESS, IAPS, ERRORGROUP, Main 
effect CORRECTNESS: F (1,20) = 90.05, p < .001; no significant interactions 
with ERRORHALVES or ERRORGROUP). Subjects were faster in the first 
compared the second error half (F (1,20) = 32,18, p > .001; no main effect of 
ERRORGROUP). 
RT differences due to preceding IAPS pictures were very small. However, 
there was a significant CORRECTNESS x IAPS X ERRORGROUP interaction 
(F (2,40) = 3.66; p < .035), which indicates that RTs were somewhat slower for 
unpleasant compared to pleasant IAPS trials in the second half of the low error 
group (348 vs. 333 ms). See Figure 17. 
Error rates: Since both experimental halves contained the same amount of 
errors, there was no need to include the factor ERRORHALVE in error rate 
analysis. Not surprisingly, the “High error group” differed from the low error 
group (error rate, “High error rate group: mean 275 errors, SD 88.4; “low error 
group”: mean 133 error, SD 29.5). There was no IAPS effect and no significant 
ERRORGROUP x IAPS interaction. 
                                           
12 See Appendix 7 b for distribution of errors across the experiment. 
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Figure 17: Reaction times to flanker stimuli, divided by error group, error halves, 
response correctness and IAPS picture preceding the flanker stimuli. Error bars 
indicate +/- 1 SE. 
Congruency effect 
The congruency effect (RTs following congruent vs. incongruent flanker 
stimuli) was analyzed as described in section 4.2.2.1. To keep consistency with 
prior analysis, error group and error halves were considered as well. Behavioral 
data showed shorter response times for congruent flanker stimuli compared to 
incongruent flanker stimuli. As reported in the section above, the high error 
group was somewhat faster than the low error group and subjects were faster in 
the first compared to the second error half. However, changes in affective states 
did not affect response times (rmANOVA; CONGRUENCY (congruent vs. 
incongruent flanker): F (1, 20) = 236.7, p < .001; ERRORHALVES: 
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F (1, 20) = 40.0, p < .001; ERRORGROUP: F (1, 20) = 3.48; p < .077; no 
significant effect of IAPS or interactions). See Figure 18 a for reaction times. 
A highly similar pattern was observed for error rates: There were more 
errors following incongruent compared to congruent flankers, this effect was 
seen independently of error group allocation and in both error halves (ANOVA 
on error rates (percentages); CONGRUENCY: F (1, 20) = 180.48; p < .001; 
mean error rates: congruent flanker: 5.3%; incongruent flanker: 17.7 %; no 
significant effects of ERRORHALVES, IAPS. Of course, there was a significant 
main effect of ERRORGROUP. No further significant interactions). 
 
Figure 18: a) Reaction times following congruent and incongruent flanker stimuli, 
divided by error group. b) Post error slowing data, divided by error group and IAPS 
picture preceding the subsequent correct response. Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
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Post error slowing 
The same response matching procedure as described in section 4.2.2.1 
was conducted to analyze post error slowing. Again, post error slowing was 
reliably found in the present study. Both groups reacted more slowly in correct 
trials following an error compared to correct trials that follow response-matched 
correct trials. The IAPS preceding the post-correct or post-error response did not 
influence post error slowing (rmANOVA, Factors POSTRESPONSE (post-
correct vs. post-error), IAPS, ERRORGROUP; POSTRESPONSE: 
F (1,20) = 68.68, p < .001; mean correct following error: 408 ms; mean correct 
following correct: 377 ms; no other significant effects or interactions). See 
Figure 18 b. 
Error correction rate 
Although not instructed to do so, participants sometimes gave a 
subsequent correct response after they have committed an error (see section 
4.1.1). It was examined whether error correction was more frequent when an 
emotional IAPS picture was previously seen. This was not the case (rmANOVA 
based on error correction rate following neutral, pleasant and unpleasant IAPS, 
ERRORGROUP: F (1,20) = 4.5; p < .046; no significant effect of IAPS; error 
correction rate for low error group: 11.2 corrected errors, low error group: 3.5 
corrected errors). However, the previous analysis indicated that subjects with 
more errors (high error group) corrected also more errors. It was tested whether 
this finding persists when the error correction rate is set in relation to the total 
amount of errors. This analysis showed that error correction rate did not differ 
between error groups (rmANOVA based on percentage of corrected errors 
relative to all errors committed, IAPS, ERRORGROUP and interactions n.s.; 
error correction rate: high error group: 12.3%; low error group: 7.6%). 
4.3.2.2. ERP data 
IAPS-locked ERPs 
Early effects: There was a clear emotional effect, best seen on occipito-
parietal electrodes (P7 and P8) with pleasant and unpleasant IAPS pictures being 
more negative. On central sites (CZ), differences are emergent between all three 
emotional conditions, with unpleasant IAPS pictures being most positive and 
neutral pictures being most negative in amplitude (early effects, mean 
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amplitudes 200 to 300 ms, parietal effect: IAPS F (2,42) = 33.69, p < .001. mean 
amplitudes in µV: neutral 5.93, pleasant 4.54, unpleasant 4.53; neutral pictures 
differed from pleasant and unpleasant pictures, p < .001. Central effect: 
F (2,42) = 31.89, p < .001, all conditions differed, with unpleasant IAPS pictures 
being relatively most positive, p <.001. Mean amplitudes in µV: neutral -4.24, 
pleasant -3.76, unpleasant -3.38). The effect was also examined including the 
factor ERRORHALVES, which showed that IAPS effects were the same in both 
experimental halves. See Figure 19. 
Late effects: On centroparietal sites, the pleasant IAPS pictures elicited 
most negative amplitudes and the unpleasant IAPS pictures elicited most 
positive amplitudes. Splitting the experiment in two halves did not change this 
pattern (late effects, mean amplitudes on a patch consisting of Cz and Pz; 400 to 
600 ms, F (2,42) = 10.69; p < .001; all conditions differed; p < .027; mean 
amplitudes in µV: neutral -.60, pleasant -.79, unpleasant -.38). See Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: ERPs locked to IAPS stimuli. To make data comparable with prior research 
(Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003, 2004), ERPs were re-referenced to the 
average reference11. See Figure 1 for exact electrode location. Dotted circles indicate the 
early effect, solid circle depict the late effect. 
Flanker-locked ERPs 
Visual inspection: As depicted in Figure 20, the congruency effect 
(incongruent flanker minus congruent flanker) was best seen on centroparietal 
electrodes and will be examined on a electrode patch consisting of Cz, Cp1, CP2 
and Pz. 
Congruency effect: Incongruent stimuli elicited a stronger negative 
component compared to congruent stimuli (N2). This effect was seen for 
subjects with a high as well as with a low error rate. The N2 was clearly seen in 
both error halves and for subjects with a high and a low error rate. 
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Figure 20: ERPs locked to flanker stimuli. Left panel: N2-effect without regarding 
preceding IAPS picture. Middle: scalp distribution at 340 ms based on difference waves 
incongruent minus congruent. Right: Difference waves based on incongruent minus 
congruent flanker stimuli, separately for all three IAPS conditions preceding the 
flanker. 
Emotional effect: Flanker following unpleasant IAPS items were most 
negative, flankers following pleasant IAPS items were most positive. This was 
true in both error halves and in both error groups. Most interestingly, there was 
no interaction between the factors CONGRUENCY and IAPS; thus, the N2 was 
not affected by the previous IAPS picture (rmANOVA, mean amplitude in a 200 
to 400 ms time window, on centroparietal electrode patch, factors 
ERRORHALVES; CONGRUENCY, IAPS, ERRORGROUP as between factor, 
all within factors significant, CONGRUENCY; F (1, 20) = 108.68, p < .001; 
IAPS: F (1,20)= 20.19, p < .001; CONGRUENCY x IAPS n.s.; ERRORGROUP 
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n.s. (Mean amplitudes for congruent and incongruent flankers: High error group: 
2.2 and 0.3 µV; low error group: 2.4 and 0.2µV). 
Response-locked ERPs - the ERN/CRN 
Visual inspection: The ERN is seen best on midline central scalp areas. 
Thus, statistics were conducted on a patch of electrodes consisting of Fz, Fc1, 
FC2 and Cz. Response-locked ERPs of midline electrodes for both subgroups 
(“high error rate” and “low error rate” group) and both error halves are depicted 
in Figure 21.  
Peak latency analysis: The ERN peaks earlier than the CRN. This was 
especially true in the second half of the experiment. There was no effect of IAPS 
on peak latencies. (rmANOVA based on peak latencies determined in a 0 to 
150 ms post response time window, most positive peak latency for correct 
responses, most negative peak latency for erroneous responses, factors 
ERRORHALVES, CORRECTNESS, IAPS, GROUP; interaction 
CORRECTNESS x ERRORHALVES: F (1,20) = 7.64, p < .012). Peak latencies 
are provided in Table 10.  
 
CORRECTNESS ERRORHALVES 
Mean 
peak latency 
Time window for 
peak amplitude 
analysis 
1st 89 50 to130 Correct 
2nd 94 50 to130 
1st 81 40 to120 Error 
2nd 61 20 to 100 
Table 10: mean peak latencies and time windows for ERN/CRN peak amplitude analysis 
for response-locked ERPs in experiment 4.3. Values are in ms. 
Mean amplitude analysis with response-matched data: Amplitudes 
were determined separately for correct and erroneous reactions for both error 
halves. Time windows were adjusted according to different peak latencies for 
those subgroups; see Table 10Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden 
werden.. ANOVA on mean amplitudes was based on the same factors as 
described for peak latencies. Errors elicited a strong ERN, which was 
significantly more negative than the CRN following correct responses 
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(CORRECTNESS: F (1, 20) = 211.23; p < .001). There was a significant 
CORRECTNESS x ERRORHALVES X IAPS interaction (F (2, 40) = 17.42, 
p < .013). Thus, IAPS effects were examined separately for correct and 
erroneous responses, and for both error halves with ERRORGROUP as 
between-group-factor. Unpleasant IAPS pictures prior to a response caused ERN 
to be more negative in the first error half of the low error group (IAPS X 
ERRORGROUP, F (2, 40) = 8.57, p < .003). This effect was also seen in 
attenuated manner for the CRN; the effect was statistically significant in the 
second error half (IAPS: F (2,40) = 3.71; p < .033). Visual inspection revealed 
that the voltage scalp distribution of the CRN is somewhat more posterior than 
the ERN, which in turn means that the CRN might be better analyzed by a 
slightly more posterior electrode patch. Examined on a patch consisting of Cz, 
Pz, CP1 and CP2, separate ANOVAs as described above found a significant 
IAPS effect for correct responses, for both, the first and the second error half. As 
for the ERN, the CRN was more negative following unpleasant IAPS pictures 
(IAPS, both halves, correct responses: F (2, 40) > 5.2, p < .01). 
Mean amplitude-no response match: As mentioned above, analysis of 
the CRN was based on a subset of correct responses which were matched to 
erroneous responses in terms of reaction times and amount of trials. However, as 
shown in behavioral data, there was a speed advantage for responses following 
congruent compared to incongruent flankers. Thus, when selecting a subset of 
fast correct responses based on their reaction time only, most of them will be 
preceded by congruent flanker trials. An optimal matching procedure would 
control for this by considering both, the response speed and the amount of 
congruent and incongruent flanker trials. This was not possible here because in 
some subjects, there were not enough fast correct responses following 
incongruent flanker stimuli. To exclude the possibility that emotional effects 
seen in the CRN is only emergent when a subset of correct trials is selected (fast 
responses with a lower proportion of incongruent trials), the same statistics as 
described for CRN on parietal patch was conducted with the complete set of 
correct trials. This did not change data interpretation at all; CRN remained most 
negative following correct responses with preceding unpleasant IAPS pictures in 
both error halves; correct responses following pleasant and neutral IAPS 
pictures did not differ (rmANOVA on CRN, parietal patch, separately for both 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
123 
error halves F (2,40) < 4.7; p < .015; pairwise comparisons: unpleasant IAPS 
differs from all other conditions, p < .02). Thus, the emotional effect is robust 
enough to be shown without sophisticated response matching algorithms. 
Response-locked ERPs - the Pe
The Pe was analyzed based on mean amplitudes in a 200 to 400 ms time 
window on a centroparietal patch of electrodes (Cz, Pz, CP1 and CP2). Since 
affective pictures modulated the ERN component, it is reasonable to assume that 
those effects are still seen in the CRN time window. To clearly distinguish 
emotional modulation of the Pe from earlier modulations, baseline was set to the 
time windows where the ERN/CRN was most pronounced (50 to 130 ms for 
correct responses, 40 to 120 ms for error responses, first half, 20 to 100 ms for 
errors, second half, see Table 10. Statistics were conducted as described above 
and revealed a more positive component for correct compared to incorrect 
responses (CORRECTNESS, F (1,20) = 184.57, p < .001). This very 
conservative approach did not reveal an effect of IAPS nor any significant 
interactions. 
Correlation between ERPs and Error Rates 
Peak amplitudes within the ERN time window and mean amplitudes 
within the Pe time windows for erroneous responses were correlated with error 
rates. There was a positive correlation between ERN amplitude and erroneous 
responses in the ERN time window, indicating that subjects with more errors 
had a decreased (less negative) ERN amplitude (r = .43. p < .049). Dividing the 
data set by ERRORHALVE revealed that the amplitude-error rate-relationship is 
best seen in the first ERRORHALVE for erroneous responses (r = .47, p < .026). 
There was no relationship between error rate and CRN. Also the Pe time window 
did not show significant correlations between Pe amplitude and error rate. 
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Figure 21: a) Response-locked ERPs on midline electrodes. Correctness is coded by line 
style, preceding IAPS picture is color-coded. ERPs are divided by error group and error 
halves. ERPs for correct responses are based on response-matched trials. b) Scalp 
distribution of the ERN and the CRN. Since the distribution between CRN and ERN 
differs, scalp distribution was not based on difference waves error minus correct 
responses. 
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4.3.3. Summary and perspective 
Summary: The experiment presented in section 4.3 displays the classical 
effects in behavioral and ERP data (see section 4.2): Incorrect responses were 
given faster than correct responses (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 
1999), and subjects responded faster to congruent compared to incongruent 
flanker trials (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Error rates were higher for incongruent 
flanker trials. Subjects with a high error rate (high error group) and subjects with 
a low error rate (low error group) did not differ in speed-accuracy-tradeoff, but 
only in the absolute error rate. Post error slowing was reliably shown; correct 
responses were given faster when they succeed correct compared to incorrect 
responses (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b, 2004; Rabbitt, 1981, 2002). 
Subjects of both groups tended to correct the same amount of errors. Most 
importantly, the IAPS picture presented prior to the flanker stimuli did not 
influence the behavioral data13.  
It was assumed that the overall error rate can be used as a measure for task 
engagement; subjects with a low error rate were more engaged in the task.  
IAPS-locked ERP data showed emotional effects already described in the 
literature (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003, 2004). The N2 was not 
affected by IAPS stimuli. 
The distinction between high and low error rate is of special importance 
for ERN/CRN analysis, because previous research described an enlarged ERN 
when subjects commit less errors (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 
1993; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b). This was also the case in the 
present study. The most interesting finding is that the ERN and the CRN were 
more negative in unpleasant IAPS trials at the beginning of the experiment (first 
error half) in the low error group. Thus, experiment 4.3 shows that unpleasant 
IAPS pictures are feasible to induce emotion-specific processing. The brain’s 
action monitoring system was set in a state that it is more active when action 
follows unpleasant, but not when action follows pleasant or neutral IAPS 
pictures. 
                                           
13 The finding that responses were somewhat slower (15 ms) in subjects with a low error rate 
in the second half of the experiment is interpreted as not very robust and might be caused by 
type 1 error. 
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Perspective: The behavioral data are highly similar to those reported in 
the other experiments of section 4 and will be discussed in 4.6 “Discussion – 
Part 2”.  
Because emotional stimuli were presented on a trial-by-trial-basis, it was 
not possible to measure effects on subjective emotions with a questionnaire. 
However, previous research, comparable in that emotions were modified by 
short-term IAPS picture presentation, showed that trial-by trial based 
presentation of IAPS pictures does not change subjective mood over the course 
of the experiment (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) or only at the beginning of the 
experiment when only negative IAPS pictures are presented (Simon-Thomas & 
Knight, 2005). However, experiment 4.5 allows access to changes in affective 
state by using a pre-and post-experimental questionnaire in a between-group-
design. 
IAPS-locked ERP data show remarkable similarity to previous research 
(Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003, 2004) and provide further evidence 
that short presentation of IAPS pictures is a feasible procedure to induce short-
term brain modulations. There was an early emotional effect with pleasant and 
unpleasant IAPS pictures being more negative on posterior sites. I agree with 
Schupp and colleagues (2003, 2004) that this early posterior negativity reflects a 
selection negativity caused by intrinsic relevance of emotional stimuli. This 
effect is fast and automatic and can be observed even when emotional pictures 
are not task relevant. Thus, even when IAPS pictures presented as short as 
80 ms, their intrinsic relevance can be detected so that they draw attentional 
resources. However, it is reasonable to assume that unpleasant IAPS pictures, 
which display potentially threatening situations (mutilations, blood, weapons), 
should also be distinguished from pleasant IAPS pictures at an early stage. Thus, 
both, pleasant and unpleasant emotional pictures should differ in the same 
direction from neutral pictures due to detection of salient picture context. 
Additionally, absolute differences between neutral and unpleasant IAPS stimuli 
should be larger than absolute differences between neutral and pleasant IAPS 
pictures due to hyper-salience of unpleasant stimuli (see section 1.5.1). This is 
exactly the case on central sites in my experiment (see Ito, Larsen, Smith, & 
Cacioppo, 1998, for similar results). Thus, here it is concluded that the selection 
negativity on posterior sites reflects emotion-relevant attention drawn towards 
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salient stimuli, whereas central differences reflect the onset of evaluation 
processes distinguishing between salient and hyper-salient stimuli. It is unclear 
why Schupp and colleagues (2004) failed to show graded differences in a neutral 
– positive – negative sequence. Varieties in experimental setup might be an 
issue. Schupp and colleagues showed sequences of IAPS pictures, which were 
not interrupted by non-emotional tasks. Even if early affective modulations are 
automatic, it cannot be excluded that the cognitive system shows some kind of 
saturation when emotional pictures are presented in sequence. 
As in the previous experiment (section 4.2) flanker-locked ERPs (N2) 
were not affected by preceding emotional IAPS stimuli. This effect is discussed 
in section 4.6. 
The present study confirmed my prediction that the ERN is more 
pronounced when subjects were presented with negative stimuli prior to the 
response. This extends previous research, which restricted IAPS-induced 
performance monitoring examination on the CRN without including ERN 
modulations (Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005). Thus, here it was shown that the 
ERN as well as the CRN is modulated towards greater negativity following 
unpleasant IAPS pictures. As previously shown, emotions induced by negative 
IAPS pictures are mild and decrease during the course of the experiment 
(Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005). This explains why the ERN increase due to 
unpleasant IAPS pictures is only seen at the beginning of the experiment. In 
addition, it is reasonable to assume that subjects with an lower error rate were 
more engaged in the experiment. Thus, they paid more attention to the flanker 
stimuli, and, probably also to the emotional stimuli prior to the flanker. An 
emotional modulation was only achieved in them. Thus, to achieve an effect 
seen in all subjects and across the entire experiment, it is advisable to conduct 
the same flanker task with a more powerful method to induce emotions. This is 
done in experiment 4.5. An integration of the emotional ERN increase in the 
framework of existing performance monitoring theories (see section 4.1.2.2) is 
conducted in 4.6 “Discussion – Part 2”. 
The absence of an ERN modulation following pleasant IAPS pictures 
might be due to several reasons: Easiest of all, it could be concluded that the 
ERN is not susceptible to positive emotions. However, I regard this conclusion 
as premature, since there are other explanations that have to be ruled out. 
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Alternatively, it is conceivable that the ERN is susceptible to pleasant stimuli, 
but the paradigm was not feasible to set the brain into a state of positive 
emotions. The paradigm could be suboptimal because pleasant IAPS pictures are 
not powerful enough to induce positive emotions with the same intensity as 
elicited by unpleasant stimuli. This argument gets support from the biological 
perspective: unpleasant pictures are perceived as unpleasant because they signal 
harm or threat, thus, they are of immediate importance for the well-being of the 
organism. Speeded and intense adaptation of the cognitive system might 
therefore only be adaptive for unpleasant, but not for pleasant stimuli. This 
propensity to react more strongly to negative stimuli has been termed the 
negativity bias has been often described in literature (see Cacioppo & Berntson, 
1999, for overview.; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). To conclude, I see 
good evidence that it is not enough to present the subject with pleasant pictures 
to set the performance monitoring system into a state of less cautious and less 
restrictive processing, which would be indicated by lower ERN amplitude for 
positive pictures. 
The experiments presented in section 4.2 and 4.3 are limited in a few 
aspects, which will be discussed in the next paragraphs. Starting with general 
properties of the IAPS picture set used for stimulation in experiment 4.3, one 
might argue that pictures differ not only in valence, but also in arousal. As 
shown in Figure 16, unpleasant pictures (low valence) are more exciting (high 
arousal) than positive and neutral pictures. Due to IAPS rating properties, it was 
not possible to select a subset that differs in valence, but not in arousal. In 
addition to that, it can be argued that unpleasant pictures differ in physical 
properties. For example, they contain more often pictures of people, the depicted 
situations might be more complex, or it could easily be that they contained 
another spectrum of colors (for example the higher red contend in pictures of 
mutilations). 
There is also a more basic shortcoming of experiments presented in 
section 4.2 and 4.3. Until now, subjects perceived emotions of other people (4.2) 
or perceived pleasant or unpleasant scenes (4.3). Thus, it might be argued that 
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there is a basic difference between perceiving emotions and experiencing 
emotions (Davidson & Irwin, 1999). To experience emotions, it is necessary to 
bring the subjects in direct contact to emotion-eliciting stimuli. Reisberg and 
Hertel (2004) summarized this important and in most research neglected 
distinction with the words “We become emotional, in other words, when we 
encounter issues and information that are pertinent to our lives, goals, and values 
(or, perhaps, the lives and values of people we care about). We refer to this more 
common kind of emotion as thematically induced, in contrast to the visually 
induced reactions involved in most previous studies, produced by the 
presentation of a specifically defined emotional visual stimulus” (p.14). 
The introduction of personal involvement instead of merely observing 
emotional faces or scenes is the basic change in the next two experiments 
presented in section 4.4 and 4.5. Experiment 4.4 uses facial feedback as an 
environmental stimulation that is in direct contact to the subject. Experiment 4.5 
goes one step further-by providing either positive or negative feedback based on 
the subject’s performance, it is attempted to bring subjects in a situation where 
positive or negative emotions are self-relevant. 
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4.4. Experiment 2c: Emotions induced by facial feedback 
4.4.1.1. Participants 
Data were acquired from 25 right-handed women. See section 2.1 for 
additional information. ERP data were analyzed from 22 subjects (mean age 22 
years, range 17 to 28), two subjects were excluded due to high and uncorrectable 
artifact levels, and one subject was excluded because she mixed up stick-
positions during the experiment. 
4.4.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
The experimental design was similar to experiments in section 4.2 and 4.3 
in terms of flanker tasks. There were no emotional pictures presented prior to the 
flanker. Thus, a trial consisted of a fixation cross with varying duration 600 to 
800 ms, (mean 700 ms), followed by a flanker stimulus with the same properties 
as described in section 4.2.1.2.  
The experiment consisted of 2100 trials. A feedback screen was presented 
after a sequence of 30 trials, informing the subjects whether they are faster or 
slower than in the mean reaction time of the previous 30 trials. Participants 
terminated the feedback screen by button press. After seven 30-trial sequences, 
there was a 15 sec. break, indicating the end of a block. Subjects were able to 
request for longer breaks if necessary. Thus, the experiment was subdivided into 
10 blocks, each block consisted of 7 sequences of 30 trials each. Flanker trials 
were randomized within each sequence with the restriction that there were 40 % 
of consistent (HHHHH and SSSSS, 20 % each) and 60 % of inconsistent 
flankers (HHSHH or SSHSS, 30 % each). See Figure 22. 
Emotional modulation: Experimental emotional modulation was 
introduced on a block-wise basis: Subjects were asked to hold a stick (Chinese 
disposable chopstick) either  
• Horizontally between the teeth (“Smile”-condition, see Figure 22) 
• Vertically with the upper lip only (“No-smile”-condition, see 
Figure 22) 
• Or have no stick in the mouth (“No stick”-condition). 
There were three Smile-condition blocks, three no-smile-condition blocks 
and four no-stick blocks. The sequence of blocks was randomized with the 
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restriction that two of the same conditions were never directly adjacent and the 
last block was always the “no-stick”-condition. To equalize the number of trials 
for each condition, the last 210 trials (always no-stick condition) were excluded 
from behavioral and ERP data analysis. Thus, each condition contained finally 3 
x 210 = 820 trials. See Figure 22. 
Flanker stimuli: Flanker stimuli were exactly the same as described in 
section 4.2.1.2. 
Instruction: As in previous experiments, participants were asked to 
respond as fast and as correct as possible to the central letter of the flanker 
string. They responded with a left-hand key to the H and with a right-hand key 
to the S. 
 
Figure 22: Setup for experiment 4.4. Emotional modulation was induced by feedback 
received from facial muscles. A "Smile" was induced by holding a wooden chopstick 
horizontally in the mouth, a smile was prevented ("no-Smile") by holding the stick 
vertically with the lips. In a third condition, subjects had no chopstick in the mouth ("no 
stick"). A trial is visualized in the right panel. 
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Sham story: Participants were not informed about the intended emotional 
modulations. Thus, to explain why they were required to hold a chopstick with 
either the lips or between the teeth, a sham story was introduced: Participants 
were told that the present ERP study examines how facial muscle artifacts 
influence ERP recordings. To demonstrate muscle artifacts, the experimenter 
presented the subjects with their own EEG on the presentation computer prior to 
the beginning of the experiment. Subjects were asked to blink and to move the 
eyes, what resulted in high and clearly detectable artifacts on the EEG. Now that 
subjects knew that eye artifact severely impacts ERP recordings, they were told 
that researchers know how to handle eye artifacts, but little is known about how 
to handle muscle artifacts generated by the mouth and by the cheek muscles. 
Thus, to examine this in detail, mouth and cheek muscles will be innervated by 
different chop stick positions. To make sure that subjects believed the story, 
most of the subjects were not studying psychology, and none of them was 
enrolled in higher than 2nd year psychology courses. At the end of the 
experiment, a questionnaire asked the participants to explain the purpose of the 
experiment. None of them was suspicious about the cover story. 
4.4.1.3. Data recording and preprocessing 
See section 2.4.1 for general recording issues. Eye artifacts were corrected 
using blind component separation described in section 2.4.2. Head artifacts were 
rejected as described in section 2.4.1. 
4.4.1.4. Data analysis 
Behavior data: Trials with reaction times lower than 200 ms and higher 
than 800 ms were excluded from behavioral data analysis.  
Post error slowing: Response-matching was implemented to analyze 
post-error slowing, because it allows a comparison of post-error slowing with 
potential RT-slowing after equally fast correct trials. See section 4.2.1.4 for 
details on response matching. 
Flanker-locked ERPs: To examine emotional modulations on 
components following the flanker stimuli, ERPs were averaged with the flanker 
stimulus onset being the zero point (100 ms baseline, only flankers with a 
subsequent correct response were included). Consistent with analysis described 
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in 4.3.2.2, the N2 effect will be examined on an electrode patch consisting of 
Cz, Cp1, CP2 and Pz. Statistical analysis contained the factors CONGRUENCY 
(congruent vs. incongruent flanker) and STICKPOSITION (“No-stick” “No-
Smile” and “Smile”). 
Response-locked ERPs: ERPs were generated relative to a 200 ms pre-
response baseline, only responses given within 200 to 800 ms after flanker 
stimulus onset were included. 
Response matching of correct trials was not performed, because it was 
shown that emotional effects on correct trials can also be displayed including all 
correct responses (see 4.3.2.2). Statistical analysis was based on the factors 
“CORRECTNESS” (correct vs. erroneous responses) and STICKPOSITION. 
Visual inspection of data showed that emotional effects were seen in both 
ERRORHALVES and for subjects with a low and a high error rate. Thus, to 
keep analysis simple, Factors “ERRORHALVE” and “ERRORGROUP” (see 
section 4.2.1.4) were not further regarded. See Table 11 for details on trials 
included in ERPs. 
 
STICK 
POSITION 
CORRECT 
NESS 
Mean trial 
number 
SD Range 
Correct 554.1 27.1 500-600 “N
o 
stick” Error 64.0 23.7 30-119 
Correct 546.0 32.3 486-594 
“Sm
ile” Error 70.8 28.5 30-131 
Correct 551.5 26.0 496-587 “N
o-
sm
ile” Error 67.0 25.4 14-126 
Table 11: The number of trials included to generate the response-locked ERPs in study 
4.4. 
Time windows for statistical analysis were defined based on peak 
latencies for correct and erroneous responses in a 0 to 150 ms post-response 
time window. Latency differences due to CORRECTNESS were considered for 
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defining time windows of CRN and ERN mean amplitude analysis. See 
Table 14 for selected time windows. Consistent with analysis reported in section 
4.2.1.4 and 4.3.1.3, the ERN was examined on a frontocentral electrode patch, 
the CRN and the Pe on a parietal electrode patch. 
The Pe was analyzed in a 200 to 400 ms time window. Consistent with 
analysis described in 4.3.1.3, the baseline for correct and erroneous responses 
was set to the time windows of ERN/CRN analysis (see Table 14). Thus, 
activation of the ERN\CRN time window was subtracted from activity in the Pe 
range. 
4.4.2. Results 
4.4.2.1. Sham story 
After completion of the experiment, subjects were asked to write down 
why it was required to hold the stick between the teeth. The answers were given 
in an open manner. None of the subjects was suspicious that the stick was to 
induce emotions. On a second sheet of paper given after completion of the first, 
subjects were prompted to find alternative explanations for the stick by asking 
them whether they could think of any other reasons for holding the stick. Again, 
none of the subjects mentioned that the stick was administered to evoke a smile 
or prevent from smiling. On a third sheet of paper, subjects were asked how they 
felt when holding the stick. There was one woman who reported to feel 
“somewhat happier in the teeth condition”. Beside that, there were no clear 
emotional modulations reported due to stick position. 
4.4.2.2. Behavioral data 
Reaction times and error rates:  
Reaction times showed a very similar pattern as described in section 
4.3.2.1 in that erroneous responses were faster than correct responses. The three 
facial feedback conditions did not influence reaction times (ANOVA, 
CORRECTNESS: F (1,21) = 339.4, p < .001; STICKPOSITION or interactions 
n.s.). See Table 12 for RTs. 
 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
135 
STICKPOSITION Correct Error 
“No stick” 397 (26) 338 (25) 
“Smile” 394 (30) 333 (24) 
“No-smile” 395 (29) 337 (24) 
Table 12: Reaction times for correct and erroneous responses in study 4.4; values are 
in ms, standard deviations are given in brackets. 
Congruency effect 
The congruency effect was examined similar as described in section 
4.3.2.1: Reaction time analysis included correct trials only following congruent 
and incongruent flankers for all three facial feedback conditions. As expected, 
RTs were faster following congruent flankers. Again, emotional modulation did 
not interfere with the congruency effect (rmANOVA, Factor CONGRUENCY: 
F (1, 21) = 265.14; p < .001; mean reaction times: congruent flanker: 380 ms; 
incongruent flanker: 424 ms. No significant effect of STICKPOSITION or 
interactions). 
A highly similar pattern was found for error rates; error rates were higher 
for incongruent trials, facial feedback modulation did not impact error rates 
(rmANOVA on error rates (percentages); CONGRUENCY: F (1, 21) = 251.95; 
p < .001; mean error rates: congruent flanker: 5.6%; incongruent flanker: 18.9 
%; no significant effects of STICKPOSITION or interactions). 
Post error slowing 
Similar post error slowing effects as described in section 4.3.2.1 were 
found. Correct trials following erroneous responses were faster than correct 
trials following response matched correct trials (response-matching procedure 
selected a subset of correct trials that matches erroneous trials in terms of total 
number and reaction time). The stick position did not influence post-error 
slowing, neither for correct nor for erroneous trials (rmANOVA, 
POSTRESPONSE (correct responses following correct responses vs. correct 
responses following erroneous responses), STICKPOSITION. 
POSTRESPONSE: F (1,21) = 28.99, p < .001); no further main effects or 
interactions). Reaction times for trials following correct and erroneous responses 
are provided in Table 13. 
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STICKPOSITION 
Correct responses 
following correct 
responses 
Correct response 
following erroneous 
responses 
“No stick” 389 (25) 421 (33) 
“Smile” 393 (34) 417 (34) 
“No-smile” 392 (37) 416 (37) 
Table 13: Reaction times for post-correct and post-error responses in study 4.4; Values 
are in ms, standard deviations are given in brackets. 
4.4.2.3. ERP data 
Flanker locked ERPs 
Visual inspection: The congruency effect (Incongruent flanker minus 
congruent flanker) was best seen on centroparietal electrodes. Visual inspection 
of the difference waves separately plotted for the three facial feedback 
conditions indicates that the N2 effect is somewhat smaller when there is a stick 
in the mouth. This effect is not very consistent, since it is seen for the “Smile” 
and the “No smile” condition. See Figure 23. 
Congruency effect: The same pattern as described in section 4.3.2.2 was 
observed: ERPs following incongruent stimuli were more negative compared to 
congruent stimuli.  
Emotional effect: facial feedback condition did not influence the N2 
(ANOVA, mean amplitude 200 to 400 ms, CONGRUENCY: F (1, 21) = 79.49; 
p < .001; mean amplitudes: congruent flanker: 4.5 µV; incongruent flanker: 2.3 
µV, no significant effect of STICKPOSITION or interactions) Thus, small 
differences seen in visual data inspection were not confirmed statistically. 
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Figure 23: ERPs locked to flanker stimuli. Left panel: N2-effect without regarding 
Stick-position. Middle: scalp distribution at 340 ms based on difference waves 
incongruent minus congruent. Right: Difference waves based on incongruent minus 
congruent flanker stimuli, separately for "Smile", "No-Smile" and "No stick condition. 
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Visual inspection: A typical ERN was seen following errors, a CRN was 
seen following correct responses. The ERN was most pronounced on a 
frontocentral patch of electrodes, the CRN was best seen somewhat more 
posterior. As predicted, the ERN and the CRN were less negative when facial 
muscles generating a smile (especially the zygomaticus major) were innervated 
during the “Smile” condition. Both other conditions were not distinguishable in 
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ERN or CRN amplitude. As in previous experiments, the ERN peaked earlier 
than the CRN; experimental manipulation did not influence ERN or CRN peak 
latencies. See Figure 24. 
Peak latency analysis: Visual impression was confirmed; the ERN 
peaked earlier than the CRN, experimental manipulation did not impact peak 
latencies (rmANOVA, factors CORRECT, STICKPOSITION; CORRECT: 
F (1,21) = 7.2; p < .014; STICKPOSITION or interactions n.s. ). See Table 14 
for peak latencies. 
 
CORRECTNESS
Mean 
peak latency 
Time window for 
peak amplitude analysis 
Correct 79 40 to120 
Error 57 20 to 100 
Table 14: mean peak latencies and time windows for ERN/CRN peak amplitude analysis 
for response-locked ERPs in experiment 4.4. Values are in ms. 
Mean amplitude analysis: As expected, erroneous responses elicited a 
more negative ERP component compared to correct responses. Analysis of 
emotional modulation yielded a less negative wave for the “Smile” condition 
only. This was true for correct as well as for erroneous responses (rmANOVA 
based on mean amplitudes in time windows listed in Table 14, 
CORRECTNESS: F (1,21) = 77.96; p < .001; STICKPOSITION: 
F (2,42) = 5.92; p < .007; no significant interactions. Individual comparisons: 
"Smile" was less negative than both other conditions, p < .016). 
Response-locked ERPs - the Pe
To adjust for differences seen in the ERN time window, amplitudes in 
time windows listed in Table 14 were subtracted prior to statistical analysis (see 
section 4.3.1.3 for further explanation). As in experiment 4.3, the Pe 
distinguished clearly between correct and erroneous responses; it was more 
positive following errors. There were no differences due to emotional 
modulation (rmANOVA, Factors CORRECTNESS, STICKPOSITION, 
CORRECTNESS: F (1,21) = 146.66, p < .001; STICKPOSITION or 
interactions n.s.). 
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Figure 24: a) Response-locked ERPs. Correctness is coded by line style, stick position is 
color-coded. b) Distribution of the ERN and the CRN. 
4.4.3. Summary and perspective 
Summary: As the previous experiments in section 4, subjects were faster 
in committing erroneous responses and RTs were lower following congruent 
flanker trials. There was the usual post-error-slowing effect. Again, affective 
modulation did not impact behavioral data. 
Furthermore, the N2 and the ERN/CRN were reliably seen. ERPs locked 
to the onset of the flanker stimuli were more negative after incongruent flankers 
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(N2); ERPs locked to responses were more negative when an erroneous 
response was given (ERN). The most important finding is that the ERN and the 
CRN were less negative when subjects were required to hold a chop stick 
between the teeth to innervate facial muscles involved in smiling. The N2 was 
not modulated by stick position. 
Perspective: 
The experiment clearly shows that facial feedback exerts a modulation 
effect on error monitoring. Alternative explanations for the facial feedback 
effects as introduced in section 1.5.3 have been carefully excluded: The written 
interview after the experiment indicates that subjects did not perceive 
themselves to be smiling, which excludes an effect based on self-perception. 
There is also no reason to assume that the effect was caused because subjects 
felt silly or funny, because this would predict an ERN effect for the vertical stick 
position (“no-stick”) as well. 
However, the experiments reported up to now did not allow direct access 
to changes in subject’s affective state, because distinct emotional modulations 
were induced several times within one subject. Measuring changes in affective 
state after the experiment were therefore not considered to yield reliable results. 
This is different in the experiment reported in the next section: Subjects were 
allocated to either a “negative affect” or a “positive affect” group. Thus, 
measurements of changes in affective state were possible not only by changes in 
ERPs, but also by using a mood questionnaire prior and after conduction of the 
experiment. 
It is predicted that subjects show an increased negative ERN and CRN 
amplitude when receiving negative feedback compared to positive feedback (see 
section 1.5.4). Feedback was provided based on response times only. Thus, in 
the next experiment, I expect a speed-accuracy-tradeoff that differs in both 
groups. The group with negative feedback should show faster reaction times and 
higher error rates, whereas the positive feedback group should show the opposite 
pattern. However, as shown in section 4.3.2.2, a higher error rate decreases the 
ERN amplitude. Thus, the effect caused by increased error rates counteracts the 
effect predicted by negative feedback. Here I predict that the emotional ERN 
increase due to negative feedback is strong enough to superimpose the 
amplitude-decreasing ERN effects due to higher error rates. 
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4.5. Experiment 2d: Emotions induced by performance 
feedback 
4.5.1.1. Participants 
Data were acquired from 25 right-handed women. See section 2.1 for 
additional information. ERP data were analyzed from 24 subjects (mean age 
23.75 years, range 19 to 30 years), one subjects was excluded because she were 
diagnosed to be epileptic and, therefore, was not free of medication. Subjects 
were allocated randomly to receive either positive or negative feedback on their 
reaction times. There were 12 subjects in each feedback group. 
4.5.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
A trial consisted of a flanker stimulus, which required either a right- or 
left hand response. There were 10 blocks with 210 trials each. A feedback 
screen was presented after every 30 trials. A set of 30 trials will be referred to as 
sub-block. Thus, there were 7 sub-blocks with feedback screens per block and 
70 feedback screens during the entire experiment. Timing of trials and blocks 
was exactly the same as described in section 4.4.1.2. 
Emotional modulation: the only difference to the previous experiment 
(section 4.4.1.2) was the way how emotional modulation was induced. Subjects 
were no longer required to hold a chopstick in the mouth. Instead, they received 
feedback based on the mean reaction time in the last-performed sub-block. 
Subjects were allocated randomly to receive either only positive or only 
negative feedback. If the mean RT of the last-performed sub-block N was faster 
than the mean RT of sub-block N minus 1, subjects in the positive feedback 
group received positive feedback on the screen, whereas subjects in the negative 
feedback group received no feedback. If mean RT of the current block was 
slower than mean RTs in the sub-block N minus 1, subjects in the positive 
feedback group received no feedback, whereas subjects in the negative feedback 
group received negative feedback on the screen. There were thee levels of 
positive and negative feedback, the feedback algorithm is described in Table 15. 
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Feedback group Feedback 
level 
Algorithm 
Positive Negative 
Level 1 
RTN up to 20 ms faster 
than RTN-1: 
“gut” 
“no 
feedback” 
Level 2 
RTN up to 40 ms faster 
than RTN-1: 
“sehr gut” 
“no 
feedback” 
Level 3 
RTN more than 40 ms faster 
than RTN-1: 
 
“hervorragend” 
“no 
feedback” 
Level 1 
RTN up to 20 ms slower 
than RTN-1: 
“no feedback” “nicht gut” 
Level 2 
RTN up to 40 ms slower 
than RTN-1: 
“no feedback” “schlecht” 
Level 3 
RTN more than 40 ms slower 
than RTN-1: 
“no feedback” 
“sehr 
schlecht” 
Table 15: Feedback given for the positive and negative feedback group. RT = mean 
reaction time for a sub-block; N = last-performed sub-block. German feedback words 
are translated as: “gut” = “good”; “sehr gut” = “very good”; “hervorragend” = 
“brilliant”; “nicht gut” = “not good”; “schlecht” = “bad”; “sehr schlecht” = “very bad”. 
Feedback words were provided in a sentence; a possible feedback text was 
“Ihre Reaktionszeit im letzen Durchgang war schlecht” (Your reaction time in 
the last sub-block was bad”). If no feedback was given, the sentence “weiter mit 
Mausklick” (press mouse button to continue) was shown. Each feedback screen 
was terminated by a button press. Thus, subjects could have a break whenever 
they omitted a button press after each screen. 
Flanker stimuli: Flanker stimuli were exactly the same as described in 
section 4.2.1.2. 
Instruction: The instruction was to respond as fast and as correct as 
possible to the central letter either with the left hand (central H) or with the right 
hand (central S). 
Questionnaire: Changes in “current feeling” (German: “Momentanes 
Befinden”) were assessed with a questionnaire “Aktuelle Stimmungsskala” 
(ASTS) directly prior and after the experiment. The ASTS (Dalbert, 1992) is a 
short and very economic version of the “profile and mood state” scale (McNair, 
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Lorr, & Doppleman, 1971). The ASTS consists of 19 German adjectives; 
subjects are required to estimate how well those adjective represent their current 
feelings on a scale ranging from 7 (very strong) to 1 (not at all). The whole 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix 5. Acknowledging the difficulties of 
transferring emotion-relevant adjectives into another language, all the labels of 
the adjectives will be given in German. Translations of the ASTS adjectives are 
provided in Appendix 6. 
4.5.1.3. Data recording and preprocessing 
See section 2.4.1 for general recording issues. Eye artifacts were corrected 
using blind component separation described in section 2.4.2; head artifacts were 
rejected as described in section 2.4.1. 
4.5.1.4. Data analysis 
Questionnaire: To analyze data from the ASTS questionnaire, 
independent t-tests were conducted on each adjective rating on pre-experimental 
and post-experimental questionnaire with groups defined by obtained feedback 
(factor FEEDBACK, positive or negative). Since sample size was pretty low for 
a between-group comparison, p-values were interpreted to indicate differences 
when being smaller than 0.1. It was expected that groups do not differ in 
“current feeling” prior to the experiment in ratings for any of the 19 adjectives. 
After the experiment, it was expected that subjects with negative feedback score 
higher on scales related to anger and sadness (zornig, unglücklich, traurig, 
betrübt, verärgert, entmutigt, wütend) and lower on scales related to happiness 
and well-being (freudig, frohgemut, fröhlich, heiter). Differences between both 
groups in the post-test were not expected on scales referring to “being tired and 
exhausted” (abgeschlafft, müde, erschöpft, entkräftet), since the experiment was 
exhausting independently of the given feedback. 
Behavior data: Trials with reaction times lower than 200 ms and higher 
than 800 ms were excluded from behavioral data analysis.  
Post error slowing: Response matching was conducted for the correct 
responses in response-locked ERP data. Thus, correct responses were equal to 
erroneous responses in terms of number and reaction time. See section 4.2.1.4 
for details on response matching. 
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Flanker-locked ERPs: To analyze the N2 effect, ERPs were averaged 
with the flanker stimulus onset being the zero point relative to a 100 ms pre-
flanker baseline. Statistical analysis was conducted on a frontal electrode patch 
consisting of Cz, Fz, FC1 and FC2 in a time window from 200 to 400 ms. 
Information regarding the number of trials included in each condition is 
provided in Table 16. 
 
ERROR – 
GROUP 
CONGRUENCY 
Mean trial 
number 
SD Range 
congruent 1115.6 75 921-1214 
Positive 
feedback 
group incongruent 649.1 73.8 516-758 
congruent 1121 64.2 991-1203 
N
egative 
feedback 
group incongruent 640.1 78.4 480-738 
Table 16: The number of trials included to generate the flanker-locked ERP conditions 
in study 4.5 
Response-locked ERPs: Highly similar data analysis settings as 
described in section 4.2.1.4 were used to analyze response-locked ERPs. Thus, 
the experiment was divided in two error halves (Factor ERRORHALVES, levels 
“first half” and “second half), and it was distinguished between correct and 
incorrect trials (Factor CORRECTNESS, levels correct or erroneous response). 
Analysis of correct trials was based on a subset of response-matched correct 
trials; see section 4.2.1.4 for details on response matching for correct trials. 
Emotional modulation was accessed by the feedback group (Between group 
factor FEEDBACK, positive vs. negative feedback group). See Table 17 for 
information regarding the number of trials included in the ERP conditions. 
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ERROR 
GROUP 
CORRECT- 
NESS 
ERROR 
HALVES 
Mean trial 
number 
SD Range 
1st 109.7 58.3 45-225 correct 
2nd 108.3 59.3 46-227 
1st 107.8 60.0 45-226 
Positive 
feedback 
group error 
2nd 107.7 59.2 46-228 
1st 127.8 61.0 42-226 correct 
2nd 128.4 60.2 47-226 
1st 125.9 60.1 43-218 
N
egative 
feedback 
group error 
2nd 127.8 60.1 45-226 
Table 17: The number of trials included to generate the response-locked ERP conditions 
in study 4.5 
Baseline, and electrode patches for the ERN/CRN were the same as 
described in section 4.2.1.4 ; time windows for ERN/CRN analysis were based 
on peak latencies and are provided in Table 21. 
4.5.2. Results 
4.5.2.1. Behavior data 
Questionnaire 
Prior to conduction of the experiment, the negative and the positive 
feedback group did not differ in their response to any of the 19 ASTS items 
(independent sample t-tests for each rated adjective, with FEEDBACK as 
between group factor, p > .10). This picture changed completely when the 
questionnaire was conducted after the experiment. The negative feedback group 
showed higher scores on the scales “zornig”, “unglücklich”, “betrübt”, 
“verärgert”, “entmutigt” and “wütend”, whereas they showed lower scores on 
the scales “freudig”, “frohgemut”, “fröhlich” and “heiter” (see Appendix 6 for 
possible English translations) (independent sample t-tests for each item, with 
FEEDBACK as between group factor, t- and p-values for each scale are given in 
Table 18).  
Figure 25 depicts differences between pre-experimental and post-
experimental questionnaire, based on subtracting the post-experimental ASTS-
scores from the pre-experimental ASTS-scores. It is clearly visible that both 
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groups differ on the above-mentioned scales. Scales referring to being exhausted 
and tired differed between pre- and posttest, but did not differ between groups 
(rmANOVA with factor PREorPOS (pre- or post-experiment); for the scales 
“abgeschlafft”, “müde”, “erschöpft”, “entkräftet”, between group factor 
FEEDBACK, PREorPOS: F (1,22) > 3.58 ; p < .07: FEEDBACK n.s.) 
 
Rated adjective T p (2-tailed) 
zornig -4.18 0.00** 
abgeschlafft -0.45 0.66 
unglücklich -1.79 0.09* 
traurig -0.87 0.39 
angenehm 0.62 0.54 
betrübt -1.80 0.09* 
freudig 3.12 0.01** 
hoffnungslos 0.00 1.00 
müde -0.37 0.72 
verärgert -1.79 0.09* 
frohgemut 2.14 0.04** 
entmutigt -2.02 0.06* 
fröhlich 1.79 0.09* 
erschöpft -0.33 0.74 
heiter 2.31 0.03** 
verzweifelt 0.60 0.56 
wütend -1.88 0.07* 
entkräftet -0.75 0.46 
lustig 0.79 0.44 
Table 18: T- and p-values for the post-experimental ASTS questionnaire. The negative 
feedback group was compared with the positive feedback group on each of the 19 scales. 
P-values lower than .1 are indicated by a *; p-values lower than .05 are indicated by **. 
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Figure 25: Comparison of the pre- and posttest results of the ASTS questionnaire. Lines 
are based by subtracting the post-experimental from the pre-experimental ASTS scores. 
A value close to zero indicates no change between pre- and posttest; negative values 
indicate that subjects rates loaded higher on the adjective after experiment conduction. 
Feedback groups are color-coded. Significant differences (p < .01) between groups are 
indicated by an asterisk. 
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Reaction times and error rates 
Subjects were faster in giving erroneous responses compared to correct 
responses. This was especially true in the first error half. Subjects responded 
faster in the second part of the experiment (second error half). Although subjects 
with negative feedback responded somewhat faster, the response time difference 
were not confirmed statistically (rmANOVA, Factors CORRECTNESS X 
ERRORHALVES14: F (1,22) = 15.66; p < .001; FEEDBACK n.s.; separate 
rmANOVAs for both error halves; CORRECTNESS: F (1,22) > 479.7; p < .001, 
no main effect of FEEDBACK or interactions). 
 
Figure 26: a) Reaction times for correct and erroneous responses separated by feedback 
group. b) Error rates. Error bars indicate +\- 1 SE. 
Error rates did not differ between both feedback conditions (independent 
t-test on error rates (percentage), between factor FEEDBACK n.s.). Thus, 
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14 See Appendix 7 c for distribution of errors across the experiment. 
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behavioral data show that feedback had little impact on behavior data. See 
Figure 26 for reaction times and error rates. 
Congruency effect 
Subjects reacted faster to congruent compared to incongruent trials; this 
effect was seen for booth error halves. The feedback groups did not differ 
significantly. The speed advantage for congruent flanker trials was seen in both 
error groups (rmANOVA based on correct responses; CONGRUENCY 
(congruent vs. incongruent flanker): F (1,22) = 214.07, p < .001; 
ERRORHALVES: F (1, 22) = 12.02, p < .002; FEEDBACK: F (1,22) = 2.29, 
n.s.; incorrect trials in the second halve were given faster than correct trials in 
the first half, indicated by CONGRUENCY x ERRORHALVES interaction, 
F (1,22) = 7.28, p < .01; no further significant interactions) See Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27: a) Reaction times for congruent and incongruent flankers for both feedback 
groups, separately for correct and erroneous responses. b) Error rates for congruent 
and incongruent flankers. Error bars indicate +\- 1 SE. 
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The same analysis as above was conducted on erroneous responses. As 
described in the analysis of reaction times above, erroneous responses were 
given faster than correct responses. Subjects did not show reaction time 
differences for congruent or incongruent erroneous responses, nor were there RT 
differences between both error halves or feedback groups (rmANOVA on 
erroneous responses. Factors CONGRUENCY, ERRORHALVES and 
FEEDBACK n.s.). See Figure 27. 
Subjects committed more errors when responding to incongruent flankers, 
this effect was consistently shown for both error halves and for both feedback 
groups. Subjects committed more errors in the second error half. (ANOVA on 
error rates (percentages); CONGRUENCY: F (1, 22) = 102.32; p < .001; 
ERRORHALVES: F (1, 22) = 4.86; p < .038; no significant effects of 
FEEDBACK and no significant interactions.) See Figure 27. 
Post error slowing 
Correct responses were faster when given after a correct trial than given 
after an erroneous trial. Analysis was based on response-matched correct 
responses using the same algorithm as described in section 4.3.2.1. This effect 
was consistently seen in both groups (rmANOVA, Factors POSTRESPONSE 
(post-correct vs. post-error), FEEDBACKGROUP; POSTRESPONSE: F 
(1,22) = 76.42, p < .001; FEEDBACK GROUP and interaction 
POSTRESPONSE x FEEDBACK GROUP n.s.). See Table 19 for post error 
slowing data.  
 
 correct responses  
following correct  
responses 
correct responses following
erroneous  
responses 
Positive feedback 392 (43) 431 (47) 
Negative feedback 371 (40) 407 (53) 
Table 19: Reaction times for post-correct and post-error responses in study 4.5; Values 
are in ms, standard deviations are given in brackets. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
151 
Error correction rate 
Subjects tended to correct for some of their errors without being instructed 
to do so (see section 4.1.1). This tendency was found in both feedback groups, 
groups did not differ (mean error correction rate, relative to error rate, values are 
in percent, SD is given in brackets: positive: 15.8 (10.8) negative: 15.1 (9.6). 
independent t-test, between group factor FEEDBACK n.s.). 
4.5.2.2. ERP data 
Flanker locked ERPs 
Visual inspection: As in the experiments reported above, incongruent 
stimuli elicited an increased negative component, which emerged around 
250 ms. Emotional effects indicated by differences between the positive and 
negative feedback group show two aspects: First, there are differences between 
positive and negative feedback group emerging around 150 ms without 
differences between congruent and incongruent flanker trials. Congruency 
effects emerge around 250 ms with the incongruent stimuli being more negative 
in both groups (N2). See Figure 28 left panel. However, the N2 effect is larger 
when subjects receive negative feedback, which is best seen in the difference 
waves based on subtracting the congruent from the incongruent condition. 
Early effect: Tested within a 150 to 250 ms, the visual impression of an 
feedback group effect prior to an congruency effect did not confirm, neither on 
the parietal electrode patch nor on the frontal electrode patch nor on electrode 
Cz (rmANOVA, Factors CONGRUENCY and FEEDBACK; FEEDBACK or 
FEEDBACK x CONGRUENCY n.s.). Instead, the congruency effect examined 
in the later time window started to emerge (for example, rmANOVA on frontal 
patch: CONGRUENCY: F (1,22) = 8.28; p < .009). This effect will be discussed 
in detail in the next paragraph. 
Congruency effect: Incongruent stimuli elicited a more negative ERP 
than congruent stimuli, this was especially true for the group receiving negative 
feedback (rmANOVA, Factors CONGRUENCY and FEEDBACK; significant 
interaction CONGRUENCY X FEEDBACK, F (1,22) = 6.09; p < .022, separate 
rmANOVAs for both groups: Positive Feedback group, 
CONGRUENCY:F (1,11) = 37.51; p < .001, Negative Feedback; 
CONGRUENCY: F (1,11) = 35.07; p < .001; interaction indicated that the 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
congruency effect was larger when subjects received negative feedback). See 
Figure 28 and Table 20.  
 
Figure 28: ERPs locked to flanker stimuli. Left panel: N2-effect for both feedback 
groups. Feedback group is color-coded; flanker congruency is coded by line style. 
Middle: scalp distribution at 340 ms based on difference waves incongruent minus 
congruent for both feedback groups. Right: Difference waves based on incongruent 
minus congruent flanker stimuli, separately for both feedback groups. 
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Feedback group Flanker congruency Mean amplitude in µV 
congruent 5.6 Positive 
incongruent 4.3 
congruent 5.7 
Negative 
incongruent 3.3 
Table 20: mean amplitude for ERPs following congruent and incongruent flanker 
stimuli on a parietal patch of electrodes. 
 
Response-locked ERPs - the ERN/CRN 
Visual inspection: As in previous experiments, a negative-going ERP 
deflection (ERN) was observed after erroneous responses, which was followed 
by a positive component (Pe). There was also a less negative component (CRN) 
following response-matched correct responses. As in the studies reported above, 
the ERN peaked somewhat earlier than the CRN. The most obvious difference 
between the negative and positive feedback group was that there are greater 
absolute differences between the ERN and the CRN display when negative 
feedback was given. Greater absolute differences between ERPs for correct and 
erroneous responses were not seen within the Pe time range. In other words, 
relative to the CRN, the ERN is much stronger activated in the negative 
feedback group. See Figure 29; differences between erroneous and correct 
responses (error minus correct) are displayed in the right panel. 
Peak latency analysis: Erroneous responses were given faster than 
correct responses. This was independent of feedback given and seen in both 
error halves (rmANOVA, Factors ERRORHALVE, CORRECT, Between-group 
factor FEEDBACK; CORRECTNESS: F (1,22) = 8.27; p < .009, no further 
significant main effects or interactions). Thus, for subsequent mean analysis, 
time windows were only distinguished between correct and erroneous responses, 
but not between the feedback groups or the error halves. The mean peak 
latencies are given in Table 21.  
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CORRECTNESS 
mean 
peak latency 
Time window for 
peak amplitude analysis
Correct 76 36 to 116 
Error 49 10 to 90 
Table 21: mean peak latencies and time windows for ERN/CRN peak amplitude analysis 
for response-locked ERPs in experiment 4.5. Values are in ms. 
Absolute differences between correct and erroneous response ERPs: 
Visual inspection indicated that differences between the ERN and the CRN are 
more pronounced when subjects received negative feedback. To test for this, 
ERPs for correct responses were subtracted from ERPs for erroneous responses. 
Statistical analysis confirmed visual inspection within the ERN/CRN time 
window (rmANOVA on difference waves erroneous minus correct responses 
(response matched); peak amplitude within 0 to 150 ms post-response; factors 
ERRORHALVE, between factor FEEDBACK, FEEDBACK: F (1,22) = 7.01; 
p < .015; no further main effects or interactions). 
Pe: The difference between erroneous and correct responses was not 
replicated in the Pe time window (rmANOVA, mean amplitude 200 to 400 ms, 
Factors FEEDBACK and ERRORHALVES, no significant effects). 
Peak amplitude analysis with response-matched data: The pattern 
described above with greater differences between ERN and CRN in the negative 
feedback group was reflected in an FEEDBACK x CORRECTNESS interaction 
(rmANOVA, FEEDBACK x CORRECTNESS: F (1,22) = 6.62; p < .017). 
Differences due to FEEDBACK and CORRECTNESS did not differ across both 
error halves (interaction ERRORHALVES x CORRECT x FEEDBACK n.s.). 
Separate analysis for the ERN and the CRN revealed group differences for the 
ERN, but not for the CRN (independent sample t-tests, groups defined by 
FEEDBACK; ERN: t (22) = 2.11; p < .046; CRN: n.s.). As shown in Figure 29; 
the CRN is somewhat more posterior distributed than the ERN. However, there 
were also no group differences in CRN amplitude when tested on a parietal 
electrode patch (Cz, Pz, CP1, CP2).  
One could argue that failure to find group differences for the CRN might 
be caused by response-matching, since the variance in mean amplitude might be 
higher in a subset of correct trials compared to all correct trials. To test for this, 
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the CRN for not response matched data was examined as well, but there were 
still no group differences (independent sample t-tests, groups defined by 
FEEDBACK; ERN: t (22) = 2.11; p < .046; CRN: n.s.). See Figure 29 c. 
Response-locked ERPs - the Pe
To clearly distinguish emotional modulations already picked up in the 
ERN/CRN domain from “pure” Pe effects, the same procedure as described in 
section 4.3.2.2 was conducted. Thus, baselines were set to time windows listed 
in Table 21. This conservative method confirmed differences between correct 
and erroneous responses. Both feedback groups differed in ERPs following 
errors, but not in ERPs following correct responses (t-tests on mean amplitudes; 
between group factor FEEDBACK, error responses: T = 2.46; p < .022: correct 
responses: t = .15; n.s.). 
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Figure 29: response-locked ERP data for both feedback groups, experiment 4.5. a) 
Correct (dotted lines) and erroneous responses (solid lines). Difference waves indicate 
larger absolute differences between the ERN and the CRN when subjects received 
negative feedback. c) Analysis of the Pe. To adjust for differences emerged in the 
ERN/CRN time window, the baseline was set to the ERN/CRN time window prior to 
statistical analysis of the Pe. Differences between both groups are only found for 
erroneous responses. d) Scalp distribution for the ERN and the CRNfor both groups. 
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4.5.3. Summary and discussion 
Summary: The questionnaire clearly indicates that the paradigm was 
feasible to induce negative feelings. In contrast, the questionnaire did not 
indicate changes in affective state when subjects received positive feedback. 
Thus, the results are interpreted that changes in negative affect were induced, 
whereas there were no changes in positive affect. 
Reaction times display the usual speed advantage for erroneous responses 
and for congruent flankers observed in the previous experiments in section 4. 
There was no clear shift from being faster for the cost of committing fewer 
errors when subjects received negative feedback. The congruency effect, post-
error slowing and error correction rate were also not affected by feedback. 
Feedback had a large impact on all examined ERP components: The N2 was 
more pronounced when subjects received negative feedback. In addition, there 
was an enlarged absolute difference between the ERN and the CRN for negative 
feedback. This effect was mainly caused by the ERN; group differences within 
the CRN were not confirmed statistically. Later in time, the Pe was more 
positive for erroneous responses in the negative feedback group. This group 
difference was not found for correct responses. 
Discussion: The discussion in this section refers only to findings 
exclusively related to experiment 4.5. Issues regarding performance monitoring 
are discussed in section 4.6. 
No performance differences between both feedback groups were found, 
which is in line with previous research reporting no performance differences 
between subjects high and low in negative affect (Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2004) and between high-and low-motivating trials (Hajcak, Moser, 
Yeung, & Simons, 2005). 
Feedback was based on subject’s reaction time only. Alternatively, it 
would be possible to base feedback on the accuracy rate. Reaction time was 
chosen because previous research (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & 
Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) indicates that 
emphasizing speed over accuracy leads to an decreased (less negative) ERN 
amplitude than emphasizing accuracy over speed. There is a slightly tendency in 
behavioral data (not significant) that subjects were somewhat faster and less 
accurate when negative feedback was given. Thus, speed was emphasizes over 
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accuracy, which should diminish the ERN. This effect works against the 
prediction that negative affect enlarges the ERN. However, the increased ERN 
described here provides a strong point that the effect is not due to speed-
accuracy-issues, but caused by the intended emotional modulation. 
Hajcak and colleagues (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005) 
conducted a flanker task in which motivational factors were manipulated by 
indicating that the next trial was either high or low in value. Subjects were told 
that performance would result in monetary gain after the experiment; performing 
especially good on high value trials increases monetary gain. They found no 
motivational differences on the behavioral level. As in the present study, they 
showed that the ERN, but not the CRN was more negative for high value 
compared to low value trials. However, as introduced in section 1.2.4, there is 
no clear line between emotion and motivation; a motivational state is an result of 
an emotion. Keeping this in mind, high value trials might be accompanied by an 
increased arousal level, because there is the danger of loosing. Thus, the 
increased ERN found by Hajcak et al. (2005) can also be indicative for ERN 
increase following negative emotions or the expectation of negative emotions. 
On the other hand, one could argue that a high value trial indicates the chance of 
a reward, and is therefore related to positive affect. However, which of both 
alternatives is feasible might depend on many things, among them personal traits 
and attitudes. Those conceptual difficulties can be avoided when not the 
motivational state, but the emotional state of the subject is manipulated 
experimentally, as done in the experiment presented here.  
One could argue that the increased N2 and the increased ERN/CRN 
difference in the negative affect group merely indicate a general increase for all 
ERP components. This could be caused by increased alertness rather than by 
affective modulation. However, I do not regard this alternative as feasible, 
because flanker-locked ERPs between both groups do not differ prior to 150 ms 
(statistical examination found no significant group differences prior to 250 ms). 
In addition, group differences within the Pe time window have only been found 
following erroneous, but not following correct responses; a general increase in 
overall activity would suggest differences following correct responses as well. 
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4.6. Discussion – Part 2 
Summary: Four experiments were presented in the second part of the 
thesis to examine emotional influences under positive and negative (experiment 
4.2 and 4.3), positive (experiment 4.4) or negative emotions (experiment 4.5). 
While behavioral measures were not indicative of changes in emotional states, 
the ERN was enlarged following negative emotions (experiment 4.3 and 4.5) 
and reduced following positive emotions (experiment 4.4). The N2 and the Pe 
were enlarged following relatively large negative emotions only (experiment 
4.4). The next section discusses the emotion-related findings in detail and 
integrates them into recent theories of affect and performance monitoring. 
4.6.1. Behavioral data 
Beyond the classical effects typically seen for flanker tasks (see 
“Summary and Perspectives” for each experiment in section 4), there were no 
effects due to affective manipulation. This is true for the congruency effect, for 
error rates, reaction times, post-error slowing as well as for error correction rate. 
At a first glance, this might appear somewhat surprising, since the experiments 
were inspired by Dreisbach’s and Goschke’s (2004) research (see section 4.1.4), 
which showed behavioral effects: Pleasant IAPS pictures presented directly 
prior to a trial eliminate switching costs in a task switching paradigm (Dreisbach 
& Goschke, 2004). On the other hand, affect-related changes in the ERN 
without changes on the behavior level were repeatedly described (Gehring, 
Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a, 2004; 
Johannes, Wieringa, Nager, Dengler, & Münte, 2001; Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, 
Morte, Münte, & Barbanoj, 2005; Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005). Thus, it 
seems to be the rule rather than the exception to find no emotional effects in 
typical ERN experiments. The experiments presented in section 4 were designed 
to produce error rates high enough to examine the ERN. It is conceivable that 
those flanker tasks provide an imperfect measure for small emotional effects. 
However, an experimental task more similar to Dreisbach’s and Goschke’s 
setting (2004) would produce a relatively low error rate (4.15 % in Dreisbach 
and Goschke, 2004). In addition, it would complicate integration of ERN results 
into previous findings. Thus, future research should develop paradigms feasible 
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to induce emotion-caused effect on both, behavioral and ERP level. Another 
issue which might facilitate emotional effects on behavioral data is that 
Dreisbach and Goschke informed their subjects that they examine how pictures 
influence task performance. To avoid withdrawal of attentional resources from 
the demanding flanker task, subjects in the experiments presented in section 4 
were not informed about the intended emotional modulation. In addition, 
presentation of pictures prior to flanker stimuli was shorter compared to 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) (80 ms vs. 250 ms), which might result in 
weakened affective responses. Those points taken together might explain why 
emotional modulations did not affect behavioral data. 
4.6.2. ERP data 
The following section discusses ERP effects related to emotional 
manipulation only; ERP effects specific to emotional stimuli were discussed 
separately for each experiment in the “summary and perspective” parts of 
section 4. 
4.6.2.1. The flanker-locked N2 
A more negative component for congruent compared to incongruent 
flanker stimuli was seen around 300 ms in all four experiments. This N2 effect 
replicates earlier findings (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Kopp, 
Rist, & Mattler, 1996; Van 't Ent, 2002). Since the present thesis was not 
primarily concerned about whether the ERN and the N2 reflect the same 
mechanisms, a comparison between both components was conducted by visual 
inspection only. The N2 appears to be somewhat more posterior than the ERN, 
which is in line with some previous research (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & 
Hohnsbein, 1999). However, a stronger point towards the same or different 
underlying mechanisms can be made if both components can be independently 
manipulated. Falkenstein and colleagues (1999) argued that the N2 amplitude is 
sensitive to overall error rate (decreased in subjects with high error rate), 
whereas the ERN is not. This is not supported by the present data. Furthermore, 
here I present the reversed pattern: Experiment 4.3 distinguishes between 
subjects with a low and a high error rate and finds no group effect on the N2, but 
a less negative ERN for subjects with a high error rate. However, Falkenstein 
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and colleagues (1999) conducted a Go/NoGo-task, which required their subjects 
to withhold a response. Those differences in task performance might contribute 
to the conflicting results. In addition, different reference methods were used 
(linked mastoid by Falkenstein, nose reference in all experiments of section 4). 
Similar to the present results, there are studies reporting decreased ERN when 
subjects committed more errors (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 
1993; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b). 
A strong point towards different processes underlying the N2 and the 
ERN can be made if both components are affected differentially by emotional 
modulation. This was clearly the case in experiment 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. While 
there was no N2 effect but an ERN/CRN when emotions were induced by IAPS 
pictures or by facial feedback, the N2 and the ERN/CRN-amplitudes were 
sensitive to the kind of feedback subjects received..  
In experiment 4.5, error rates were slightly (but not significantly) lower 
when subjects received positive feedback. A prediction based solely on error 
rates would assume a larger N2 for this group. However, the pattern observed in 
study 4.5 is exactly the other way round; N2 amplitude was increased for the 
negative feedback group. This supports my argumentation that not absolute error 
rate, but emotional modulation is responsible for changes seen in the N2. 
Apparently, those affective changes have to be relatively large, so that they are 
only seen when emotional experience includes personal involvement. As 
indicated by the questionnaire, this was the case in experiment 4.5. 
The N2 has been shown to be reduced in subjects recruited from a group 
of impulsive-violent offenders (Chen, Tien, Juan, Tzeng, & Hung, 2005) relative 
to matched non-violent offenders. Results were interpreted to reflect 
impairments in impulse inhibition. Following this line of argumentation, an 
increased N2 as seen in the negative feedback group in experiment 4.5 indicate 
increased impulse inhibition. It is conceivable that subjects under negative affect 
do inhibit response alternatives in favor to more established response 
alternatives, as suggested by previous research (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; 
Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003) and in section 4.1.3.1. Thus, the 
present thesis shows that the N2 might serve as an indicator of emotional 
engagement. Apparently, the negative emotion has to be relatively strong. Very 
mild negative emotions as induced by negative IAPS pictures (experiment 4.4) 
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or possibly induced by low dosage of Yohimbine (Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, 
Morte, Münte, & Barbanoj, 2005) are not powerful enough to manipulate the 
N2.  
4.6.2.2. The response-locked ERN/CRN 
A clear ERN/CRN component was seen in all four studies. The ERN was 
most pronounced over frontocentral areas, whereas the CRN reaches its peak 
somewhat more posteriorly. It remains unclear why the ERN and the CRN do 
not show the same distribution, as suggested by other research (Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2004; Simon-Thomas & Knight, 2005). Earlier research 
(Falkenstein, 2004) argued that distribution differences might be caused by 
different reference methods (see section 4.1.2.1). However, the fact that the 
CRN was found to be more posteriorly across all four studies suggests that the 
finding is robust across the chosen flanker task and recording setting. There is 
also some evidence that the ERN and the CRN do not describe exactly the same 
mechanisms: While the ERN was susceptible to motivational factors, the CRN 
was not (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). However; the present 
experiments were not designed to finally decide on this topic, further research 
should address this issue.  
There is much literature showing that the ERN is generated in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (see Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004, 
for meta analysis). As mentioned above (section 4.1), this region of the brain can 
be functionally separated into dorsal cognitive and a rostral affective subdivision 
(Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). In addition, the ACC shows a specialization on the 
cellular level: Only in humans and great apes, the ACC contains a special class 
of spindle-like neurons. Relative to ordinary pyramid cells, they are up to four 
times larger in volume and differ in dendrites properties. Those spindle neurons 
show a high grade of long-distance projections (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, 
Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001). Equipped with this specialization, the ACC might 
serve as a relay station between evolutionary old and new developed brain 
structures or, in other words, as “an interface between emotion and cognition” 
(Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001, p. 107). In line with this, 
the ACC has been shown to be involved in emotional self-control, focused 
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problem solving, error recognition and adaptive responses to changing 
conditions; shortly in all basic aspects of intelligent behavior. 
The ERN was stronger under negative affect conditions, which replicates 
earlier results based on between-group-designs (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 
2003a, 2004; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, Morte, Münte, 
& Barbanoj, 2005). Here, I show that an increased ERN can also be observed in 
the same subjects within the same sessions; even on a trial-by-trial-basis 
(experiment 4.3).Thus, increased ERN is not inevitably an indication for 
maladaptive functions. Instead, the ERN reflects flexible adjustment to 
environmental requirements. 
To my knowledge, the present research (experiment 4.4) is the first 
reporting ERN decrease due to positive affect. Lack of ERN research on positive 
emotions might be due to several reasons: First, there are many affective 
disorders related to negative affect, but there are only few disorders which 
primary symptom are increased positive affect. Thus, from the clinical 
standpoint, there is less need to examine interactions of positive affect and 
performance monitoring. In addition, there is emerging evidence that negative 
affects are faster and more reliably elicited (see section 4.3.3). On the other 
hand, it has been shown that reduction of negative emotions (providing 
Oxazepam, a drug with anxiolytic properties; see section 4.1.3), diminishes the 
ERN amplitude (Johannes, Wieringa, Nager, Dengler, & Münte, 2001) and low 
dosage of alcohol, which is known to induce some kind of pleasant feeling, also 
diminishes the ERN amplitude (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002). Thus, there is the 
need to integrate both, positive and negative affect into current models of 
performance monitoring. 
4.6.2.3. The response-locked Pe  
As pointed out by Hajcak, McDonald, and Simons (2004), there is still a 
lack of formal examination on affective influences on the Pe. Some evidence 
suggest that the Pe is not susceptible to affective variables (Hajcak, McDonald, 
& Simons, 2003a; Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000) or that the Pe is somewhat 
smaller in highly anxious subjects (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak 
& Simons, 2002). 
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An explicit examination of the Pe was provided by Hajcak, McDonald, 
and Simons (2004): They described the Pe to be smaller (less positive) in 
subjects scoring high on a negative affect scale. More negative Pe amplitudes 
following negative affect induction were not reported in any of the present 
experiments. However, visual inspection of the left panel in Figure 21 indicates 
a comparable pattern: The ERN as well as the Pe were more negative following 
negative affect induction. In the present study, this effect was not significant, 
because a very conservative approach was employed. In contrast to Hajcak et al. 
(2004), Pe analysis was conducted with baseline set to the ERN time window, 
which enables a distinction between emotional effects on the ERN and Pe. Thus, 
whereas the Pe effect reported by Hajcak et al. (2004) might still include some 
activity related to the ERN, I cannot be entirely sure that the baseline correction 
was too conservative and made an existing effect disappear. Future research is 
necessary to finally decide on this issue. 
Analysis of the Pe for experiment 4.5 was based on the same conservative 
baseline-adjustment procedure. However, the Pe amplitude was more positive, 
which contradicts Hajcak et al.’s (2004) finding of a decreased (less positive) Pe. 
Hajcak and colleagues concluded “that subjects high in NA may find their errors 
less salient or be less aware of their errors”(p. 196). I regard this explanation as 
counterintuitive and not feasible, since it is well known that subjects high in 
negative affect (for example subjects with anxiety disorder and/or depression) 
tend to overestimate the significance of their errors (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988) 
and are poor in suppressing failure-related thoughts (Conway, Howell, & 
Giannopoulos, 1991). If the Pe is related to conscious error processing 
(Falkenstein, 2004) (see section 4.1.2.3), this component should be enlarged in 
subjects high on negative affect, and, accordingly, in subjects with induced 
negative affect. This is exactly the case in experiment 4.5. It remains unclear 
how those differences in Pe amplitude between studies might be reconciled, but 
the results presented here fit better into theoretical frameworks of affective 
disorders. A possible explanation could be that the brain adapts in subjects 
which are always high on negative affect. Thus, a clear Pe amplitude increase is 
only seen in subjects who are not permanently in a negative affective state. 
Interestingly, as the results presented here, earlier research by Hajcak and 
colleagues (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a) showed more positive Pe 
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amplitudes for subjects classified as phobic or worried relative to matched 
controls. However, they restricted their statistical analysis to the ERN. 
4.6.2.4. Integrating affect and reinforcement learning 
Previous research pointed out that there is the need to integrate affective 
and motivational issues into existing theories of performance monitoring 
(Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). This is done in the next section. I 
propose that positive affect modulates performance monitoring by changing 
dopamine level in mesencephalic structures, whereas negative affect acts in the 
opposite direction. 
Previous research indicated that positive affect increases activity in 
mesencephalic dopaminergic structures (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). 
According to the reinforcement learning hypothesis, a dopamine increase causes 
increased inhibition of the anterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), 
which is measurable by a decrease of ERN amplitude. Although the present data 
cannot provide information regarding the exact structures involved, the less 
negative ERN following positive affect in experiment 4.4 corresponds with 
Ashby et al’s (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999) as well as with Holroyd and Coles’ 
(2002) proposals. Here, I suggest that positive affect increases activity of 
dopaminergic mesencephalic structures. This increase accumulates with signals 
receiving from the basal ganglia; generated by evaluation of the ongoing 
behavior. Thus, there are more inhibiting signals forwarded to the ACC, which 
reduces monitoring on the given task. Importantly, the reinforcement learning 
theory makes only prediction about the ERN (Holroyd & Yeung, 2003), specific 
predictions regarding the N2 and the Pe cannot be derived.  
There is some reason to assume that negative affect can be described as 
the other end of a positive-negative continuum(Russell & Carroll, 1999). 
Congruent with this, it has been argued that happiness and sadness do activate 
the same brain circuits (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003) (see section 
1.4.3). Thus, when positive affect is associated with increased dopamine level in 
midbrain and frontal brain areas, negative affect could be associated with 
decreases in dopamine level. This view receives some support from patients 
suffering from depression, which has increased negative affect as a central 
defining characteristic. Depression has been associated with a broad variety of 
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changes in brain metabolism, among them decreased activation in left, right and 
bilateral prefrontal areas, in cortical- limbic and thalamocortical connections and 
an increased amygdala activation (see Davidson, Abercrombie, Nitschke, & 
Putnam, 1999, for overview). There is also burgeoning evidence of ACC 
involvement in depression: It was shown that patients who responded to 
treatment showed increased activity in the emotional rostral ACC region 
compared to control subjects, whereas nonresponders showed less ACC 
activation (Mayberg et al., 1997; Wu et al., 1999). Other researchers found that 
there is an increase in dopamine D2 receptor binding in the ACC and the 
striatum during treatment of major depression in treatment responders, but not in 
nonresponders (Larisch et al., 1997). Thus, here I conclude that negative affect 
changes ERN amplitude towards greater negativity, probably by changes in 
dopaminergic level. However, I do not propose that exactly the same circuits as 
claimed for positive effects are involved, because Ashby et al. (Ashby, Isen, & 
Turken, 1999) clearly stated that the theory of positive affect is not feasible to 
explain mechanisms in negative affect. In line with this, recent meta-analysis 
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 
2003) and Wager et al. (Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003) linked only 
positive affect to the basal ganglia, which, as mentioned above, play a critical 
role in evaluation of behavior outcomes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) and reward 
processing (Hamann & Mao, 2002). 
As mentioned above, the present flanker tasks produced reliable effects on 
performance monitoring processes, but were not sensitive to changes in 
cognitive flexibility, indicated by facilitated orientation towards new 
requirements (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Future research should focus on 
developing paradigms that demonstrate behavioral and neuropsychological 
effects within one task. In addition, only one experiment demonstrated that 
positive affect modulates performance monitoring. This could be due to the 
reason that it is easier to induce negative relative to positive emotions. 
Nevertheless, more research is needed to examine the effects on positive affect 
on performance monitoring. Unlike most previous research, the present thesis 
distinguished between perceiving emotional stimuli and experiencing emotions 
due to personal involvement (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Reisberg & Hertel, 
2004). This has been shown to be an important issue, which should be 
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considered in future research. Since it has been shown that man and women act 
differently upon emotional stimuli (see section 3.2.3), subsequent research 
should also include male subjects and provide a direct comparison between 
genders.  
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5. Conclusion 
Using memory encoding and performance monitoring as examples for 
cognitive functions, the present dissertation demonstrates that cognition and 
emotions are highly interactive. Positive background emotions facilitated recall 
performance (3.2) and decreases performance monitoring (experiment 4.4). This 
provides further evidence that positive emotions tune the cognitive system to act 
less focused on task requirements. This, in general, might indicate a switch 
towards increased flexibility and less restrictive and controlled behavior. In 
contrast, negative affect decreases cognitive flexibility, which is indicated by 
increased focus to central, task-relevant information (no increased memory 
performance by negative background information in experiment 3.2 and 3.3 and 
increased ERN when there is an error in task performance, experiments 4.3 and 
4.5). 
The present thesis supports the idea that examination of cognition without 
considering emotional aspects is incomplete. Thus, the distinction between 
cognition and emotions should be considered as historically developed; new 
neuropsychological models should no longer regard them as brain functions that 
can be examined independently. 
There are some limitations which should be kept in mind when integrating 
the present results into the large body of neuropsychological findings. First of 
all, there is the need of replication, especially in the case of positive emotions. 
This is because positive emotions are harder to induce experimentally and, 
probably not independent from the first point, there is relatively few research on 
positive emotions. Second, the present thesis derived their findings mainly from 
ERPs; future research should feel challenged to re-examine the current results 
using a) methods with better spatial resolution, b) paradigms which are able to 
show effects also on the behavior level, c) employing subjects of both genders. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
170 
6. Acknowledgement 
 
At first, I would like to thank PD Dr. Jascha Rüsseler and Prof. Dr. 
Thomas F. Münte for enabling me to conduct those experiments and supporting 
me on all aspects of the dissertation process. In addition, I would like to thank 
Dr. Marcus Heldmann, Jürn Möller and Dr. Arie van der Lugt for supporting me 
on methodological, technical and programming issues. I also appreciate the 
support I gained from our student assistants Nadine Strien and Peggy Tausche 
for assisting me during data acquisition and from Jan-Ole Schumann who 
supported me in data preprocessing. Special thanks also to Dr. Josep Pallares, 
who programmed the SOBI-algorithm used for artifact correction, and to Gregor 
Szycik for all those long discussions (and all the fun we had…) while working 
on this thesis. I would like to thank Dr. Julia Festman for proof reading, Esther 
Kluba for providing the photos in Figure 22 and to Uwe Schröder for designing 
the book cover. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and my 
friends for all the support I gained. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
171 
7. References 
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Buchanan, T. W. (2005). Amygdala damage impairs emotional 
memory for gist but not details of complex stimuli. Nature Neuroscience, 8(4), 512-
518. 
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. (1994). Impaired recognition of 
emotion in facial expressions following bilateral damage to the human amygdala. 
Nature, 372(6507), 669-672. 
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Hamann, S., Young, A. W., Calder, A. J., Phelps, E. A., et al. (1999). 
Recognition of facial emotion in nine individuals with bilateral amygdala damage. 
Neuropsychologia, 37(10), 1111-1117. 
Aho, A. V., Kernighan, B. W., & Weinberger, P. J. (1988). The AWK programming language. 
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
Allman, J. M., Hakeem, A., Erwin, J. M., Nimchinsky, E., & Hof, P. (2001). The anterior 
cingulate cortex: The evolution of an interface between emotion and cognition. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 935, 107-117. 
Amrhein, C., Muhlberger, A., Pauli, P., & Wiedemann, G. (2004). Modulation of event-
related brain potentials during affective picture processing: a complement to startle 
reflex and skin conductance response? International Journal of Psychophysiology, 
54(3), 231-240. 
Anders, S., Lotze, M., Erb, M., Grodd, W., & Birbaumer, N. (2004). Brain activity underlying 
emotional valence and arousal: a response-related fMRI study. Human Brain 
Mapping, 23(4), 200-209. 
Ashby, F. G., Isen, A. M., & Turken, A. U. (1999). A neuropsychological theory of positive 
affect and its influence on cognition. Psychological Review, 106(3), 529-550. 
Averill, J. R. (1994). In teh eyes of the beholder. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The 
nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 15–19). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Baayen, R. H., Piepenbrock, R., & Gulikers, L. (1995). The CELEX Lexical Database 
(Release 2) [CD-ROM]. Philadelphia: PA: Linguistic Data Consortium, University of 
Pennsylvania [Distributor]. 
Barrett, L. F., & Wager, T. D. (2006). The Structure of Emotion: Evidence From 
Neuroimaging Studies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(2), 79-85. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
172 
Beedie, C. J., Terry, P. C., & Lane, A. M. (2005). Distinguishing mood from emotion. 
Cognition and Emotion, 19, 847–878. 
Bentin, S., Allison, T., Puce, A., Perez, E., & McCarthy, G. (1996). Electrophysiological 
studies of face perception in humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 8(6), 551-
565. 
Bentin, S., & Deouell, L. Y. (2000). Structural encoding and identification in face processing: 
ERP evidence for separate mechanisms. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17(1-3), 35-54. 
Berntsen, D. (2002). Tunnel memories for autobiographical events: Central details are 
remembered more frequently from shocking than from happy experiences. Memory 
and Cognition, 30(7), 1010-1020. 
Blair, R. J., & Cipolotti, L. (2000). Impaired social response reversal. A case of 'acquired 
sociopathy'. Brain, 123 ( Pt 6), 1122-1141. 
Bradley, M. M., Greenwald, M. K., Petry, M. C., & Lang, P. J. (1992). Remembering 
pictures: pleasure and arousal in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology : 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 18(2), 379-390. 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1999). Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Instruction 
manual and affective ratings: Technical Report C-1, The Center for Research in 
Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2000). Measuring emotion: Behavior, feeling, and physiology. 
In R. D. Lane & L. Nadel (Eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion (pp. 242-276). 
New York: US: Oxford University Press. 
Breiter, H. C. (1996). Response and habituation of the human amygdala during visual 
processing of facial expression. Neuron, 17(5), 875-887. 
Brown, T. A., Chorpita, B. F., & Barlow, D. H. (1998). Structural relationships among 
dimensions of the DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders and dimensions of negative 
affect, positive affect, and autonomic arousal. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
107(2), 179-192. 
Buck, R. (2000). Conceptualizing motivation and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
23(02), 195-196. 
Bush, G., Luu, P., & Posner, M. I. (2000). Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior 
cingulate cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 215-222. 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1999). The affect system: Architecture and operating 
characteristics. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8(5), 133 137. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
173 
Calder, A. J., Keane, J., Manes, F., Antoun, N., & Young, A. W. (2000). Impaired recognition 
and experience of disgust following brain injury. Nature Neuroscience, 3(11), 1077-
1078. 
Canli, T., Zhao, Z., Brewer, J., Gabrieli, J. D., & Cahill, L. (2000). Event-related activation in 
the human amygdala associates with later memory for individual emotional 
experience. Journal of Neuroscience, 20(19), RC99. 
Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M. M., Noll, D., & Cohen, J. D. (1998). 
Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the online monitoring of performance. 
Science, 280(5364), 747-749. 
Chen, C. Y., Tien, Y. M., Juan, C. H., Tzeng, O. J., & Hung, D. L. (2005). Neural correlates 
of impulsive-violent behavior: an event-related potential study. Neuroreport, 16(11), 
1213-1216. 
Christianson, S. A., & Loftus, E. F. (1991). Remembering emotional events: The fate of 
detailed information. Cognition and Emotion, 5(2), 81-108. 
Cimbalo, R. S. (1978). Making something stand out: The isolation effect in memory 
performance. In M. M. Grunneberg, P. E. Morris & S. R.N. (Eds.), Practical aspects 
of memory (pp. 101-110). New York: Academic Press. 
Conway, M., Howell, A., & Giannopoulos, C. (1991). Dysphoria and thought suppression. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15(2), 153 166. 
Cooper, E. H., & Pantle, A. J. (1967). The Total-Time Hypothesis in Verbal Learning. 
Psychological Bulletin, 68(4), 221-234. 
Costa, M., Braun, C., & Birbaumer, N. (2003). Gender differences in response to pictures of 
nudes: a magnetoencephalographic study. Biological Psychology, 63(2), 129-147. 
Croft, R. J. (2000). The Differential Correction of Eyelid-Movement and Globe-Rotation 
Artefact from the EEG (Reply to Verleger). Journal of Psychophysiology, 14(4), 207-
209. 
Cuthbert, B. N., Schupp, H. T., Bradley, M. M., Birbaumer, N., & Lang, P. J. (2000). Brain 
potentials in affective picture processing: covariation with autonomic arousal and 
affective report. Biological Psychology, 52(2), 95-111. 
Dalbert, C. (1992). Subjektives Wohlbefinden junger Erwachsener: Theoretische und 
empirische Analysen der Struktur und Stabilität. Zeitschrift für Differentielle und 
Diagnostische Psychologie, 13(207-220). 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
174 
Davidson, R. J. (2004). What does the prefrontal cortex "do" in affect: Perspectives on frontal 
EEG asymmetry research. Biological Psychology, 67(1,2), 219-233. 
Davidson, R. J., Abercrombie, H., Nitschke, J. B., & Putnam, K. (1999). Regional brain 
function, emotion and disorders of emotion. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 9(2), 
228-234. 
Davidson, R. J., & Irwin, W. (1999). The functional neuroanatomy of emotion and affective 
style. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(1), 11-21. 
Davidson, R. J., Maxwell, J. S., & Shackman, A. J. (2004). The privileged status of emotion 
in the brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America (PNAS), 101(33), 11915-11916. 
de Gelder, B., Vroomen, J., Pourtois, G., & Weiskrantz, L. (1999). Non-conscious recognition 
of affect in the absence of striate cortex. Neuroreport, 10(18), 3759 3763. 
Dien, J. (1998). Issues in the application of the average reference: Review, critiques, and 
recommendations. Behavior Research Methods Instruments & Computers, 30(1), 34-
43. 
Dimberg, U., & Thunberg, M. (1998). Rapid facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. 
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 39(1), 39-45. 
Dolan, R. J. (2002). Emotion, cognition, and behavior. Science, 298(5596), 1191-1194. 
Dolan, R. J., & Vuilleumier, P. (2003). Amygdala automaticity in emotional processing. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 985, 348-355. 
Dolcos, F., & Cabeza, R. (2002). Event-related potentials of emotional memory: encoding 
pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral pictures. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 2(3), 252-263. 
Dolcos, F., LaBar, K. S., & Cabeza, R. (2004). Dissociable effects of arousal and valence on 
prefrontal activity indexing emotional evaluation and subsequent memory: an event-
related fMRI study. Neuroimage, 23(1), 64-74. 
Donchin, E., & Coles, M.-G. (1988). Is the P300 component a manifestation of context 
updating? Behavior and Brain Sciences, 11, 357-427. 
Dreisbach, G., & Goschke, T. (2004). How positive affect modulates cognitive control: 
reduced perseveration at the cost of increased distractibility. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology : Learning, Memory and Cognition, 30(2), 343-353. 
Dubois, S., Rossion, B., Schiltz, C., Bodart, J. M., Michel, C., Bruyer, R., et al. (1999). Effect 
of familiarity on the processing of human faces. Neuroimage, 9(3), 278-289. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
175 
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of 
behavior. Psychological Review, 66, 183-201. 
Eimer, M. (1993). Effects of attention and stimulus probability on ERPs in a Go/Nogo task. 
Biological Psychology, 35(2), 123-138. 
Eimer, M. (2000). Event-related brain potentials distinguish processing stages involved in 
face perception and recognition. Clinical Neurophysiology, 111(4), 694-705. 
Eimer, M., & Holmes, A. (2002). An ERP study on the time course of emotional face 
processing. Neuroreport, 13(4), 427-431. 
Ekman, P. (1993). Facial expression and emotion. American Psychologist, 48(4), 384-392. 
Ekman, P. (1994). All emotions are basic. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The nature of 
emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 15–19). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion. : (pp. 45-60): John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1976). Pictures of facial affect. Palo Alto: CA: Consulting 
Psychologists. 
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identification of a 
target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception and Psychophysics, Vol 16(1), 143-149. 
Erk, S., Kiefer, M., Grothe, J., Wunderlich, A. P., Spitzer, M., & Walter, H. (2003). 
Emotional context modulates subsequent memory effect. Neuroimage, 18(2), 439-447. 
Erk, S., Martin, S., & Walter, H. (2005). Emotional context during encoding of neutral items 
modulates brain activation not only during encoding but also during recognition. 
Neuroimage, 26(3), 829-838. 
Fabiani, M., & Donchin, E. (1995). Encoding processes and memory organization: a model of 
the von Restorff effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology : Learning, Memory and 
Cognition, 21(1), 224-240. 
Fabiani, M., Karis, D., & Donchin, E. (1990). Effects of mnemonic strategy manipulation in a 
Von Restorff paradigm. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 
75(2), 22-35. 
Falkenstein, M. (2004). ERP correlates of erroneous performance. In M. Ullsperger & M. 
Falkenstein (Eds.), Errors, Conflicts, and the Brain. Current Opinions on 
Performance Monitoring (pp. 5-14). Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Human 
Cognitive and Brain Sciences. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
176 
Falkenstein, M., Hielscher, H., Dziobek, I., Schwarzenau, P., Hoormann, J., Sunderman, B., et 
al. (2001). Action monitoring, error detection, and the basal ganglia: an ERP study. 
Neuroreport, 12(1), 157-161. 
Falkenstein, M., Hohnsbein, J., Hoormann, J., & Blanke, L. (1991). Effects of crossmodal 
divided attention on late ERP components. II. Error processing in choice reaction 
tasks. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 78(6), 447-455. 
Falkenstein, M., Hoormann, J., Christ, S., & Hohnsbein, J. (2000). ERP components on 
reaction errors and their functional significance: a tutorial. Biological Psychology, 
51(2-3), 87-107. 
Falkenstein, M., Hoormann, J., & Hohnsbein, J. (1999). ERP components in Go/Nogo tasks 
and their relation to inhibition. Acta Psychologica, 101(2-3), 267-291. 
Fernandez, G., Weyerts, H., Tendolkar, I., Smid, H. G., Scholz, M., & Heinze, H. J. (1998). 
Event-related potentials of verbal encoding into episodic memory: dissociation 
between the effects of subsequent memory performance and distinctiveness. 
Psychophysiology, 35(6), 709-720. 
Fiedler, K. (2001). Affective states trigger processes of assimilation and accommodation. In 
G. L. Clore & L. L. Martin (Eds.), (pp. 85-99). Mahwah, NJ,: US: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Publishers. 
Fitzgerald, K. D., Welsh, R. C., Gehring, W. J., Abelson, J. L., Himle, J. A., Liberzon, I., et 
al. (2005). Error-related hyperactivity of the anterior cingulate cortex in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 57(3), 287-294. 
Friedman, D., Ritter, W., & Snodgrass, J. G. (1996). ERPs during study as a function of 
subsequent direct and indirect memory testing in young and old adults. Cognitive 
Brain Research, 4(1), 1-13. 
Friedman, D., & Sutton, S. (1987). Event-related potentials during continuous recognition 
memory. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology Supplement, 40, 316-
321. 
Frijda, N. H. (2000). Emotion theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(2), 199-+. 
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E., & Donchin, E. (1993). A neural 
system for error detection and compensation. Psychological Science, 4(6), 385–390. 
Gehring, W. J., Himle, J., & Nisenson, L. G. (2000). Action-monitoring dysfunction in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychological Science, 11(1), 1-6. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
177 
Gray, J. A. (1999). Cognition, emotion, consious experience and the Brain. In T. Dalgleish & 
M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 83-102). Sussex, U.K.: 
John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., & Simons, R. F. (2003a). Anxiety and error-related brain activity. 
Biological Psychology, 64(1-2), 77-90. 
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., & Simons, R. F. (2003b). To err is autonomic: error-related brain 
potentials, ANS activity, and post-error compensatory behavior. Psychophysiology, 
40(6), 895-903. 
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., & Simons, R. F. (2004). Error-related psychophysiology and 
negative affect. Brain and Cognition, 56(2), 189-197. 
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Yeung, N., & Simons, R. F. (2005). On the ERN and the 
significance of errors. Psychophysiology, 42(2), 151-160. 
Hajcak, G., & Simons, R. F. (2002). Error-related brain activity in obsessive-compulsive 
undergraduates. Psychiatry Research, 110(1), 63-72. 
Hamann, S. (2001). Cognitive and neural mechanisms of emotional memory. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 5(9), 394 - 400. 
Hamann, S., & Mao, H. (2002). Positive and negative emotional verbal stimuli elicit activity 
in the left amygdala. Neuroreport, 13(1), 15-19. 
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. (2002). The neural basis of human error processing: 
reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological 
Review, 109(4), 679-709. 
Holroyd, C. B., & Yeung, N. (2003). Alcohol and error processing. Trends in Neurosciences, 
26(8), 402-404. 
Hunt, R. R., & Lamb, C. A. (2001). What causes the isolation effect? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology : Learning, Memory and Cognition, 27(6), 1359-1366. 
Isen, A. M. (2001). An influence of positive affect on decision making in complex situations: 
Theoretical issues with practical implications. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
11(2), 75-85. 
Isen, A. M., Daubman, K. A., & Nowicki, G. P. (1987). Positive affect facilitates creative 
problem solving. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(6), 1122-1131. 
Ito, T. A., Larsen, J. T., Smith, N. K., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1998). Negative information weighs 
more heavily on the brain: the negativity bias in evaluative categorizations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75(4), 887-900. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
178 
James, W. (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind, 9(34), 188-205. 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York,: H. Holt and company, online 
available at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/index.htm. 
Jasper, H. H. (1958). The ten-twenty- electrode system of the international federation. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 10, 371-375. 
Jeffreys, D. A., & Tukmachi, E. S. A. (1992). The Vertex-Positive Scalp Potential Evoked by 
Faces and by Objects. Experimental Brain Research, 91(2), 340-350. 
Johannes, S., Wieringa, B. M., Nager, W., Dengler, R., & Münte, T. F. (2001). Oxazepam 
alters action monitoring. Psychopharmacology, 155(1), 100-106. 
Johnstone, T., Somerville, L. H., Alexander, A. L., Oakes, T. R., Davidson, R. J., Kalin, N. 
H., et al. (2005). Stability of amygdala BOLD response to fearful faces over multiple 
scan sessions. Neuroimage, 25(4), 1112-1123. 
Joyce, C. A., Gorodnitsky, I. F., & Kutas, M. (2004). Automatic removal of eye movement 
and blink artifacts from EEG data using blind component separation. 
Psychophysiology, 41(2), 313-325. 
Karama, S., Lecours, A. R., Leroux, J. M., Bourgouin, P., Beaudoin, G., Joubert, S., et al. 
(2002). Areas of brain activation in males and females during viewing of erotic film 
excerpts. Human Brain Mapping, 16(1), 1-13. 
Karis, D., Fabiani, M., & Donchin, E. (1984). "P300" and memory: Individual differences in 
the von Restorff effect. Cognitive Psychology, 16(2), 177-216. 
Keil, A., Bradley, M. M., Hauk, O., Rockstroh, B., Elbert, T., & Lang, P. J. (2002). Large-
scale neural correlates of affective picture processing. Psychophysiology, 39(5), 641-
649. 
Kemp, A. H., Silberstein, R. B., Armstrong, S. M., & Nathan, P. J. (2004). Gender differences 
in the cortical electrophysiological processing of visual emotional stimuli. 
Neuroimage, 21(2), 632-646. 
Kiehl, K. A., Liddle, P. F., & Hopfinger, J. B. (2000). Error processing and the rostral anterior 
cingulate: an event-related fMRI study. Psychophysiology, 37(2), 216-223. 
Kierkels, J. J., van Boxtel, G. J., & Vogten, L. L. (2006). A model-based objective evaluation 
of eye movement correction in EEG recordings. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical 
Engineering, 53(2), 246-253. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
179 
Kirchhoff, B. A., Wagner, A. D., Maril, A., & Stern, C. E. (2000). Prefrontal-temporal 
circuitry for episodic encoding and subsequent memory. Journal of Neuroscience, 
20(16), 6173-6180. 
Kok, A. (1997). Event-related-potential (ERP) reflections of mental resources: a review and 
synthesis. Biological Psychology, 45(1-3), 19-56. 
Kopp, B., Rist, F., & Mattler, U. (1996). N200 in the flanker task as a neurobehavioral tool 
for investigating executive control. Psychophysiology, 33(3), 282-294. 
Krohne, H. W., Pieper, M., Knoll, N., & Breimer, N. (2002). The cognitive regulation of 
emotions: The role of success versus failure experience and coping dispositions. 
Cognition and Emotion, 16(2), 217 243. 
LaBar, K. S., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., LeDoux, J. E., & Phelps, E. A. (1998). Human 
amygdala activation during conditioned fear acquisition and extinction: a mixed-trial 
fMRI study. Neuron, 20(5), 937-945. 
LaBar, K. S., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., & Phelps, E. A. (1998). Role Of The Amygdala in 
Emotional Picture Evaluation as Revealed By fMRI. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Supplement S, 108. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. (1997). International affective picture system 
(IAPS): Technical Manual and affective Ratings. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. (1999). International affective picture system 
(IAPS): instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical Report A-4, The Center 
for Research in Psychophysiology. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1998). Emotion and motivation: measuring 
affective perception. Journal of Clinical Neurophysiology, 15(5), 397-408. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., Fitzsimmons, J. R., Cuthbert, B. N., Scott, J. D., Moulder, B., et 
al. (1998). Emotional arousal and activation of the visual cortex: an fMRI analysis. 
Psychophysiology, 35(2), 199-210. 
Lang, P. J., & Greenwald, M. K. (1988). The international affective picture system 
standardization procedure and initial group results for affective judgement. 
Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida. 
Lang, P. J., Greenwald, M. K., Bradley, M. M., & Hamm, A. O. (1993). Looking at pictures: 
affective, facial, visceral, and behavioral reactions. Psychophysiology, 30(3), 261-273. 
Lange, C. (1887). Über Gemühtsbewegungen. Leipzig: Thomas, online at 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Lange/. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
180 
Larisch, R., Klimke, A., Vosberg, H., Loffler, S., Gaebel, W., & Muller-Gartner, H. W. 
(1997). In vivo evidence for the involvement of dopamine-D2 receptors in striatum 
and anterior cingulate gyrus in major depression. Neuroimage, 5(4 Pt 1), 251-260. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1999). The cognition-emotion debate: a bit of history. In T. Dalgleish & M. 
Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 3–19). Sussex, U.K.: John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
LeDoux, J. (1997). Parallel Memories: Putting Emotions Back Into The Brain: A Talk With 
Joseph LeDoux: http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ledoux/ledoux_p1.html. 
Lisman, J. E., & Grace, A. A. (2005). The hippocampal-VTA loop: controlling the entry of 
information into long-term memory. Neuron, 46(5), 703-713. 
Lundqvist, D., Flykt, A., & Öhman, A. (1998). The Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces. 
Stockholm, Sweden: Department of Neurosciences Karolinska Hospital. 
Luu, P., Collins, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2000). Mood, personality, and self-monitoring: 
negative affect and emotionality in relation to frontal lobe mechanisms of error 
monitoring. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(1), 43-60. 
Luu, P., & Pederson, S. M. (2004). The Anterior Cingulate Cortex: Regulating Actions in 
Context. In M. I. Posner (Ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Attention: New York, NY, 
US: Guilford Press. 
Maratos, E. J., Allan, K., & Rugg, M. D. (2000). Recognition memory for emotionally 
negative and neutral words: an ERP study. Neuropsychologia, 38(11), 1452-1465. 
Mayberg, H. S., Brannan, S. K., Mahurin, R. K., Jerabek, P. A., Brickman, J. S., Tekell, J. L., 
et al. (1997). Cingulate function in depression: a potential predictor of treatment 
response. Neuroreport, 8(4), 1057-1061. 
McIntosh, D. N. (1996). Facial feedback hypotheses: Evidence, implications, and directions. 
Motivation and Emotion, 20(2), 121-147. 
McNair, D. M., Lorr, M., & Doppleman, L. F. (1971). EITS – manual for Profile of Mood 
States. San Diego, California: Educational and Industrial Testing Service. 
Menon, V., Adleman, N. E., White, C. D., Glover, G. H., & Reiss, A. L. (2001). Error-related 
brain activation during a Go/NoGo response inhibition task. Human Brain Mapping, 
12(3), 131-143. 
Morris, J. S., Ohman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (1998). Conscious and unconscious emotional 
learning in the human amygdala. Nature, 393(6684), 467-470. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
181 
Murphy, F. C., Nimmo-Smith, I., & Lawrence, A. D. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of 
emotions: a meta-analysis. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 3(3), 
207-233. 
Neville, H. J., Kutas, M., Chesney, G., & Schmidt, A. L. (1986). Event-related brain 
potentials during initial encoding and recognition memory of congruous and 
incongruous words. Journal of Memory and Language, 25(1), 75-92. 
Nieuwenhuis, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., Blom, J., Band, G. P., & Kok, A. (2001). Error-related 
brain potentials are differentially related to awareness of response errors: evidence 
from an antisaccade task. Psychophysiology, 38(5), 752-760. 
Ochsner, K. N. (2000). Are affective events richly recollected or simply familiar? The 
experience and process of recognizing feelings past. Journal of Experimental 
Psycholology: General, 129(2), 242-261. 
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 9(5), 242-249. 
Ohman, A., Flykt, A., & Esteves, F. (2001). Emotion drives attention: detecting the snake in 
the grass. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130(3), 466-478. 
Otten, L. J., & Donchin, E. (2000). Relationship between P300 amplitude and subsequent 
recall for distinctive events: dependence on type of distinctiveness attribute. 
Psychophysiology, 37(5), 644-661. 
Paller, K. A., Kutas, M., & Mayes, A. R. (1987). Neural correlates of encoding in an 
incidental learning paradigm. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 
67(4), 360-371. 
Palomba, D., Angrilli, A., & Mini, A. (1997). Visual evoked potentials, heart rate responses 
and memory to emotional pictorial stimuli. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 27(1), 55-67. 
Patrick, C. J., & Lavoro, S. A. (1997). Ratings of emotional response to pictorial stimuli: 
Positive and negative affect. Motivation and Emotion, 21(4), 297-321. 
Phan, K. L., Wager, T., Taylor, S. F., & Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of 
emotion: a meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI. Neuroimage, 
16(2), 331-348. 
Phan, K. L., Wager, T. D., Taylor, S. F., & Liberzon, I. (2004). Functional neuroimaging 
studies of human emotions. CNS Spectrums, 9(4), 258-266. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
182 
Phelps, E. A., O'Connor, K. J., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., Grillon, C., & Davis, M. (2001). 
Activation of the left amygdala to a cognitive representation of fear. Nature 
Neuroscience, 4(4), 437-441. 
Polich, J., & Kok, A. (1995). Cognitive and Biological Determinants of P300 - an Integrative 
Review. Biological Psychology, 41(2), 103-146. 
Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 13, 25-42. 
Rabbitt, P. M. A. (1981). Sequential reactions. In D. Holding (Ed.), Human skills (pp. 153-
175). New York: Wiley. 
Rabbitt, P. M. A. (2002). Consciousness is slower than you think. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Section A: Human Experimental Psychology, 55(4), 1081-
1092. 
Ranganath, C., & Rainer, G. (2003). Neural mechanisms for detecting and remembering novel 
events. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(3), 193-202. 
Reisberg, D., & Hertel, P. (2004). Memory for Emotional Events. In D. Reisberg & F. Heuer 
(Eds.), Memory and Emotions (pp. 3-41). New York: US: Oxford University Press. 
Riba, J., Rodriguez-Fornells, A., Morte, A., Münte, T. F., & Barbanoj, M. J. (2005). 
Noradrenergic stimulation enhances human action monitoring. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 25(17), 4370-4374. 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., de Vlugt, Y., Bramlage, A., Spaan, M., Elton, M., Snel, J., et al. (2002). 
Alcohol consumption impairs detection of performance errors in mediofrontal cortex. 
Science, 298(5601), 2209-2211. 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E. A., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2004). The role of the 
medial frontal cortex in cognitive control. Science, 306(5695), 443-447. 
Robinson, M. D. (1998). Running from William James' bear: A review of preattentive 
mechanisms and their contributions to emotional experience. Cognition and Emotion, 
12(5), 667-696. 
Rolls, E. T. (1999). The brain and emotion (Reprinted ed.). Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Rolls, E. T. (2000). Precis of The brain and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(2), 
177-191; discussion 192-233. 
Rolls, E. T. (2004). The brain and emotion (Reprinted ed.). Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
183 
Rüsseler, J., Hennighausen, E., Münte, T. F., & Rösler, F. (2003). Differences in incidental 
and intentional learning of sensorimotor sequences as revealed by event-related brain 
potentials. Cognitive Brain Reseach, 15(2), 116-126. 
Rüsseler, J., & Rösler, F. (2000). Implicit and explicit learning of event sequences: evidence 
for distinct coding of perceptual and motor representations. Acta Psychologica, 
104(1), 45-67. 
Russell, J. A., & Carroll, J. M. (1999). On the bipolarity of positive and negative affect. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125(1), 3-30. 
Sawamoto, N., Honda, M., Okada, T., Hanakawa, T., Kanda, M., Fukuyama, H., et al. (2000). 
Expectation of pain enhances responses to nonpainful somatosensory stimulation in 
the anterior cingulate cortex and parietal operculum/posterior insula: an event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Neuroscience, 20(19), 7438-
7445. 
Scherer, K. R. (1994). Towards a concept of "Modal emotions". In P. Ekman & R. J. 
Davidson (Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 25-31). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Scherer, K. R. (2000). Psychological models of emotion. In J. C. Borod (Ed.), The 
neuropsychology of emotion.: New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
Scherer, K. R. (2005). What are emotions? And how can they be measured? Social Science 
Information, 44(4), 693-727. 
Schupp, H. T., Cuthbert, B. N., Bradley, M. M., Cacioppo, J. T., Ito, T., & Lang, P. J. (2000). 
Affective picture processing: the late positive potential is modulated by motivational 
relevance. Psychophysiology, 37(2), 257-261. 
Schupp, H. T., Junghöfer, M., Weike, A. I., & Hamm, A. O. (2003). Emotional facilitation of 
sensory processing in the visual cortex. Psychological Science, 14(1), 7-13. 
Schupp, H. T., Junghöfer, M., Weike, A. I., & Hamm, A. O. (2004). The selective processing 
of briefly presented affective pictures: an ERP analysis. Psychophysiology, 41(3), 441-
449. 
Schupp, H. T., Ohman, A., Junghöfer, M., Weike, A. I., Stockburger, J., & Hamm, A. O. 
(2004). The facilitated processing of threatening faces: an ERP analysis. Emotion, 
4(2), 189-200. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
184 
Simon-Thomas, E. R., & Knight, R. T. (2005). Affective and cognitive modulation of 
performance monitoring: behavioral and ERP evidence. Cognitive, Affective and 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 5(3), 362-372. 
Simons, R. F., Graham, F. K., Miles, M. A., & Chen, X. (2001). On the relationship of P3a 
and the Novelty-P3. Biological Psychology, 56(3), 207-218. 
Soussignan, R. (2002). Duchenne smile, emotional experience, and autonomic reactivity: a 
test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Emotion, 2(1), 52-74. 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and facilitating conditions of the 
human smile: a nonobtrusive test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54(5), 768-777. 
Strange, B. A., & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Adaptive anterior hippocampal responses to oddball 
stimuli. Hippocampus, 11(6), 690-698. 
Strange, B. A., Henson, R. N. A., Friston, K. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2000). Brain mechanisms for 
detecting perceptual, semantic, and emotional deviance. Neuroimage, 12(4), 425-433. 
Strange, B. A., Hurlemann, R., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). An emotion-induced retrograde 
amnesia in humans is amygdala- and beta-adrenergic-dependent. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), 100(23), 
13626-13631. 
Talairach, J., & Tournoux, P. (1988). Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human Brain: 
Three-Dimensional Proportional System. Stuttgart: Georg Thieme. 
Tracey, I., Ploghaus, A., Gati, J. S., Clare, S., Smith, S., Menon, R. S., et al. (2002). Imaging 
attentional modulation of pain in the periaqueductal gray in humans. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 22(7), 2748-2752. 
Tucker, D. M., Liotti, M., Potts, G. F., Russell, G. S., & Posner, M. I. (1994). Spatiotemporal 
analysis of brain electrical fields. Human Brain Mapping, 1(2), 134-152. 
Van 't Ent, D. (2002). Perceptual and motor contributions to performance and ERP 
components after incorrect motor activation in a flanker reaction task. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 113(2), 270-283. 
van Veen, V., & Carter, C. S. (2002a). The anterior cingulate as a conflict monitor: fMRI and 
ERP studies. Physiology and Behavior, 77(4-5), 477-482. 
Van Veen, V., & Carter, C. S. (2002b). The timing of action-monitoring processes in the 
anterior cingulate cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(4), 593-602. 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
185 
Verleger, R. (2000). Should We Really Use Different Estimates for Correcting EEG Artefacts 
Produced by Blinks and by Saccades? Journal of Psychophysiology, 14(4), 204-206. 
von Restorff, H. (1933). Ueber die Wirkung von Bereichsbildungen im Spurenfeld. 
Psychologische Forschung, 18, 299-342. 
Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I., & Taylor, S. F. (2003). Valence, gender, and 
lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: a meta-analysis of findings from 
neuroimaging. Neuroimage, 19(3), 513-531. 
Wager, T. D., Rilling, J. K., Smith, E. E., Sokolik, A., Casey, K. L., Davidson, R. J., et al. 
(2004). Placebo-induced changes in FMRI in the anticipation and experience of pain. 
Science, 303(5661), 1162-1167. 
Wagner, A. D., Koutstaal, W., & Schacter, D. L. (1999). When encoding yields remembering: 
insights from event-related neuroimaging. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 354(1387), 1307-1324. 
Wallace, W. P. (1965). Review of the historical, empirical, and theoretical status of the von 
Restorff phenomenon. Psychological Bulletin, 63(6), 410-424. 
Wallstrom, G. L., Kass, R. E., Miller, A., Cohn, J. F., & Fox, N. A. (2004). Automatic 
correction of ocular artifacts in the EEG: a comparison of regression-based and 
component-based methods. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 53(2), 105-
119. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. 
Wenzlaff, R. M., & Grozier, S. A. (1988). Depression and the magnification of failure. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97(1), 90-93. 
Whalen, P. J., Rauch, S. L., Etcoff, N. L., McInerney, S. C., Lee, M. B., & Jenike, M. A. 
(1998). Masked presentations of emotional facial expressions modulate amygdala 
activity without explicit knowledge. Journal of Neuroscience, 18(1), 411-418. 
Wierzbicka, A. (1999). Emotions across languages and cultures : diversity and universals. 
Cambridge: University Press. 
Wiswede, D., Rüsseler, J., Hasselbach, S., & Münte, T. F. (2006). Memory recall in arousing 
situations - an emotional von Restorff effect? BMC Neuroscience, 7, 57. 
Wiswede, D., Rüsseler, J., & Münte, T. F. (2007). Serial position effects in free memory 
recall – an ERP-study Biological Psychology, 75, 185-193. 
Emotional modulation of cognitive functions 
 
186 
Wrase, J., Klein, S., Gruesser, S. M., Hermann, D., Flor, H., Mann, K., et al. (2003). Gender 
differences in the processing of standardized emotional visual stimuli in humans: a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Neuroscience Letters, 348(1), 41-45. 
Wright, C. I., Martis, B., Schwartz, C. E., Shin, L. M., Fischer, H. H., McMullin, K., et al. 
(2003). Novelty responses and differential effects of order in the amygdala, substantia 
innominata, and inferior temporal cortex. Neuroimage, 18(3), 660-669. 
Wu, J., Buchsbaum, M. S., Gillin, J. C., Tang, C., Cadwell, S., Wiegand, M., et al. (1999). 
Prediction of antidepressant effects of sleep deprivation by metabolic rates in the 
ventral anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 156(8), 1149-1158. 
Wundt, W. (1905). Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. Leipzig: Engelmann. 
Yeung, N., Cohen, J. D., & Botvinick, M. M. (2004). The neural basis of error detection: 
conflict monitoring and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 111(4), 
931-959. 
Yip, J. T., & Lee, T. M. (2006). Selective impairment of sadness and disgust recognition in 
abstinent ecstasy users. Neuropsychologia, 44(6), 959-965. 
Young, A. W., Perrett, D. I., Calder, A. J., Sprengelmeyer, R., & Ekman, P. (2002). Facial 
expressions of emotion: stimuli and tests (FEEST). Bury St. Edmunds (UK): Thames 
Valley Test Company. 
Zald, D. H. (2003). The human amygdala and the emotional evaluation of sensory stimuli. 
Brain Research Reviews, 41(1), 88-123. 
Zalla, T., Koechlin, E., Pietrini, P., Basso, G., Aquino, P., Sirigu, A., et al. (2000). 
Differential amygdala responses to winning and losing: a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging study in humans. European Journal of Neuroscience, 12(5), 1764-
1770. 
 
 
Daniel Wiswede 
 
187 
8. Appendix 
 
IAPS # motive arousal valence 
3000 Mutilation  7.3 1.5 
3010 Mutilation  7.2 1.7 
3030 Mutilation  6.8 1.9 
3053 Burn_victim 6.9 1.3 
3060 Mutilation  7.1 1.8 
3080 Mutilation  7.2 1.5 
3170 Baby tumor  7.2 1.5 
3266 Injury  6.8 1.6 
3530 Attack  6.8 1.8 
4490 Erotic male  6.1 6.3 
4607 Erotic couple 6.3 7.0 
4608 Erotic couple 6.5 7.1 
4656 Erotic couple 6.4 6.7 
6230 Aimed Gun 7.4 2.4 
6260 Aimed Gun  6.9 2.4 
6313 Attack  6.9 2.0 
6350 Attack  7.3 1.9 
6540 Attack  6.8 2.2 
9405 Sliced hand 6.1 1.8 
9410 Soldier 7.1 1.5 
total mean  6.9 2.8 
total SD  .4 2.1 
Appendix 1: Arousal and valence ratings for arousing background stimuli, study 3.2 
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IAPS # motive arousal valence 
1120 Snake 7.2 3.0 
3030 Mutilation 7.1 1.5 
3064 Mutilation 7.3 1.2 
3071 Mutilation 7.1 1.7 
3120 Dead body 7.5 1.3 
3140 Dead body 6.9 1.5 
3170 Baby tumor 7.6 1.2 
6350 Attack 7.5 1.4 
6510 Attack 7.2 2.1 
6540 Attack 7.1 1.9 
total mean  7.3 1.7 
total SD  0.2 0.6 
Appendix 2: Arousal and valence ratings for arousing background stimuli, study 3.3 
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neutral Happy Fearful 
MC01_Hap_000% MC01_Hap_100% MC01_Fea_100% 
MC02_Hap_000% MC02_Hap_100% MC02_Fea_100% 
MC03_Hap_000% MC03_Hap_100% MC03_Fea_100% 
MC04_Hap_000% MC04_Hap_100% MC04_Fea_100% 
MC05_Hap_000% MC05_Hap_100% MC05_Fea_100% 
MC06_Hap_000% MC06_Hap_100% MC06_Fea_100% 
MC07_Hap_000% MC07_Hap_100% MC07_Fea_100% 
MC08_Hap_000% MC08_Hap_100% MC08_Fea_100% 
MC09_Hap_000% MC09_Hap_100% MC09_Fea_100% 
MC10_Hap_000% MC10_Hap_100% MC10_Fea_100%. 
Appendix 3: list of all face pictures used in study 4.2.  
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Emotion IAPS # Motive Valence Arousal
7020 Fan 2.2 4.9
7175 Lamp 1.9 5.0 
7050 Hairdryer 2.9 5.0 
7080 Fork 2.7 5.1 
7217 Clothes rack 2.6 5.0 
7006 Bowl 2.6 5.1 
7035 Mug 2.8 5.2 
7034 Hammer 3.0 4.9 
7010 Basket 2.0 4.9 
neutral 
7185 Abstract art 2.7 5.1 
Mean neutral   2.5 5.0 
SD neutral   0.4 0.1 
5760 Nature 3.7 8.4 
2057 Father 4.7 8.4 
2260 Baby 4.8 8.5 
1610 Rabbit 3.3 8.4 
1710 Puppies 5.3 8.6 
5830 Sunset 4.9 8.5 
2050 Baby 5.1 8.6 
1460 Kitten 4.4 8.6 
1750 Bunnies 4.0 8.6 
pleasant 
2040 Baby 5.0 8.7 
Mean pleasant   4.5 8.5 
SD pleasant   0.6 0.1 
3060 Mutilation 7.3 1.7 
3051 Mutilation 6.0 2.1 
6550 Attack 7.2 2.1 
3261 Tumor 5.9 1.7 
9571 Cat 6.5 1.4 
3400 Severed hand 7.1 2.1 
3102 Burn victim 7.2 1.2 
6313 Attack 7.3 1.6 
3100 Burn victim 7.0 1.4 
unpleasant 
3000 Mutilation 7.8 1.2 
Mean unpleasant   6.9 1.6 
SD unpleasant   0.6 0.3 
Appendix 4: Arousal and valence ratings for arousing background stimuli, study 4.3.
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ASTS © Dalbert, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg 
MOMENTANES BEFINDEN 
Nachfolgend finden Sie eine Liste mit Wörtern, die verschiedene Gefühle und 
Gefühlszustände beschreiben. Bitte lesen Sie sorgfältig jedes einzelne Wort und kreuzen Sie 
dann die Zahl an, die am besten Ihren Gefühlszustand im Moment beschreibt. Bitte machen 
Sie bei jeder Aussage ein Kreuz. 
  
sehr stark 
stark 
ziem
lich 
etw
as 
schw
ach 
sehr schw
ach 
überhaupt nicht 
1 zornig 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
2 abgeschlafft 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
3 unglücklich 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4 traurig 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
5 angenehm 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
6 betrübt 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7 freudig 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
8 hoffnungslos 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
9 müde 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
10 verärgert 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
11 frohgemut 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
12 entmutigt 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
13 fröhlich 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
14 erschöpft 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
15 heiter 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
16 verzweifelt 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
17 wütend 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
18 entkräftet 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
19 lustig 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Bitte überprüfen Sie nochmals, ob Sie kein Wort ausgelassen haben. 
Appendix 5: The ASTS Questionaire “Aktuelle Stimmungsskala”; “current feeling”.
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German word English translation 
zornig angrily, angry, irate, wrathful 
abgeschlafft ? 
unglücklich to feel blue, unhappy  
traurig sad, cheerless, doleful 
angenehm convenient  
betrübt unhappy, sad, afflicted 
freudig glad, joyful 
hoffnungslos hopeless 
müde tired 
verärgert angry, annoyed, displeased 
frohgemut cheerful, in good spirit 
entmutigt discouraged 
fröhlich cheerful, happy, blitheful  
erschöpft exhausted, jaded 
heiter blithe 
verzweifelt desperate 
wütend enraged, furious 
entkräftet enervated, devitalized 
lustig blithe, merry 
Appendix 6: Translation of German ASTS questionnaire, source for translation: 
http://dict.leo.org/.  
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Appendix 7: Figures a) to c) show the percentage of correct responses given when 50% 
of the errors were committed; separately for each subject. A value close to 50 (dashed 
line) indicates that errors were equally distributed across the experiment. Values lower 
than 50 indicate that the subject made more errors at the beginning of the experiment. 
a) experiment 4.2 b) experiment 4.3 c) experiment 4.5. 
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